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Henry Ford Health System v. Amica Mutual Ins.

Court of Appeals of Michigan
Mar 14, 2024
No. 364286 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2024)

Opinion

364286

03-14-2024

HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, Defendant-Appellant, and PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY and FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendants-Appellees.


UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 21-015707-NF

Before: Garrett, P.J., and Riordan and Letica, JJ.

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Arnica Mutual Insurance Company (Arnica), appeals as of right a consent judgment in this action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Specifically, Arnica challenges the trial court's underlying decision denying Arnica's motion for summary disposition and conclusion that Arnica was the highest priority insurer. We affirm.

In the consent judgment, Arnica retained its rights to appeal the summary disposition decision.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of an automobile accident involving Desmond Jones (Jones) that occurred on February 7, 2021. Between 2011 and 2020, Jones resided with his mother and maternal grandparents in a home on Chippewa Drive in Warren, Michigan. Jones had his own bedroom in the home's basement. After Jones graduated from high school in 2018, he was given his maternal grandfather's Kia Optima. However, Jones did not purchase his own insurance, and the Kia continued to be registered and insured by his maternal grandfather. Nonetheless, Jones made monthly contributions toward the cost of the maternal grandfather's insurance policy with Arnica.

Jones suffered severe injuries when another driver crossed into Jones's lane of travel and struck Jones's vehicle head-on.

The maternal grandfather also insured other vehicles.

After the Covid-19 pandemic began, Jones limited his contacts outside the family home because his mother and maternal grandparents were high-risk individuals in light of medical conditions or age. Jones wanted more freedom to leave the home and work. Consequently, in August 2020, Jones moved in with his paternal grandparents in Clinton Township. In the move, Jones took all his belongings from his maternal grandparents' home except his bed and television. At the home of his paternal grandparents, Jones had his own bedroom. But, Jones did not change his driver's license to reflect his new address. Also, he did not notify Arnica of his change of address or obtain his own automobile policy. Jones continued to receive his mail at the Warren address. In his deposition, Jones expressed that he did not intend to return to the maternal grandparents' home, yet after the accident, he moved back there. The dispute in this case is whether Jones was domiciled with his maternal grandparents or paternal grandparents at the time of the accident.

In November 2021, plaintiff, Henry Ford Health System (plaintiff), filed a complaint against Arnica, defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (Progressive), and defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), to recover medical expenses for services provided to Jones, and requested relief under the no-fault act, specifically MCL 500.3112. In June 2022, the trial court consolidated plaintiffs case with a separate action filed by Jones arising out of the same automobile accident.

In August 2022, Arnica moved for summary disposition, alleging that Jones was not domiciled at his maternal grandfather's home at the time of the accident, and therefore, Arnica was not first in the order of priority for the payment of PIP benefits. Arnica contended that Jones was not covered under its policy because Jones was not a named insured under his maternal grandfather's policy. Further, Arnica asserted that Jones did not meet its policy's definition of a family member which required that Jones be a resident of the maternal grandfather's home to recover benefits. Arnica claimed that under the multi-factor test in Workman v Detroit Auto InterIns Exch, 404 Mich. 477; 274 N.W.2d 373 (1979), Jones was not domiciled at his maternal grandparents' home because Jones's declared intent was to be domiciled with his paternal grandparents, that he intended to stay there for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, never intended to return to his maternal grandparents' home, was paying rent to his paternal grandparents, and moved nearly all of his belongings to their home.

In its response to the motion, Progressive asserted that under the Workman and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich.App. 675; 333 N.W.2d 322 (1983), tests, Jones was domiciled at his maternal grandfather's home at the time of the accident. Progressive contended that Jones would have remained at his maternal grandfather's home if it was not for the Covid-19 pandemic, and that his residency at his paternal grandparents' home was simply temporary because he intended to move out and get a place of his own.

At the hearing on the dispositive motion, the parties argued their respective positions as raised in their briefs. The trial court stated that: (1) Jones did not change his address for his mail, for his bank, or for his driver's license, and still picked up mail from his maternal grandparents' house; (2) he paid rent at his paternal grandparents' house; (3) he had a bedroom at both places; (4) he took all of his possessions, except his bed and television, to his paternal grandparents' house; (5) he would not have left his maternal grandparents' house if it were not for the pandemic; (6) he did not intend to return to his maternal grandparents' home but wished to get his own place; (7) he did actually return to his maternal grandparents' house after the accident; (8) his maternal grandfather intended to cover him on his car insurance; (9) the car Jones used was registered to his maternal grandfather; (10) he paid his maternal grandfather for the insurance but not for rent, but that amount was lowered when he moved out; and (11) Jones was only 20 when the accident occurred, so he likely did not have many possessions to move. The trial court found that the facts favored Jones's domicile being his maternal grandparents' house and denied Arnica's motion for summary disposition, dismissed from the case both Progressive, the insurer for Jones's paternal grandmother, and Farmers, the insurer assigned through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, and found Arnica to be the highest priority insurer. In light of the trial court's underlying ruling, the parties agreed to a consent judgment which determined the amount of money to be paid by Arnica to other parties. From this judgment, Arnica appeals.

Progressive relied on its brief but did make note of Estate of Gilmore v Nationwide Ins Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 15, 2004 (Docket No. 244825), which found a girl to still be domiciled at her parents' home, despite her declaring she never intended to return after college.

