Opinion
NUMBER 11-94-JJB-DLD
10-05-2011
DONALD HENSLEY, JR. (#112218) v. BURL CAIN, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the U. S. District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 5, 2011.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DOCIA L. DALBY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONALD HENSLEY, JR. (#112218)
VERSUS
BURL CAIN, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
NUMBER 11-94-JJB-DLD
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT
Before the court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Record document number 24. The motion is opposed.
Record document number 25.
Background
Pro se plaintiff, an inmate confined at Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Burl Cain and unidentified medical and food services personnel. Plaintiff alleged that he became ill after being served food he believed was spoiled. Plaintiff alleged that after becoming ill, he was denied adequate medical treatment for his severe gastrointestinal pain in violation of his constitutional rights.
Warden Cain moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), Fed.R.Civ.P., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The unidentified defendants were not served with the summons and complaint and did not participate in the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Applicable Law and Analysis
Subsection (c)(1) of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e provides the following:
(c) Dismissal.--(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). The Supreme Court recently expounded upon the Twombly standard, explaining that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ____ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. It follows that "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not 'show[n] — 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed ... and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted). But even a pro se complainant must plead "factual matter" that permits the court to infer "more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. The court need not accept "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," or "naked assertions [of unlawful misconduct] devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. at 1949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant argued that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity insofar as the plaintiff sued him in his official capacity.
The distinction between personal and official capacity suits was clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hafer v. Melo, et al, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). A suit against a state official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the state. Id., 502 U.S. at 25, 112 S.Ct. at 361, citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985). Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named individual, the "entity's 'policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law." Graham, supra, at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105.
Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under of color of state law. A showing that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right is enough to establish personal liability in a section 1983 action. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25, 112 S.Ct. at 362.
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), makes it clear that the distinction between official-capacity suits and personal-capacity suits is more than a "mere pleading device." Officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2311, n. 10, quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167, 105 S.Ct. at 3106, n. 14. Thus, the plaintiff may recover money damages against the defendant insofar as the defendant was sued in his individual capacity for actions taken by him under color of state law which caused the deprivation of constitutional rights. Additionally, because the plaintiff sought prospective injunctive relief his claim against the defendant in his official capacity is also actionable under § 1983. Of course, the plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a constitutional right to obtain any relief, whether in the form of damages or prospective injunctive relief.
Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff alleged that Warden Cain failed to adequately supervise the actions of food services personnel to ensure that inmates were not served spoiled food.
To be liable under § 1983, a person must either be personally involved in the acts causing the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the act of that person and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1983).
Supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1987); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917, 107 S.Ct. 1369 (1987) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978)). The existence of a constitutionally deficient policy cannot be inferred from a single wrongful act. O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 609, 610 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985)).
Plaintiff did not allege that the defendant implemented a constitutionally deficient policy. Rather, the plaintiff conceded that there are standards, regulations and directives in place governing sanitary food preparation and service at the state penitentiary which were simply not followed by food services personnel. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that food preparation and service is governed by ACA Standards 3-4294, 3-4298, 3-4303, 34307 and 3-4309, as well as LSP Department Regulation C-06-001 and LSP Directive No. 11.003. Plaintiff did not allege that these policies are constitutionally deficient or that Warden Cain knew or believed that the food preparation and service procedures in effect would result in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
RECOMMENDATION
It is the recommendation of the magistrate judge that the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of Burl Cain be granted and the claims against him be dismissed and this matter be referred back to the magistrate judge for further proceedings on the plaintiff's medical indifference claim.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 5, 2011.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DOCIA L. DALBY