Decided February 11, 2004 The petitioner Daniel Henderson's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 80 Conn. App. 499 (AC 23253), is denied. Daniel Henderson, pro se, in support of the petition.
“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim.... The [petitioner] is also not guaranteed assistance of an attorney who will make no mistakes.... What constitutes effective assistance [of counsel] is not and cannot be fixed with yardstick precision, but varies according to the unique circumstances of each representation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn.App. 499, 503–505, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). A
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn.App. 499, 503, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). “In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction.... That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.... Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 503, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). "In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction. . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable."
Specifically, our review of the court's judgment of dismissal requires us to review the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner to determine whether he has established a prima facie showing of a Strickland claim; see Thomas v. West Haven, supra, 249 Conn. 392; however, due to the lack of a definitive description of what constitutes "deficient performance," we are also required to evaluate the specific circumstances of the claim and indulge a strong presumption in favor of finding that the representation was not deficient. See Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 504, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). B Failure to Employ Evidence
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 503, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). "In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction. . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable."
" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 503, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). The basis for all of the petitioner's allegations relating to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stems primarily from his testimony regarding Meisler's conduct.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 503, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). "In Strickland v. Washington, [ 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States Supreme Court adopted a two-part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings: the [petitioner] must show: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; id., 687-88; and (2) that defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 504, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). Turning to the prejudice component of the Strickland test, "[i]t is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors [made by counsel] had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 499, 503-504, 835 A.2d 1036 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 918, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004). "For ineffectiveness claims resulting from guilty pleas, we apply the standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), which modified Stricklands prejudice prong. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."