The court stated that Jones was 20, but he was actually 21.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews summary disposition rulings de novo. Henry Ford Health Sys v Everest Nat'lIns Co, 326 Mich.App. 398, 402; 927 N.W.2d 717 (2018). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich. 177, 183; 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), summary disposition is appropriate "if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Id. A court may consider the entire record, including "affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties" when deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich. 274, 278; 681 N.W.2d 342 (2004).

III. ANALYSIS

Arnica contends that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Jones was domiciled with his paternal grandparents, not his maternal grandparents, and the trial court erred in its decision to the contrary. We disagree.

MCL 500.3114(1) states, in relevant part:

Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5), a personal protection insurance policy described in section 3101(1) applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person's spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.

The question of where a person is domiciled is generally a question of fact. Grange Ins Co of Mich. v Lawrence, 494 Mich. 475, 490; 835 N.W.2d 363 (2013). But, when the underlying facts are not in dispute, the determination of domicile is a question of law. Id. The Grange Court defined domicile to mean "the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." Id. at 493 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Domicile has also been described as "that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A person can have only one domicile at a time and it changes only when "acquiring another." Id. at 493-494 (citation omitted). A person must acquire a new domicile before his or her old domicile is terminated. Id. at 494. A domicile and a residence are not the same. Id. A person can have more than one residence, even if it is temporary. Id. at 494-495.

In Workman, the Supreme Court laid out a multi-factor test to determine a domicile:

(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his "domicile" or "household;"
(2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household;
(3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises;
(4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging "residence" or "domicile" in the household. [Workman, 404 Mich. at 496-497 (citations omitted).]

In Dairyland, this Court determined the four Workman factors were only "among the relevant factors to be considered" and not the only factors. Dairyland, 213 Mich.App. at 681-682 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Dairyland Court found other factors should be considered, including: the person's mailing address, whether the person maintains possessions at the insured's home, whether the insured's address is listed on the person's driver's license and other documents, whether the person has a bedroom in the insured's home, and whether the person is dependent on the insured for financial assistance or support. Id. at 682.

Arnica contends that Jones was domiciled at his paternal grandparents' house and not domiciled at his maternal grandparents' house under the Workman factors. It cites to Jones's intention to stay with his paternal grandparents indefinitely; his payment of rent to his paternal grandparents that created a formality of residency; Jones's move of nearly all his possessions to his paternal grandparents' home, reflecting an intention not to return to his maternal grandparents' home; and Jones's failure to be listed as a named insured on his maternal grandfather's Arnica policy. In light of these facts, Arnica asserts that Jones did not reside at his maternal grandfather's home and was not domiciled at their home for purposes of MCL 500.3114(1).

In the present case, the trial court did not err in determining that Jones's domicile remained at his maternal grandparents' house. A person must establish a new domicile in order to terminate the previous domicile. Applying the Workman and Dairyland factors, the facts favor Jones's domicile being his maternal grandparents' house and do not establish that Jones had changed his domicile to his paternal grandparents' house. Under Workman, it is clear that Jones had no intent to make his paternal grandparents' house his permanent or indefinite residence. Rather, he planned to stay there temporarily while he saved up money to get his own place to live. Jones's move was only precipitated by the Covid-19 pandemic. At his paternal grandparents home, Jones had the freedom to work and have contact with the public without putting his mother and maternal grandparents at risk of getting Covid-19. His maternal grandparents supported him by not charging rent and making payments directly to Arnica on his behalf for car insurance with the money Jones gave them. But, he was charged rent while living with his paternal grandparents and did not receive any financial support from them. Although Jones was living with his paternal grandparents at the time of the accident, he still maintained a bedroom at both houses. His bedroom at his maternal grandparents' house contained his bed and television and had not changed between the time he left and the accident. Despite Jones's statement that he did not intend to return to his maternal grandparents' house, he did, in fact, return after the accident, further indicating that his stay with his paternal grandparents was only temporary. Indeed, Jones's intention was to work and save money to secure his own residence, not to live permanently with his paternal grandparents.

Under the Dairyland factors, the facts further demonstrate that Jones was domiciled at his maternal grandparents' house. Jones's mail was still sent to his maternal grandparents' house, and he maintained his maternal grandparents' address on his driver's license and on his bank records. Although Jones did bring his clothes and a majority of his possessions with him to his paternal grandparents' house, he still had a bedroom with his bed and television at his maternal grandparents' house. Jones also relied on his maternal grandfather for financial support, even after he began living with his paternal grandparents. Jones's maternal grandfather continued to insure the Kia that Jones drove because an insurance premium independently charged to Jones would have been costly in light of his young age. Jones's maternal grandfather made the insurance payments directly to Arnica on behalf of Jones. Jones's paternal grandparents did not provide any financial assistance to Jones after he moved in with them.

Jones is not a named insured under the Arnica policy because he does not meet the policy's definition of a family member. However, this issue is no longer relevant to this appeal because Jones was domiciled at his maternal grandparents' home. His maternal grandfather was insured by Arnica. Therefore, under MCL 500.3114(1), the trial court properly determined that Arnica was the insurer first in order of priority and properly dismissed both Progressive and Farmers.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Henry Ford Health System v. Amica Mutual Ins.

Court of Appeals of Michigan
Mar 14, 2024
No. 364286 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2024)
Case details for

Henry Ford Health System v. Amica Mutual Ins.

Case Details

Full title:HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE…

Court:Court of Appeals of Michigan

Date published: Mar 14, 2024

Citations

No. 364286 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2024)