t v. Best, 19 Cal.2d 368, 381, 121 P.2d 702 (1942)); see also 4 B. Witkin, Summary of California Law, § 434 (9th ed.) (defining easement as an " interest in the land of another, which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment of the other's land"). Common law courts have consistently distinguished between ownership of an easement and ownership of the burdened land. See, e.g., City of Hayward v. Mohr, 160 Cal.App.2d 427, 432, 325 P.2d 209 (1958) (though easement is interest in land, it is only "a limited use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists, . . . it is not itself either land or an estate in land"); Robinson v. Cuneo, 137 Cal.App.2d 573, 577, 290 P.2d 656 (1955) (refusing to construe easement to prohibit owner of land from using area of easement because, unlike owner, easement holder "owns no part of the land itself and has no right to exclude the owner from the use of any of the land, except insofar as a use interferes with his easement rights"); Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Ky. 1960) (easement holder is not an "owner" of land); Weeks v. Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 276 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. 1955) (because easement holder did not have possessory interest or any right in property beyond limits of right to lay and maintain pipeline, he could not be held liable for waste). Given this well established distinction, we see no basis for holding that easement holders are owners for purposes of CERCLA liability. While we deem a defendant's status as an owner under common law as necessary to being an owner under CERCLA, we do not consider whether it is sufficient.

See, e. g., 2 American Law of Property, Sections 8.4 and 8.21 (1952). Restatement, Property, Section 450 (1952); Concord Corp. v. Huff, 144 Colo. 72, 355 P.2d 73 (1960); Park County Rod Gun Club v. Department of Highways, 163 Mont. 372, 517 P.2d 352 (1973); Boyd v. McDonald, 81 Nev. 642, 408 P.2d 717 (1965); State v. California Oregon Power Co., 225 Or. 604, 358 P.2d 524 (1961); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla.Ct.App. 1960); Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.Ct.App. 1960). Debtor, for example, relies on State v. California Power Company, 225 Or. 604, 358 P.2d 524 (1961).

1973); Boyd v. McDonald. 408 P.2d 717 (Nev. 1965); State v. California Oregon Power Co., 358 P.2d 524 (Ore. 1961); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311 (Fla.Ct.App. 1960); Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345 (Ky.Ct.App. 1960). Debtor, for example, relies on State v. California Power Company, 358 P.2d (Ore. 1961).

"Illinois Cent R.R. Co. v. Roberts, 928 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Ky. App. 1996) (citing Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, 336 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. 1960)).Meade v. Ginn, 159 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Ky. 2004).

Although counsel for plaintiff contended at oral argument that a prescriptive easement is "not an interest in land as such", no authority was cited for this proposition, and it is unlikely that any such authority could be found. All the cases and textbooks consulted by this court classify easements as interests in land, albeit incorporeal, nonpossessory interests. See, e.g., Peaslee v. Dietrich, 365 Mich. 338, 112 N.W.2d 562 (1961); Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1960); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements § 2; 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 1 b, Restatement of Property, § 450. See also Territory v. Arneson, 44 Haw. 343, 347-49, 354 P.2d 981, 984-85 (1960), finding that a right of access to a public road is "property" and "land".

It is a "right, distinguished from ownership, to use in some manner the land of another for a specified purpose." Inter-County Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Reeves, 294 Ky. 458, 171 S.W.2d 978, 983 (Ky. App. 1943); see also Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 336 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. 1960). Easements can be in gross or appurtenant.

It is, however, a property right or interest in land. It is an incorporeal hereditament to which corporeal property is rendered subject. See Henry Bickel Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, Ky., 336 S.W.2d 345 (1960); Lyle v. Holman, Ky., 238 S.W.2d 157 (1951); and 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 2 (1996). A railroad easement, like other easements, is nothing more than the right of the railroad to pass over the land of others.