The collective deposition testimony of the various eyewitnesses to the accident placed the location of plaintiffs fall approximately on the border between defendant's property and that owned by defendant Stephen W. Turri, individually and as owner of Henry B's, Inc. In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was on Turri `s property when he fell, defendant may be held liable in the event that the dangerous condition on his property caused or contributed to the accident ( see Orr v Spring, 288 AD2d 663, 665; Hennessy v Palmer Video, 237 AD2d 571).
"`"[L]iability for a dangerous or defective condition on property is generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property. . . . Where none is present, a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the dangerous or defective condition of the property"'" ( Hennessy v. Palmer Video, 237 AD2d 571, 571, quoting Minott v. City of New York, 230 AD2d 719, 720, quoting Turrisi v. Ponderosa, Inc., 179 AD2d 956, 957; see Orr v. Spring, 288 AD2d 663, 665). Here, while it is true that Burton Deitz testified at one point that Auto Tow was in charge of the winter maintenance of the parking lot, he later qualified that statement by indicating that either he or one of his companies did the plowing and sanding.
Liability for an injury caused by a dangerous condition is "'generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property' * * *. An exception to this rule exists where the owner of the abutting property created or contributed to the dangerous condition * * *" (Hennessy v. Palmer Video, 237 A.D.2d 571, 571-572, quoting Minott v. City of New York, 230 A.D.2d 719, 720 [citations omitted]). It is undisputed that Gould did not own the parking lot. In support of her argument that the negligent design of Gould's building created or contributed to the dangerous condition in the parking lot, plaintiff submitted an expert affidavit asserting that the design of the building "unnecessarily diverted water toward the parking lot" and that this diversion of water "contributed to the icy and slippery conditions that existed in the parking lot at the time of the accident". Inasmuch as no objective evidence was offered in support of these conclusions or that the conditions existed at the time of this accident, the "opinion was properly rejected as speculative, remote and lacking an adequate factual foundation" (La Duke v. Albany Motel Enters., 282 A.D.2d 974, 975). Given the absence of nonspeculative proof that the alleged dangerous icy condition was the result of water run-off from Gould's building, pl
The Supreme Court improperly denied Arba's motion for summary judgment. The record demonstrates that Arba neither owned, occupied, controlled, nor made special use of the area of the parking lot in which the injured plaintiff slipped and fell (see, Hennessy v. Palmer Video, 237 A.D.2d 571; Minott v City of New York, 230 A.D.2d 719; Turrisi v. Ponderosa, Inc., 179 A.D.2d 956; Balsam v. Delma Eng'g Corp., 139 A.D.2d 292, 296-297). The evidence further demonstrates that Mba did not create or contribute to the alleged dangerous condition (see, Hennessy v. Palmer Video, supra).
As a tenant in the building, Angion did not owe a duty to the plaintiff unless it created or contributed to the dangerous condition complained of. (See Hennessy v Palmer Video, 237 A.D.2d 571 [2d Dept 1997]). There is no proof that anyone employed by Angion was in the LabCorp tenant space on the date of the alleged accident and no proof that anyone employed by Angion carried an umbrella into the LabCorp tenant space or in any way created or contributed to the rain water condition alleged.
Had these defaulting defendants been party to this motion for summary judgment, there is no doubt that summary judgment would be granted in their favor for the same reasons. Clearly, as is the case here, if an adjoining landowner or lessee did not own, occupy, control, or make special use of the parking lot in which the accident occurred, then it cannot be held liable ( Casale v. Brookdale Medical Associates , 43 AD3d 418, 419 [2d Dept 2008] ); Hennessy v. Palmer Video , 237 AD2d 571, 572 [2d Dept 1997] ); ( Minott v. City of New York , 230 AD2d 719 [2d Dept 1996] ). In any event, plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity: 1) to contest the Burns affidavit in opposing the summary judgment motion; 2) to research land records for the four-year life of this case, and specifically, after the summary judgment motion was granted, and the 2 months between April 19, 2019 and June 17, 2019; and 3) to demonstrate any special use or other connection between the YPA lot and the defaulting defendants.
"It is well established that 'liability for a dangerous or defective condition on property is generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property . . . Where none is present, a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the dangerous or defective condition'" ( Hennessy v Palmer Video, 237 AD2d 571, quoting Minott v City of New York, 230 AD2d 719, 720.)
"[I]t is well established that `liability for a dangerous or defective condition on property is generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property. . . Where none is present, a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the dangerous or defective condition'" (Hennessy v Palmer Video, 237 AD2d 571, 571 [2d Dept 1997], quoting Minott v City of New York, 230 AD2d 719, 720 [2d Dept 1996]). Here, the Crothall defendants have made a prima facie showing entitling them to summary judgment.