Hensley v. Hensley

20 Citing cases

  1. Jazz Builders, Inc. v. Earth Energy Sys., Inc.

    A139221 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2016)

    Thus, an appeal from the denial of a section 473 motion must rest on aggrievement from an underlying adverse judgment. Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895 (Hensley) is illustrative. In that case, a neighbor dispute over hillside slippage, the plaintiff, Campbell, sued her neighbors, the Hensleys, for negligent excavation.

  2. Alvarez v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

    187 Cal.App.4th 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 17 times
    In Alvarez, a panel qualified medical examiner (PQME) telephoned defense counsel and requested copies of records that the PQME could not locate.

    Contrary to respondents' argument, whether a party is an "aggrieved party" under section 4062.3 has nothing to do with prejudice. It is concerned with whether the party has standing and is a proper party to seek review. (See, e.g., County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953]; Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 898-899 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684]; San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State of California (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 54 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 525].) Nevertheless, an ex parte communication may be so insignificant and inconsequential that any resulting repercussion would be unreasonable.

  3. Sampson v. Parking Service 2000 Com, Inc.

    117 Cal.App.4th 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 30 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Second, although the attorney fees order was in Sampson's favor, because it was significantly less than he requested it was "unfavorable," thus rendering him an "aggrieved" party for purposes of this appeal. (See generally, Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 899 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684].) CONTENTIONS

  4. Efstratis v. First Northern Bank

    59 Cal.App.4th 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 12 times

    Although plaintiff Lank Development Corporation (whose sole shareholder is plaintiff Efstratis) purported to join in the notice of appeal, there is no showing it is in any respect an aggrieved party. We thus dismiss the corporation's purported appeal for want of standing (Code Civ. Proc., § 902 [undesignated section references will be to this code]; Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684]), and adjust the caption accordingly. BACKGROUND

  5. Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23

    42 Cal.App.4th 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 195 times
    Holding that "interference with the market" theory of liability could not be employed to prove the tort, which "applies to interference with existing noncontractual relations which hold the promise of future economic advantage"

    Even were we to treat Safeway's cross-appeal as having been taken from the judgment rather than from a nonappealable order (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, §§ 82, 87, pp. 104-105, 108-109), Safeway fails to show it was in any way aggrieved by a judgment entirely in its favor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 898 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684].) Indeed, Safeway offers no argument in support of its cross-appeal other than to claim any error in the judgment was harmless because the court should have granted its motion for summary judgment for the reasons set out in its voluminous petition for writ of mandate.

  6. Schmidt v. Retirement Board

    37 Cal.App.4th 1204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 16 times

    ( County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953].) In support of its contention that appellant is not an aggrieved party, respondent cites Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684]. In Hensley, the defendants argued that the trial court should have modified, rather than set aside, a default money judgment entered against them.

  7. Knight v. McMahon

    26 Cal.App.4th 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 11 times
    In Knight, a majority of the Court of Appeal relied on Tripp, supra, 17 Cal.3d 671, to conclude that administrative law judges may award section 3287(a) interest in the same proceeding in which they issue an award of retroactive in-home supportive services (Welf.

    "`. . . [Appellant's] interest "`must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.'"'" ( Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 899 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684]; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953].) Here appellant's petition specifically alleged that the administrative law judge erred in failing to award interest and that she was injured by having to litigate the issue which should have been resolved at the administrative hearing. Respondents filed no answer to the petition.

  8. In re Marriage of Brockman

    194 Cal.App.3d 1035 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 32 times

    It is "well settled by statute, case law, and logic that only an aggrieved party may bring the appeal." ( Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 898 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 684].) "`A fundamental precept of appellate procedure is that "if the judgment or order is in favor of a party he is not aggrieved and cannot appeal.

  9. Atlas Constr. Supply, Inc. v. Builders

    60 Cal.App.5th 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    In fact, the authority is to the contrary."]; Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 899, 235 Cal.Rptr. 684 ["Although the [defendants] will have to defend the case on its merits, the possibility of an adverse judgment in the future does not make them ‘aggrieved’ parties."].)

  10. Hong Lien T. Pham v. Brent V.N. Pham (In re Marriage of Hong Lien T Pham)

    No. G056996 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 2, 2020)

    "It is an elementary and fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a judgment or order will not be disturbed on an appeal prosecuted by a party who consented to it." (Sorensen v. Lascy (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 606, 608; see Delagrange v. Sacramento Sav. & Loan Assn. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 828, 831 ["Having consented to the judgment of dismissal, [plaintiff] may not appeal therefrom"]; see also Hensley v. Hensley (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 895, 898-900 [holding that a party could not appeal the trial court's order setting aside a default judgment—rather than merely modifying it—because the party had argued to the court that it could set aside the judgment].) In this case, Nguyen did not merely consent to being left out of the marital dissolution case, she demanded it.