Opinion
03-22-00386-CR
05-24-2024
Christopher Henry, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
Do Not Publish
FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 82621, THE HONORABLE PAUL L. LEPAK, JUDGE PRESIDING.
Before Triana, Kelly, and Smith, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Edward Smith, Justice.
Appellant Christopher Henry was convicted by a jury of capital murder and sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.31(a)(2), 19.03(a)(2). Henry contends that his written judgment of conviction is at variance with the trial judge's oral pronouncement of sentence, which Henry asserts was for life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, its procedural history, and the evidence adduced at trial, we do not recite them in this opinion except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the reasons for it. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.1, .4.
Henry was convicted of capital murder, which he committed when he was over 18 years old. The State did not seek the death penalty in this case, and, after a hearing on punishment, the trial judge pronounced Henry's sentence:
THE COURT: Mr. Henry, having found you guilty of capital murder, having accepted the jury's verdict I will impose a sentence of life in prison and should parole laws change you will be given credit for any time that you have spent in the county jail prior to disposition of the case.
Are there any additional matters to be taken up at this time?
THE STATE: Your Honor, are you pronouncing sentence that this is life without parole?
THE COURT: I don't make that decision. If the parole laws change and he can get parole, then he can get parole. It's a life sentence on a capital murder conviction. My understanding is under current parole law that's life without parole but I don't tell them how to do their business.
The written judgment of conviction states that the punishment assessed was "LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE." This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Henry contends that the trial court orally pronounced a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole; that because there is a variance between the pronouncement and the written judgment, the pronouncement controls; and that the Court must reform the written judgment to reflect the correct sentence.
Subsection 12.31(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code provides:
An individual adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the state does not seek the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for . . . life without parole, if the individual committed the offense when 18 years of age or older.Id. at § 12.31(a)(2).
"The assessment of punishment entails three components: the verdict, the judgment, and the sentence." Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d 511, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A trial court's pronouncement of sentence, which is "the appealable event," Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), is oral, while "'the judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement,'" Ette, 559 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). A trial judge may not "orally pronounce one sentence in front of the defendant, but enter a different sentence in his written judgment, outside the defendant's presence." Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 136. To do so "violates any notion of constitutional due process and fair notice." Id. As a general rule, when the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment vary, "the oral pronouncement controls." Ette, 559 S.W.3d at 516 (citing Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135). In such cases, "[t]he solution . . . is to reform the written judgment to conform to the sentence that was orally pronounced." Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
There was no variance between the trial court's pronouncement and the written judgment in this case. The trial judge stated that Henry's time-served would only affect the calculation of his sentence "should the parole laws change"; that "[i]f the parole laws change[,] . . . then he can get parole"; and that "under current parole law," "a life sentence on a capital murder conviction . . . [is] life without parole." Although the trial court mentioned hypothetical changes in the law during sentencing, its pronouncement remained clear: because Henry was over 18 years of age when he committed the offense, and the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court was obligated to impose the statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without parole. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.31(a)(2). Accordingly, because there was no variance between the sentence pronounced and that reflected in the written judgment, we need not reform the latter. We overrule Henry's sole issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Henry's only issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
Affirmed.