The three prongs of this test focus on the occasion when the injury occurred rather than the work relationship in general. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga. App. 310, 312-313 (2) (a) (i), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012); see also Hoffman v.Wells, 260 Ga. 588, 590 (2), 397 S.E.2d 696 (1990) (explaining borrowed servant doctrine’s effect on transfer of vicarious liability from lending employer to borrowing employer); Ross v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 258 Ga. 234, 235 (1), 367 S.E.2d 793 (1988) (same). [5] In the medical context involving the negligent acts of hospital employees during surgery, the three prong test, requires the hospital to show that it
Before the PAA was passed, physicians could be vicariously liable for the negligence of other medical personnel based on principles of respondeat superior, agency, and imputed negligence. See Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga.App. 310, 315 (2) (a) (iii) (734 S.E.2d 548) (2012) (trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on physician's potential vicarious liability for the negligence of hospital personnel either "by modifying the [plaintiffs'] requested charge on the borrowed servant doctrine, by giving one of the other instructions requested by the [plaintiffs] on the principles of respondeat superior, agency or imputed negligence, or by devising its own charge on the issue"). The General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of existing law, including vicarious liability principles, when it enacted the PAA.
Before the PAA was passed, physicians could be vicariously liable for the negligence of other medical personnel based on principles of respondeat superior, agency, and imputed negligence. See Hendley v. Evans , 319 Ga. App. 310, 315 (2) (a) (iii), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012) (trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on physician's potential vicarious liability for the negligence of hospital personnel either "by modifying the [plaintiffs’] requested charge on the borrowed servant doctrine, by giving one of the other instructions requested by the [plaintiffs] on the principles of respondeat superior, agency or imputed negligence, or by devising its own charge on the issue"). The General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of existing law, including vicarious liability principles, when it enacted the PAA.
(Citation omitted.) Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga.App. 310, 311(2), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012). Here, MARTA requested that the trial court instruct the jury that it must determine the percentage of the plaintiffs' fault, if any, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover any damages if the plaintiffs were 50 percent or more responsible for the injury or damages, and if the plaintiffs were less than 50 percent responsible for any injury or damages, then the jury was to apportion the total damage award.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga. App. 310, 311 (2) (734 SE2d 548) (2012). And, while the contents of a special verdict form are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, Sims v. Heath, 258 Ga. App. 681, 687 (7) (577 SE2d 789) (2002), the form must nevertheless be "adequately crafted to elicit a decision on the issues before the court."
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga.App. 310, 311(2), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012). And, while the contents of a special verdict form are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, Sims v. Heath, 258 Ga.App. 681, 687(7), 577 S.E.2d 789 (2002), the form must nevertheless be “adequately crafted to elicit a decision on the issues before the court.”
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that instructing the jury pursuant to OCGA § 24–14–22 was unwarranted.See Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga.App. 310, 317–18(2)(b)(i), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012) (holding that instruction regarding former OCGA § 24–4–22 is applicable only in cases when it is shown that a party has withheld evidence within party's control and an instruction on that principle should be given only in “exceptional cases.”); cf. Silman, 286 Ga. at 27–28, 685 S.E.2d 277 (holding that defendant's removal and demolition of old deck (following its collapse), without more, was insufficient to show spoliation); Craig, 304 Ga.App. at 797(1), 697 S.E.2d 888 (holding that defendant's discarding of protruding landscape timber spikes, seven months before plaintiffs filed suit alleging injury caused by spikes, did not constitute spoliation). 3.
Gurin v. Harris, 129 Ga.App. 561, 563(3), 200 S.E.2d 368 (1973). See Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga.App. 310, 318(2)(b)(ii), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012); Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga.App. 151, 154–155(2)(a), 193 S.E.2d 19 (1972); Ramirez v. Mansour, 104 Ga.App. 651, 652(1), 122 S.E.2d 594 (1961). The presumption does not apply in this context because a defendant “is under no duty to aid the plaintiff in making out his case.”
Gurin v. Harris, 129 Ga.App. 561, 563(3), 200 S.E.2d 368 (1973). See Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga.App. 310, 318(2)(b)(ii), 734 S.E.2d 548 (2012) ; Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga.App. 151, 154–155(2)(a), 193 S.E.2d 19 (1972); Ramirez v. Mansour, 104 Ga.App. 651, 652(1), 122 S.E.2d 594 (1961). The presumption does not apply in this context because a defendant “is under no duty to aid the plaintiff in making out his case.”
Even though the lease agreement provided that the tractor was operating under the "exclusive direction and supervision" of Lumber and that Lumber had "exclusive possession, control, and use" of the tractor and "assume[d] complete responsibility" for its operation, Pinson was apparently satisfied that it was nonetheless responsible for the accident. See Hendley v. Evans, 734 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. App. 2012). C. The Grange Mutual Policy