Opinion
24A-CR-1049
11-26-2024
Denny R. Henderson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Pulaski Superior Court The Honorable Crystal A. Kocher, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 66D01-2209-F6-136
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Denny R. Henderson appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. We disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] The evidence most favorable to the conviction is as follows. On September 6, 2022, Detroit Whitehead, who is the stepfather of Henderson's grandchildren, was standing on a bridge near Henderson's home in Winamac, displaying a sign that said "abusive grandparents have no rights." Tr. Vol. II p. 176. He was accompanied by Zackariah Whritenour. Eventually, Henderson parked his van nearby, walked toward Whitehead, and asked what the sign said. Whitehead turned so that Henderson could see the sign more clearly, and Henderson asked, "[D]o you think that's funny?" Id. at 179. Whitehead replied, "[N]o . . . any kind of abuse to children isn't funny." Id. Henderson moved closer and said, "[D]o you want to go? Do you want to go?" Id. Henderson was "very angry" and "loud" and began using profanity. Id. at 180. Henderson moved even closer to Whitehead, who asked Whritenour to record the incident. Henderson knocked Whritenour's phone out of his hand, and when Whritenour bent down to pick it up, Henderson hit him in the mouth, breaking one of his teeth.
[¶3] Henderson "kept getting closer" to Whitehead and "kept trying to swing" at him. Id. at 181. Whitehead stepped back until he was against the side of the bridge. He put his hands up and said, "I am not trying to fight . . . I am not doing this." Id. at 182. Henderson "took a swing" at Whitehead, and Whitehead wrapped his arms around him. Id. After a few seconds, Henderson said he had calmed down, and Whitehead let him go. Henderson then grabbed Whitehead's hand and bent back one of his fingers. Police arrived and spoke to the parties. Whitehead declined an ambulance to the hospital but later that night went to the emergency room because his finger "was hurting like crazy, and it was purple." Id. at 184. His finger wasn't broken, but he was given a shot for the pain.
[¶4] The State charged Henderson with two counts of Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury and one count of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct ("fighting" or "tumultuous conduct"). A jury trial was held, and Whitehead and Whritenour testified as set forth above. Henderson claimed self-defense. He didn't testify, but his girlfriend testified that she observed the confrontation from a distance, Whitehead and Whritenour were the aggressors, Henderson yelled "get your hands off of me" and "call the police," and Whitehead and Whritenour were "high fiving and fist bumping" afterward. Tr. Vol. III pp. 3, 6. The jury found Henderson guilty of disorderly conduct but not guilty on the battery counts. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days of home detention.
[¶5] Henderson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Henderson contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. His argument covers several aspects of self-defense law, but it ultimately requires us to disregard Whitehead's and Whritenour's testimony under the incredible-dubiosity doctrine. That doctrine allows us to impinge upon a fact-finder's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses when "the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it." Hampton v. State, 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The doctrine rarely applies and "requires that there be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence." Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015).
[¶7] Henderson's argument fails for two reasons. First, it wasn't "a sole testifying witness" who identified Henderson as the aggressor-Whitehead and Whritenour both testified that Henderson attacked them. Second, Whitehead's and Whritenour's testimony wasn't so inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. Henderson notes that he was fifty-two years old and much smaller than Whitehead and Whritenour, who were in their twenties, and he argues that the notion of him attacking them "runs counter to human experience and common sense." Appellant's Br. p. 17. While such a scenario is no doubt uncommon, it is not so highly unlikely that no reasonable juror could believe it happened.
[¶8] Because Henderson's sufficiency argument depends on the application of the incredible-dubiosity doctrine, and he has failed to satisfy the requirements of that doctrine, we affirm his conviction.
[¶9] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Crone, Sr. J., concur.