In Piggee [ Sand Springs Ry. Co. v. Piggee, 196 Okla. 136, 163 P.2d 545] we said statements are admissible as part of the res gestae: (1) when made at or near time of the occurrence; (2) when spontaneously made; (3) when provoked or influenced by happening of the accident itself so as to become a part thereof. The Taylor [ Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024] case declared admission of res gestae statements was justified by spontaneous nature of the statement, which provides sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness to render declarations admissible in evidence. Also see, Wigmore on Evidence 2nd, § 1749, that spontaneous or instinctive utterance made under circumstances calculated to provide a degree of trustworthiness, derive some credit independently of the declaration.

Although considerable weight is regularly given to the trial court's exercise of his discretion, there is no indication that appellate courts are ready to give up their supervision entirely. Roberts v. United States (CA 8, 1964), 332 F.2d 892; Lampe v. United States (1956), 97 App DC 160, ( 229 F.2d 43), certiorari denied 359 U.S. 929; State v. Drosos (1962), 253 Iowa 1152 ( 114 N.W.2d 526); White v. City of Marquette (1905), 140 Mich. 310; Henry Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Taylor (1940), 188 Okla. 380 ( 108 P.2d 1024); Hartford Accident Ind. Co. v. Olivier (CA 5, 1941), 123 F.2d 709. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 708, p 771; ALI, Model Code of Evidence, Rule 512(b); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(4)(b).

The conclusion in Harris, supra, properly was based upon settled reasoning expressed in earlier decisions. See, Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024 (1940); and, Sand Springs Ry. Co. v. Piggee, supra. In Piggee we said statements are admissible as part of the res gestae: (1) when made at or near time of the occurrence; (2) when spontaneously made; (3) when provoked or influenced by happening of the accident itself so as to become a part thereof.

We have held that the question of admissibility of statements as a part of the res gestae is largely dependent on the facts and circumstances presented in each particular case. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Harris, Okla., 425 P.2d 957; Sinclair Oil and Gas Co. v. Cheatwood, Okla., 350 P.2d 944; Huffman v. Gaylor, Okla., 267 P.2d 564; Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024; Feenberg Supply Co. v. Pierce, 185 Okla. 662, 95 P.2d 640; Margay Oil Corporation v. Jamison, 177 Okla. 433, 59 P.2d 790. This court follows the rule of liberal construction in regard to the application of the res gestae rule in Workmen's Compensation cases. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Harris, supra; Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, supra.

" In Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024, 1027, this Court, in discussing res gestae, stated: "* * * It seems clear that the statement was admitted upon the theory that it is a part of the res gestae, and we will confine our discussion to the question of whether the statement was properly admitted under the res gestae rule.

"The question of the admissibility of statements as a part of the res gestae is largely determined by the facts and circumstances of each case, and should in a great measure be left to the determination of the trial court." In Sand Springs Ry. Co. v. Piggee, 196 Okla. 136, 163 P.2d 545, 547, we cited with approval Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024, wherein it is stated: "* * * It is sufficient to say that admission of such statements is justified by the spontaneous nature of the statement, which is in itself a sufficient guarantee of the trustworthiness of such declarations to render them admissible, if they are made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, and it is not necessary that the declarations be so strictly contemporaneous with the occurrence to which they relate as to be admissible under the so-called `verbal act' doctrine, the element of time being important only for the purpose of determining whether the declaration was made when the speaker was under the stress of nervous excitement as a result of the occurrence to the extent that the reflective faculties were stilled and the utterance therefore a sincere expression of his actual impressions and belief.

The evidence objected to was admissible as part of the res gestae and the court committed no error in admitting it. The facts in this case bring it within the rule announced in the following cases: Gibson Oil Co. v. Westbrooke, 160 Okla. 26, 16 P.2d 127; Henry Chevrolet Co., Inc., v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024; Sand Springs Railway Co. v. Piggee, 196 Okla. 136, 163 P.2d 545. In the case last above cited we held:

All were properly admitted. Oklahoma City v. Lycan, 193 Okla. 170, 141 P.2d 1013; Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024; Hale-Halsell Co. v. Webb, 184 Okla. 589, 89 P.2d 273. Over the objection of plaintiff, the trial court admitted in evidence an ordinance of the city of Guthrie relating to the stopping of vehicles at railway crossings.

We have, however, on different occasions said that the question of admissibility of such evidence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case, and should in a great measure be left to the determination of the trial court. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Baker, 145 Okla. 100, 291 P. 962; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Minton, 181 Okla. 306, 73 P.2d 422; Feenberg Supply Co. v. Pierce, 185 Okla. 662, 95 P.2d 640; Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 188 Okla. 380, 108 P.2d 1024. In the case of Feenberg Supply Co. v. Pierce, supra, in an action brought by a pedestrian to recover damages for injuries sustained from being struck by a truck, we held that a statement made by the driver of the truck immediately after the accident, upon inquiry propounded by plaintiff, that he could not stop the truck and that he did not sound the horn for the reason that he had neither brakes nor horn, was admissible as part of the res gestae.