Opinion
No. 01 C 9678
March 6, 2003
OPINION
On December 21, 2001, plaintiff Sylvester Hendricks filed suit against defendants. Mr. Hendricks' rather enigmatic complaint appears to allege civil rights deprivations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") and common law tort claims of battery, libel and slander. In the fall of 2002, I allowed Mr. Hendricks to amend his complaint, which was filed on November 7, 2002. Defendant Chicago Board of Education ("the Board") moved to dismiss and strike the amended complaint, and in response, Mr. Hendricks has amended his complaint once more. I am granting the Board's motion to dismiss and strike because Mr. Hendricks' Second Amended Complaint does not cure the defects raised in the Board's motion to dismiss and strike.
The Board argues that Mr. Hendricks has failed to state a timely § 1983 claim against it, the applicable statute of limitations being two years. Other than allegations relating to an election held in 2002, the only allegations that occurred within the two year limitations period appear to be Mr. Hendricks' tort claims against individual defendants. With respect to the claims relating to the 2002 election, the Board argues that these claims do not constitute a continuing violation of those claims arising prior to 2002, which is the only way for the post-2002 claims to save the pre-2002 claims. See Filipovic v. KR Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1999). In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Hendricks attempts to rectify this defect by adding the word "continually" to his allegations. However, the mere addition of the word "continually" does not clarify how the post-2002 and pre-2002 allegations are connected such that there is a continuing violation. To constitute a continuing violation, (1) the exact day of the violation must be difficult to discern because of the ongoing nature of the decision-making process; (2) there is an openly espoused policy; or (3) the conduct is so covert that it is unrecognizable until seen in the light of subsequent acts. Place v. Abbott Laboratories, 215 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2000). Mr. Hendricks' Second Amended Complaint does not show how the post-2002 claims fit into any of these situations. In addition, even if this were not the case, Mr. Hendricks' allegations still do not constitute a valid § 1983 against the Board. To state a valid § 1983 claim against the Board, Mr. Hendricks must show that he was deprived of his constitutional rights pursuant to the Board's policies, customs or practices, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), which he did not in his First Amended Complaint. Mr. Hendricks attempts to correct this deficiency in his Second Amended Complaint by adding the language "that several Board `policy' [sic] and practice [sic] were constitutional violation [sic]" and that the Board, "serving as the governing board of the school district, with final policy-making authority," violated his constitutional rights. However, this language does not indicate what policies, practices or customs violate Mr. Hendricks' constitutional rights, nor does it indicate the person or persons with final policy-making authority who allegedly caused a constitutional violation. None of the individuals named by Mr. Hendricks are final policy-making officials of the Board. Therefore, the Board's motion to dismiss is granted for failure to state a valid claim.
Finally, the Board points out that it cannot be held liable for an award of punitive damages, and this is firmly established by the Illinois Local Government and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-101 et seq., and the applicable case law. Thus, I am striking those portions of Mr. Hendricks' complaint seeking to hold the Board liable for punitive damages.
The Board's motion to dismiss and strike is granted in full.