That evidence was sufficient to show Williams' recent possession of the goods found in the crawl space. Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 345, 346 ( 291 S.E.2d 422). As to appellant Applin, however, we are constrained to hold that there was no probative evidence connecting him with the stolen goods.

See Williams v. State, 252 Ga. 7, 9 (2) ( 310 S.E.2d 528). In Williams v. State, 166 Ga. App. 892, 893 (3) (4), supra, we affirmed this defendant's conviction based upon Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 345, 346 ( 291 S.E.2d 422), in that where there is a conviction of burglary based upon the recent possession of stolen property "there must be an absence of or an unsatisfactory explanation of that possession," and that "proof of these facts beyond a reasonable doubt creates a presumption or permissible inference of the defendant's guilt," that is, that the defendant committed the crime charged and proven. See Selph v. State, 142 Ga. App. 26, 29 ( 234 S.E.2d 831). Henderson v. State, supra, then cited Bankston v. State, 159 Ga. App. 342, 343 (4) ( 283 S.E.2d 319), that after a review of the entire record this court found that a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, also citing Williamson v. State, 248 Ga. 47, 48-58 ( 281 S.E.2d 512).

In this case, the appellant Williams and a co-defendant Applin were convicted of burglary based, in part, on proof of their recent, unexplained possession of the stolen goods. The Court of Appeals affirmed Williams' conviction. As authority, the Court of Appeals cited Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 345 ( 291 S.E.2d 422) (1982), which contains the holding that recent, unexplained possession of stolen property is a circumstance which, standing alone, is sufficient to support a conviction of burglary of the goods. In affirming Williams' conviction, the Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of Williams' motion for new trial, which was based on an affidavit of one of the jurors to the effect that another juror had told the jury during its deliberations that he had seen one of the defendants in a store attempting to shoplift.

"`To convict a defendant based upon recent possession of stolen goods, it must be shown the goods were stolen and there must be an absence of or an unsatisfactory explanation of that possession. [Cit.] The proof of these facts beyond a reasonable doubt creates a presumption or permissible inference of the defendant's guilt, that is that the defendant himself committed the crime charged and proven.' [Cit.]" Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 345, 346 ( 291 S.E.2d 422) (1982). The evidence in the instant case satisfied the standard of proof set forth above.

]" Allen v. State, 146 Ga. App. 815, 816 (1) ( 247 S.E.2d 540) (1978). See also Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 345, 346 ( 291 S.E.2d 422) (1982); Brown v. State, 157 Ga. App. 473, 474 ( 278 S.E.2d 31) (1981); Williamson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 615 (1) ( 275 S.E.2d 699) (1980), aff'd 248 Ga. 47 ( 281 S.E.2d 512) (1981); Evans v. State, 156 Ga. App. 162, 163 (3) ( 275 S.E.2d 341) (1980); Evans v. State, 138 Ga. App. 460 ( 226 S.E.2d 303) (1976). Despite the testimony of Eddie Lamar Reed that the burglaries were committed by himself and his brother, the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses were questions for the trior of fact.

Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128 ( 218 S.E.2d 856) (1975)." Parrish v. State, 160 Ga. App. 601, 602 ( 287 S.E.2d 603) (1982); see Cole v. State, 162 Ga. App. 353 (6) ( 291 S.E.2d 427) (1982); Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 320 (4) ( 291 S.E.2d 422) (1982); Code Ann. § 27-2101 (now OCGA § 17-8-4); see also Murphy v. State, 246 Ga. 626 (2) ( 273 S.E.2d 2) (1980); Montgomery v. State, 156 Ga. App. 448 (1) ( 275 S.E.2d 72) (1980). This burden on Cowart to make a clear showing of prejudice amounting to a denial of due process requires him "to do more than raise the possibility that a separate trial would give him a better chance of acquittal."