Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary intention plainly appears, . . . Duncan Medical Services v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Com'n., 1994 OK 91, ¶ 18, 911 P.2d 247, 253-54; Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 15, 833 P.2d 1218, 1228; Hess v. Excise Bd. of McCurtain County, 1985 OK 28, ¶ 6, 698 P.2d 930, 932. J.C. Penney relies on Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J. Super. 14, 490 A.2d 320 (1985), for an extension of the statutory presumption to merchandise worn in plain view. There, the court held that the meaning of the words "concealed unpurchased merchandise" need not be limited to merchandise which is hidden or out of sight, but that in keeping with the legislative objectives may be construed as applying to items in plain view but worn or carried as though they had been purchased.

"Because of the seriousness of the shoplifting problem, this court has concluded that [the Act] must be construed in a manner reasonably calculated to carry out its objective of protecting the merchant from shoplifting and safeguarding the innocent customer." Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J. Super. 14, 17, 490 A.2d 320 (App.Div. 1985). While it is undisputed that Liptak removed a coupon from the inside of one package of panty hose and from the outside of two other packages, the parties disagree as to whether those coupons qualify as "merchandise" under the Act.

Placing an object in the pocket or wearing it while exiting the store is considered concealment. See Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J. Super. 14, 18 (App.Div. 1985). Additionally, the judge considered that Evans had purchased $592.30 worth of clothing that evening, that she had told the store detective she had forgotten to pay for the bow and offered to pay for it, and that apparently Evans had no criminal record.

This requirement balances the interests of the merchant, on the one hand, to protect itself from shoplifters, and the interests of the public, on the other hand, to be free from being detained without a good and sufficient cause. See Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J.Super. 14, 490 A.2d 320, 322 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1985) (per curiam) (stating that the merchant's privilege statute “must be construed in a manner reasonably calculated to carry out its objective of protecting the merchant from shoplifting and safeguarding the innocent customer” and stating that a merchant may not act without cause); J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So.2d 679, 684 (1963) (stating that, on the one hand, such statutes protect merchants from shoplifters and, on the other hand, they do not give merchants complete power and authority to detain, search, and accuse customers of stealing upon the mere whim of a merchant or its employees). The burden is on the merchant to demonstrate probable cause and that probable cause was present at the time the detention commenced.

This requirement balances the interests of the merchant, on the one hand, to protect itself from shoplifters, and the interests of the public, on the other hand, to be free from being detained without a good and sufficient cause. See Henry v. Shopper's World, 490 A.2d 320, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (per curiam) (stating that the merchant's privilege statute "must be construed in a manner reasonably calculated to carry out its objective of protecting the merchant from shoplifting and safeguarding the innocent customer" and stating that a merchant may not act without cause); J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 148 So. 2d 679, 684 (Miss. 1963) (stating that, on the one hand, such statutes protect merchants from shoplifters and, on the other hand, they do not give merchants complete power and authority to detain, search, and accuse customers of stealing upon the mere whim of a merchant or its employees).

In Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J.Super. 14, 17 (App. Div. 1985), we considered the issue of what constitutes a reasonable detention under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(e). Recognizing the significant costs to a retail store of protecting its products and avoiding losses, we held as a matter of law that a thirty-to-forty-five-minute detention was not unreasonable under the statute.

A court need not always slavishly adhere to a literal reading of a statute. In Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J. Super. 14, 18, 490 A.2d 320 (App.Div. 1985), we tempered the traditional rule requiring a literal construction of statutory language: A statute must be interpreted sensibly, rather than literally, with the purpose and reason for the legislation being controlling.

While acknowledging that Dronebarger's claim had substantial merit, the court noted that "`often the surest path to misconstruction is a literal reading of a statute.'" Johns-Manville, at 525 (quoting Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J. Super. 14, 18, 490 A.2d 320 (1985)). Under the literal terms of the New Jersey statute, the court stated, an attorney liable for malpractice could not be considered a person liable for injury or death. Nonetheless, the statute reflected "a very strong legislative determination that injured workers are not entitled to double recovery." Johns-Manville, at 526.

For example, "conceal" has been construed to include the wearing of a coat outside of the store that masks an offender's possession of merchandise. See Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J. Super. 14, 18 (App. Div. 1985). We realize that N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11b(2) uses the term "or otherwise" after the word "conceal."

See Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J.Super. 174, 192-93, 538 A.2d 414 (App.Div. 1988). See also N.J. Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338, 288 A.2d 855 (1972) (holding that "[w]here a literal rendering will lead to a result not in accord with the essential purpose and design of the act, the spirit of the law will control the letter"); Henry v. Shopper's World, 200 N.J.Super. 14, 18, 490 A.2d 320 (App.Div. 1985) (holding that "[a] statute must be interpreted sensibly, rather than literally, with the purpose and reason for the legislation being controlling") (citation omitted). As Chief Justice Weintraub recognized long ago: