OpinionReported below, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 982 N.Y.S.2d 627.Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied [see 23 N.Y.3d 908, 992 N.Y.S.2d 797, 16 N.E.3d 1277 (2014) ]. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.

Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, DeFilippo was not entitled to receive General Municipal Law § 207–c benefits pending a determination by the hearing officer. Although a recipient of such benefits is entitled to a due process hearing prior to the suspension or reduction of those benefits (see Matter ofDeMasi v. Benefico, 34 A.D.3d 472, 473, 823 N.Y.S.2d 537 ), the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that DeFilippo was not receiving such benefits when she applied for benefits in 2016, and that she had, in fact, returned to unrestricted duty eight years earlier (see General Municipal Law § 207–c[1] ; Matter ofMiele v. Town of Clarkstown, 299 A.D.2d 362, 362, 749 N.Y.S.2d 274 ; Matter ofHensel v. City of Utica, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 1218, 982 N.Y.S.2d 627 ). Accordingly, the Sheriff's Office properly treated her application as one for new benefits.

Although the hearing officer's findings are entitled to considerable weight, they are not conclusive and may be overruled by the administrative authority, provided that the final determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter ofSimpson v. Wolansky, 38 N.Y.2d 391, 394, 380 N.Y.S.2d 630, 343 N.E.2d 274 ; Matter ofStevens v. Axelrod, 162 A.D.2d 1025, 1026, 557 N.Y.S.2d 809 ). Here, where the medical evidence was in conflict, it was for the administrative agency to choose between the conflicting opinions, and the courts are not free to reject the choice made by the administrative agency where room for choice exists (see Matter ofCampo v. City of Mount Vernon, 156 A.D.3d at 694–695, 67 N.Y.S.3d 277 ; Matter ofHensel v. City of Utica, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 1218, 982 N.Y.S.2d 627 ; Matter ofClouse v. Allegany County, 46 A.D.3d 1381, 1382, 849 N.Y.S.2d 372 ). The testimony and opinion of the physician who examined the petitioner on behalf of the respondents was rational and fact-based and, since a reasonable mind could accept that testimony and opinion, the determination of the respondents is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter ofMankowski v. Nassau County, 160 A.D.3d 739, 742–743, 76 N.Y.S.3d 58 ; see also300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ).

Following a hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that petitioner was able to perform his light-duty assignment in the camera room and thus was not totally disabled. We agree with respondent that the Hearing Officer's determination that petitioner could continue to perform the duties of a camera monitor is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Hensel v City of Utica, 115 AD3d 1217, 1218, lv denied 23 NY3d 908, rearg denied 24 NY3d 975; Matter of Quintana v City of Buffalo, 114 AD3d 1222, 1223-1224, lv denied 23 NY3d 902; Matter of Clouse v Allegany County, 46 AD3d 1381, 1381-1382). Although petitioner presented evidence suggesting that he was not able to work at all, the Hearing Officer instead credited other evidence that petitioner could perform a light-duty assignment. "The Hearing Officer was entitled to weigh the parties' conflicting medical evidence" (Clouse, 46 AD3d at 1382), and " [w]e may not weigh the evidence or reject [the Hearing Officer's] choice where the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice exists' " (id., quoting Matter of CUNY-Hostos Community Coll. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 NY2d 69, 75; see Matter of Anderson v City of Buffalo, 114 AD3d 1160, 1161; Quintana, 114 AD3d at 1224).

We agree with respondent that the Hearing Officer's determination that petitioner could continue to perform the duties of a camera monitor is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Hensel v. City of Utica, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 1218, 982 N.Y.S.2d 627, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 908, 2014 WL 2936032, rearg. denied 24 N.Y.3d 975, 995 N.Y.S.2d 699, 20 N.E.3d 644 ; Matter of Quintana v. City of Buffalo, 114 A.D.3d 1222, 1223–1224, 979 N.Y.S.2d 760, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 902, 2014 WL 1775991 ; Matter of Clouse v. Allegany County, 46 A.D.3d 1381, 1381–1382, 849 N.Y.S.2d 372 ).

Respondents issued a final determination comporting with the Hearing Officer's recommendation. On this record, we are constrained to conclude that respondents' determination that there was no causal link between petitioner's alleged injuries and the accident is supported by substantial evidence ( see Matter of Hensel v. City of Utica, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 1218, 982 N.Y.S.2d 627, lv. denied23 N.Y.3d 908, 2014 WL 2936032, rearg. denied24 N.Y.3d 975, 995 N.Y.S.2d 699, 20 N.E.3d 644).

Contrary to the petitioners' contention, DeFilippo was not entitled to receive General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits pending a determination by the hearing officer. Although a recipient of such benefits is entitled to a due process hearing prior to the suspension or reduction of those benefits (see Matter of DeMasi v Benefico, 34 A.D.3d 472, 473), the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that DeFilippo was not receiving such benefits when she applied for benefits in 2016, and that she had, in fact, returned to unrestricted duty eight years earlier (see General Municipal Law § 207-c[1]; Matter of Miele v Town of Clarkstown, 299 A.D.2d 362, 362; Matter of Hensel v City of Utica, 115 A.D.3d 1217, 1218). Accordingly, the Sheriff s Office properly treated her application as one for new benefits.