Opinion
No. 1071 C.D. 2013
04-03-2014
Matthew J. Henschel, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
Matthew J. Henschel (Licensee), pro se, appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) denying his appeal from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege for refusing to submit to chemical testing after his arrest for violating Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3802 (relating to driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol or controlled substance). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court.
Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b)(1)(i), provides:
(b) Suspension for refusal.-
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person as follows:
(i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a period of 12 months.
On August 4, 2012, Officers Peter Dewey and Nate Correll of the Bushkill Township Police Department responded to a police dispatcher's report of a single-vehicle accident in the 200 block of East Mountain Road in Wind Gap, Pennsylvania. The officers ultimately learned that the accident occurred at a bluegrass music festival (Bluegrass Festival) being held on the property of the Appalachian Fiddle and Bluegrass Association (Bluegrass Association). Upon entering the Bluegrass Association's parking lot, the officers observed a blue Ford Explorer that appeared to have crashed into the woods. When the officers approached the vehicle, Licensee was asleep in the driver's seat, and the keys were in the ignition but the engine was not running. While speaking with Licensee, Officer Dewey detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle, and Licensee admitted that he had been drinking at the Bluegrass Festival. After administering field sobriety tests, Officer Dewey asked Licensee to take a breath test, but Licensee refused. Licensee was placed under arrest for suspicion of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and transported to the Northampton County DUI Processing Center for a blood draw. However, Licensee refused to submit to a blood test.
Shortly thereafter, Licensee received notice from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) that his operating privilege was suspended for a period of one year, effective October 9, 2012, pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code for refusal to submit to chemical testing. Licensee appealed the suspension to the trial court.
At the hearing, Officer Dewey testified that at 3:00 a.m. on August 4, 2012, he and Officer Correll responded to a 911 call that a vehicle "was crashed into the woods." (February 7, 2013 Hearing Transcript at 7). He stated that when they arrived at the Bluegrass Association property, he observed that the back end of Licensee's vehicle was in the parking lot area but the front end was in the woods, pointed at a downward angle and covered with brush and broken tree branches. Officer Dewey testified that the grass around the vehicle was damp with dew and that tire tracks were visible leading from the parking lot to the vehicle. He explained that there was condensation on the surface of the vehicle, but the hood above the engine compartment was dry, which led him to believe that the engine had been running before he had arrived on the scene. According to Officer Dewey, when he awakened Licensee and advised him that he was responding to a report that a vehicle had crashed into the woods, Licensee admitted to him that "he was drinking at the Bluegrass Festival," but explained that he had parked his car with its front end in the woods "to get out of the way of the sun so he didn't bake in his car." (Id. at 12). On cross-examination, Officer Dewey stated that there was no alcohol in Licensee's vehicle at the time of the arrest, but conceded that Licensee could have consumed alcohol after parking the vehicle and thrown the bottle(s) in the trash prior to falling asleep.
Officer Dewey also introduced several photographs into evidence depicting the vehicle's condition.
Licensee's counsel explained that Licensee was a guest at the Bluegrass Festival, a weekend-long event at which the attendees camp overnight. He conceded that Licensee had consumed alcohol at the festival, but argued that Licensee was merely sleeping in his car well after the festival had ended, and that there was no objective evidence indicating that Licensee had operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Albert Frank LePosa, the Bluegrass Association's grounds manager, testified that Licensee's vehicle was not parked in violation of any Bluegrass Association rules or regulations and that sleeping in one's vehicle is permitted at the Bluegrass Association's property.
Finding Officer Dewey's testimony credible, the trial court denied Licensee's appeal. The trial court explained that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Dewey had reasonable grounds to conclude that Licensee had been in actual physical control of his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and cited several facts supporting this conclusion, including: (1) the 911 caller reported that a vehicle "crashed into the woods;" (2) the vehicle appeared to have crashed into the woods; (3) the vehicle was in a crowded parking lot at a busy music festival, which suggests that if it had been in its apparently-crashed position for an extended period of time, the officers would have received an earlier 911 call; (4) the damp grass showed visible tire tracks leading from the parking lot to the vehicle; (5) the vehicle's hood was dry; and (6) Licensee was alone behind the wheel with the key in the ignition. The trial court also distinguished Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 737 A.2d 1203 (1999), and Solomon v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 966 A.2d 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), the two cases cited by Licensee in support of his argument. The trial court explained that in those cases, the officers were checking on suspicious vehicles, not responding to a 911 call; the cars were parked appropriately as opposed to being crashed into the woods; and the officers found no physical evidence that the cars had been running shortly before the officers' arrival, as the officers found here. Finally, the trial court rejected the alternative hypothesis suggested by Licensee's counsel that Licensee entered the vehicle while sober, drove it into the woods, and then consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication, noting that this theory is inconsistent with the aforementioned facts and is less likely than the series of inferences drawn by Officer Dewey. This appeal followed, in which Licensee again argues that he was merely sleeping in his vehicle, and that Officer Dewey did not have reasonable grounds to conclude that he operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law have been committed or whether the trial court's determinations demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion. Lanthier v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 22 A.3d 346, 350 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
In order to sustain a suspension of a licensee's operating privilege under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code for a refusal to submit to chemical testing, PennDOT must establish that the licensee (1) was arrested for driving under the influence by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned that refusal might result in a license suspension. Lanthier, 22 A.3d at 348.
The only issue here is whether PennDOT met its burden of proving that Officer Dewey had reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee operated or physically controlled the vehicle's movement while under the influence of alcohol. In assessing whether PennDOT has met this burden, we consider the totality of the circumstances and determine, as a matter of law, whether a person in the position of the arresting officer could have reasonably reached this conclusion. Helt v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 856 A.2d 263, 266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). As this Court has noted:
The parties stipulated that Officer Vincent Bruneo provided Licensee with valid warnings and that Licensee refused to submit to chemical testing of his blood. (See February 7, 2013 Hearing Transcript at 36-38). --------
The test for whether a police officer has reasonable grounds for believing a motorist is intoxicated is not very demanding. Reasonable grounds exist if the officer could have concluded the licensee drove the vehicle. An officer's belief that the licensee was driving will justify a request to submit to chemical testing if one reasonable interpretation of the circumstances supports the officer's belief. ...
Further ... it is not necessary for an arresting officer to actually observe the licensee operating the vehicle, nor does the existence of reasonable alternative
conclusions bar the arresting officer's actual belief from being reasonable.Schlag v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 963 A.2d 598, 603 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court that Officer Dewey had reasonable grounds to conclude that Licensee was in actual physical control of his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. It is undisputed that Licensee was intoxicated at the time of his arrest, and there is ample objective evidence suggesting that Licensee had driven his vehicle shortly before the officers arrived.
Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of April, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, dated May 23, 2013, at No. C-0048-CV-2012-9675, is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge