It is not within the purview of voir dire to inquire into technical legal questions, such as those ultimately involving the presumption of innocence, issues which are more properly the subject of a legal charge by the trial court. Henderson v. State, 173 Ga. App. 302, 303 (1) ( 326 S.E.2d 246) (1985). For this reason, the trial court properly excluded counsel's questions about the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof on the allegations in the indictment, and the comparative guilt of Harper relative to other persons. Counsel's questions about the State's evidentiary burden and proof beyond a reasonable doubt were also properly disallowed.

Moak next complains that the trial court improperly limited his inquiry on voir dire into the willingness of jurors to consider the presumption of innocence if Moak exercised his right not to testify. This issue was addressed by this court under virtually identical circumstances in Henderson v. State, 173 Ga. App. 302, 303 (1) ( 326 S.E.2d 246) (1985). Henderson contended the trial court erred in excluding a voir dire question "which in effect inquired whether knowing that a defendant does not have to present evidence and should that right be exercised, any juror would hold that election against [appellant]."

Whether every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt of the defendant has been properly excluded is a question for the jury. Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656, 659 ( 229 S.E.2d 132) (1976); Henderson v. State, 173 Ga. App. 302, 304 ( 326 S.E.2d 246) (1985). We see no reason to disturb their finding.