No. 05-05-00493-CR
Opinion issued June 28, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 416-81714-04. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, O'NEILL, and MAZZANT.
Opinion By Justice MAZZANT.
Gregory Lawrence Henderson appeals his conviction for forgery. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
On June 23, 2004, appellant went into the Community Credit Union in Allen to cash a check drawn on an account belonging to Michael Horton. He handed the check to Tiffany Bump, a teller, who testified that the check had a strong smell of vinegar and was discolored. Bump stated that she immediately realized the check had been washed and was therefore a forgery. She also noticed the writing appeared as if someone pressed down very hard as they wrote the check. Bump told appellant she needed to get approval before cashing the check and promptly notified Kathi Flores, her supervisor. Upon further inspection, Flores noticed the handwriting did not match what they had on file. She also noticed the memo line indicated the check was for fence repair work, which she stated is another sign of forgery. Flores stated that, by this point, she was certain the check was not a legitimate document, and she called the police. Appellant waited for twenty to thirty minutes, periodically asking how long it would take. Appellant asked Bump to return the check because he was late for a doctor's appointment and his ride was waiting for him outside. In order to keep him there until the police arrived, Bump apologized for the delay and told him it would not be much longer. Appellant finally told Bump he needed to go. He left without the check, ran to the corner of the premises, and then walked around the building to the drive-through area. Bump testified that appellant walked away from the credit union towards a carwash, threw up his hands as though his ride left him, and then turned around and headed towards the ATM. She thought it was not normal behavior because there was no parking lot in the drive-through area and no one would have been waiting in that particular area for him. At this point Officer Jeff McGee arrived and yelled at appellant, who was about fifteen yards away from him, to walk towards him. Appellant proceeded through the parking lot instead of towards McGee, so he yelled a second time. This time, appellant complied, and McGee told him he was detaining him in connection with a forgery investigation. McGee attempted to handcuff appellant, who tensed up and stiffened his arms. McGee instructed appellant not to resist or he would be forced to use pepper spray. Appellant began to scream and pull away from McGee, causing him to physically force appellant to the ground and call for backup. Horton, the account holder, testified that the check appellant attempted to cash originally had been made out to Capital One Credit for $180 and placed in his mailbox. Horton testified that he did not give anyone permission to use the check, the handwriting on the check was not his, his name was misspelled, and the credit card company never received the check. Appellant was subsequently convicted of forgery. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years' confinement and an $8,000 fine. Discussion
In two issues, appellant complains the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for forgery. When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a familiar standard. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). The jury is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). The jury may draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light and will set the verdict aside only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004)); Goodrich v. State, 156 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd). The question under this standard is whether, considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484. Evidence can be factually insufficient if it is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or contrary evidence exists that is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. In examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we defer to the factfinder's determination of the credibility of the evidence. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). To prove the crime of forgery, the State was required to show that appellant, with intent to defraud or harm another, passed a writing that purported to be the act of another, who did not authorize the act. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 32.21 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). It is undisputed that appellant attempted to cash a check that had been chemically washed and signed by someone other than Horton, who testified he did not authorize anyone to do so. Therefore, the only issue is whether the State carried its burden of proof that appellant had the requisite intent. Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove he intended to harm or defraud another. Specifically, appellant maintains the State failed to show he knew the check was a forgery. We disagree. Intent to harm or defraud another requires proof of knowledge the instrument is a forgery. Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). The intent to defraud or harm another may be established by circumstantial evidence. Id. Because appellant did not present any evidence at trial, we consider only the evidence presented by the State. In this case, the State presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer appellant knew the check was forged. For instance, the check appellant attempted to cash had a strong smell of vinegar, was discolored green from its original shade of blue, and the handwritten portions were heavily imprinted, which should have alerted appellant to the suspicious condition of the check. Also, the memo line of the check indicated the money was in exchange for fence repair work but the address of the check holder was an apartment. Additionally, the signature was misspelled. Appellant also purportedly had a car waiting for him outside but there was no one there when he left. Appellant asserts he did not leave the credit union but was only attempting to notify his ride of the delay. He also argues the State failed to carry its burden of proof because he waited patiently for twenty or thirty minutes at the credit union. Appellant claims this was not normal behavior of one attempting to cash a forged check. However, the fact that there are conflicting, plausible explanations of appellant's behavior is not dispositive in light of the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. See Huntly v. State, 4 S.W.3d 813, 815 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (upholding defendant's conviction of forgery despite the fact he presented two forms of identification and waited twenty minutes for the bank to cash the check). The circumstantial evidence in this case would enable a rational jury to conclude appellant knew the check was forged. Therefore, his intent to defraud or harm another could be inferred. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient and the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was guilty of forgery. Further, reviewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say the evidence of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the factfinder's determination or that the proof of guilt is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. We therefore conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the verdict. Appellant's first and second issues are overruled. We affirm the trial court's judgment.