Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2046-G.
April 4, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants Tom Baker, Wayne Scott and Allan Polunsky (collectively, "the defendants") for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Windell Eugene Henry ("Henry"), has not responded. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
On February 20, 2002, Henry filed two handwritten documents entitled "Exceptions to Defendants Summary Judgment Evidence (Objections)" and "Addendum To: Exceptions to Defendants Summary Judgment Evidence (Objections)." See Docket Sheet. Neither of these documents contain any arguments or citation to legal authority in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Rather, these documents appear to contest the authenticity of the exhibits attached to the defendants' summary judgment motion. See Appendix to Defendants Baker, Polunsky and Scott's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary Judgment Appendix."). At best, Henry's opposition to the summary judgment motion in these filings consists of a one sentence argument, "The defendants summary judgment motion does not itself state the specific grounds on which judgment is sought so as to define the issues and put the plaintiff on notice with adequate information to oppose the motion." Exceptions to Defendants Summary Judgment Evidence at 1. As will become evident in this memorandum order, the court finds Henry's argument, to the extent it even is one, totally devoid of merit.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 19, 2000, Henry, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the defendants for alleged violations of his civil rights. Complaint Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaint") at 1. Henry is currently an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal-Justice-Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID") and is incarcerated at the Dawson State Jail in Dallas County, Texas. Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary Judgment Motion") at 1.
According to the complaint, Henry alleges that the defendants prevented him from having access to the court by not allowing him to use the law library at the TDCJ-ID's Hutchins State Jail in Dallas County, Texas to research issues pertinent to one of his appeals. Complaint at 1-2; Summary Judgment Motion at 1-2. Specifically, Henry asserts that a policy exists at the Hutchins State Jail that denies new arrivals at the facility access to the law library. Answers to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire ("Magistrate Answers") at 1. Henry claims this policy resulted in denying him the use of the law library from August 17, 2000 until September 7, 2000, "one day prior to the date when my appellate brief was due." Id. at 3. Henry contends lie was harmed by this policy because there were several issues he wanted to research for his appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Henry v. Francis. Id. at 4 and attachment. In that civil rights action, the Fifth Circuit sustained this court's decision to dismiss Henry's suit against Judge Robert Francis, of the 195th Judicial District Court of Texas, and Teena Sanchez, an assistant court manager, as frivolous. See Henry v. Francis, 244 F.3d 135 (table) (5th Cir. 2000). Henry asserts that he was unable to adequately research various issues for this appeal that were "necessary to discover, and build, make corrections or additions to, etc. legal arguments based upon the case law or legal theory." Magistrate Answers at 6. Henry further claimed that "[i]t is impossible for [him] to tell how the policy impacted the ultimate disposition of this legal matter." Id. at 4 and attachment.
Defendant Tom Baker is the director of the Texas Department of Justice, State Jail Division. See Complaint at I. Defendant Wayne Scott is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and defendant Allan Polunsky is the chairman of the board of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Id. See also Summary Judgment Motion at 2 ("Defendants Baker, Polunsky, and Scott were all employed by the TDCJ-ID during the time of which Plaintiff complains.").
In light of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, Henry also requested that the court grant class action status and issue an injunction halting unconstitutional procedures at the Hutchins State Jail. Complaint at 3; Summary Judgment Motion at 1. On February 4, 2002, the defendants filed the instant motion, arguing summary judgment is appropriate on several grounds, including Henry's lack of standing, that Henry's claim did not state a cognizable constitutional violation and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Summary Judgment Motion at 3-8.
II. ANALYSIS 1. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 5 6 (c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movant makes such a showing by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The disposition of a case through summary judgment "reinforces the purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show . . . some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the non-movant's summary judgment burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of the movant is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, the motion's opponent fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and as to which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Although the court is not permitted to enter a "default" summary judgment when a party fails to respond to such a motion, the court is allowed to accept the evidence adduced by the movant as undisputed. See Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). The failure of a party to respond means that he has not designated specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. "A summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to his unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment evidence." Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Solo Serve Corporation v. Westowne Associates, 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)).
2. Lack of Standing
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 828 (1977) (holding that an inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts requires that prison authorities assist the inmate in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers). This right "is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
The issue of standing in the context of prisoner-access-to-courts cases was addressed by the Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey in which the Court stated, "The requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (citations omitted). In the access-to-courts context, the Court reasoned that a prisoner must demonstrate actual injury in order to have standing and that "[b]ecause Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." Id. at 351. The Court also held that the actual-injury requirement is not satisfied by just any frustrated legal claim. The frustrated legal claim must have been nonfrivolous, and must have challenged the inmate's sentence, or the conditions of his confinement. Id. at 352-53, 355.
The court agrees with the defendants that in the case at hand, Henry has not articulated an actual injury. Summary Judgment Motion at 1. Henry acknowledges that he is unable to state how the policy of denying new inmates access to the law library impacted the disposition of his appeal before the Fifth Circuit. Magistrate Answers at 4. Although he lists several issues he wanted to research for his appeal, see id. at 6, he fails to cite an actual injury he suffered that meets the injury requirement articulated by the Supreme Court in Lewis. 518 U.S. at 355. This is particularly true in light of the fact that, on appeal, his claim was found to be frivolous by the Fifth Circuit. See Henry, 244 F.3d 135 (table). Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In light of this disposition, the court will not address the defendants' other arguments in support of summary judgment. The court does note, however, that summary judgment also would have been appropriate on the basis that Henry's temporary denial of access to the law library did not violate his constitutional rights because the uncontested facts demonstrate that the defendants did provide Henry access to legal materials in his cell during the period of time in question. See Summary Judgment Motion at 4-5. Henry never alleges that he was denied access to legal materials provided in this manner.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered that the plaintiff take nothing on his claims in this case.SO ORDERED.