Opinion
No. 05-04-00733-CR
Opinion Issued June 1, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-35340-MI. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following his conviction for possession of cocaine, Omar Edenilson Henriquez complains in a single point of error on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. At appellant's motion to suppress hearing, a police officer testified that appellant consented to a search of his car. The officer testified that he used the Spanish words for "the officer wants permission to search the car" in a question form. The officer further testified that the Spanish words constituted a request, rather than a demand. When a second officer searched the car, he found a small baggy containing cocaine near the driver's seat. In his sole point of error, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress the cocaine because the record fails to show by clear and convincing evidence that appellant understood the officer was requesting his permission to search the car. A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable subject only to established exceptions. One such exception is a search conducted with the consent of the subject. Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The Texas Constitution requires the State to prove the validity of consent by clear and convincing evidence. Id. At a suppression hearing to determine consent, the trial judge is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility. Accordingly, in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and review de novo the court's application of the law. See id. Where, as in this case, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Reviewing the evidence of appellant's case in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, it is clear the trial court found that appellant understood the officer was requesting, rather than demanding, his permission to search the car. Deferring to the trial court on this matter, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment.