Opinion
CV164007650S
09-20-2018
Mark HENDERSON (Inmate #382714) v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Kwak, J.
The petitioner, Mark Henderson, initiated this matter by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on November 12, 2015, and amended on February 16, 2017. In the underlying criminal case, the petitioner was charged with robbing a bank on March 31, 2011. On April 29, 2013, the petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine, to robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(2). On July 16, 2013, the petitioner was sentenced with an enhanced penalty as a persistent dangerous felony offender pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40(a), and received a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
The petitioner initiated the present habeas petition on November 12, 2015. In his two-count amended petition, filed on February 16, 2017, the petitioner claims (1) that his plea was not voluntary, knowing or intelligent due to his trial counsel’s failure to advise him regarding the persistent dangerous felony offender sentence enhancement; and (2) that Public Acts § 15-216, as applied to the petitioner, constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
On August 15, 2017, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss count two of the petition, the petitioner’s ex post facto claim, on the grounds that the habeas court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29. The court granted the respondent’s motion on March 14, 2018 , dismissing count two of the petition.
A trial proceeded on the first count of the petitioner’s habeas petition on May 24, 2018, at which the petitioner called Kenneth Novi, private investigator, Attorney John Drapp and himself as his witnesses. The petitioner presented several exhibits to the court, including relevant transcripts, court documents and correspondence.
The petitioner’s claim challenges the validity of his guilty plea. "To be valid, guilty pleas must be made knowingly and voluntarily ... [T]he trial court judge bears an affirmative, nondelegable duty to clarify the terms of a plea agreement. [U]nless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Almedina v. Commissioner of Correction, 109 Conn.App. 1, 5-6, 950 A.2d 553 (2008). "In order to make a knowing and voluntary choice, the defendant must possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, including all relevant information concerning the sentence ... The defendant must also be aware of the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court ... because a realistic assessment of such promises is essential in making an intelligent decision to plead guilty ... A determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 6.
The petitioner alleges that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because it was entered as a result of Attorney Drapp’s intentional failure to apprise the petitioner of the elements of the persistent dangerous felony offender enhancement in retaliation for grievance complaints the petitioner had filed. This claim must fail.
The record reveals that the trial court, Iannotti, J., thoroughly canvassed the petitioner regarding his guilty plea on April 29, 2013, including mention of the persistent dangerous felony offender enhancement. Attorney Drapp testified at the habeas trial that he "without a doubt" reviewed all relevant information with the petitioner, including the persistent dangerous felony offender enhancement, prior to the petitioner pleading guilty. This court finds Attorney Drapp’s testimony to be credible. The plea canvass was dispositive of the petitioner’s willingness to take a guilty plea pursuant to the Alford doctrine. He knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the plea agreement and forfeited his right to a trial. As a result, his claim must be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the petitioner’s claim is hereby denied.