Opinion
No. LT–005480–11.
2012-10-18
HEMPSTEAD VILLAGE HOUSING ASSOCIATES d/b/a Woods Edge Apartments, Petitioner/Landlord, v. John PITTS, Respondent.
Walsh & Roth, LLP, West Babylon, attorneys for petitioner. Lisa Levy, of Counsel to Jeffrey A. Seigel, Esq., Nassau/Suffolk Law Services, Committee Inc., Hempstead, attorneys for respondent.
Walsh & Roth, LLP, West Babylon, attorneys for petitioner. Lisa Levy, of Counsel to Jeffrey A. Seigel, Esq., Nassau/Suffolk Law Services, Committee Inc., Hempstead, attorneys for respondent.
MICHAEL A. CIAFFA, J.
IN LIMINE DECISION
Respondent, John Pitts, resides in a section 8 housing development known as Woods Edge Apartments. His landlord, petitioner Hempstead Village Housing Associates, commenced a holdover eviction proceeding against him in September, 2011, pursuant to a termination notice alleging “repeated violations of the lease” by respondent, “both substantial and/or minor.”
Petitioner's claims were conditionally resolved by an interim stipulation of settlement, dated December 14, 2011. The settlement agreement required respondent's attendance at an anger management course. In the meantime, the proceeding was adjourned to permit monitoring of respondent's conduct over the next 10 months. The stipulation of settlement also included a provision allowing petitioner to restore the case to the trial calendar “for trial of any alleged violation of the lease or stipulation” during that 10 month monitoring period.
At court proceedings held on July 17, 2012, petitioner brought to the Court's attention its allegation that respondent “was in violation of the stipulation and Woods Edge House Rules” due to his failure to “sign in and out of the building.” The House Rule at issue provides: “All Residents and Visitors are required to SIGN–In and OUT. Tenant are not allowed to sign in or out for their visitors. Everyone MUST PRINT CLEARLY. (No exceptions).”
The facts relating the alleged violations are not disputed. On various dates between February 8, 2012 and June 29, 2012, respondent “refused to sign in” when entering his apartment building at 110 Jerusalem Avenue, Hempstead. One security guard's activity report, dated May 8, 2012, records an incident in which respondent became “very upset” when asked to sign in. “He said to me that it is B.S. that the tenants have to sign in and that its harassment.” Another security guard's report, dated June 7, 2012, states that respondent “apologized by saying that he knew its my job to ask him to sign but he refuses to do so because ... he feels like an inmate that has to sign ...”
Notably, petitioner's counsel represents that the “sign in/out” rule has only been applied to tenants and their visitors at times when a security guard is present in the lobby. According to petitioner's counsel, security guards are posted in the lobby “Mondays through Sunday commencing at 3:00 p.m.” During other daytime hours, and after 1:00 a.m. two evenings each week, tenants and their visitors can come and go as they please, without signing in or signing out.
Furthermore, as explained by petitioner's counsel, tenants “are required to sign in/out only once for the day, that is, first time in and first time out. They are not asked or expected to sign in and out every single time they leave the building, as this would be an undue burden on the tenant. More importantly, they only are required to sign in this one time in and out, when security is at the door.”
By agreement of the parties, they request an in limine ruling whether such facts could support an eviction. Respondent's counsel maintains that the alleged violations of the “sign in-out” rule, by themselves, are not enough to warrant evicting respondent from his section 8 housing. Petitioner's counsel, in contrast, contends that respondent's repeated refusal to comply with the “sign in/out” rule is a “material” violation the lease, justifying an eviction.
Both parties have submitted memoranda addressing the issue. Respondent's counsel challenges petitioner's position on several grounds. Respondent's first contention merits little discussion. To the extent respondent argues that the rule is “vague and overbroad,” the Court disagrees. The rule, on its face and as applied, is not vague in the least. Nor does the rule's application raise any substantial “overbreadth” concerns, such as those addressed in cases involving public housing rules requiring “prior permission” for overnight visitors. E.g. McKenna v. Peekskill Housing Authority, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.1981).
Nevertheless, based on the manner in which the rule has been applied, respondent properly questions whether the “sign in/out” rule truly serves a valid purpose. Without question, a section 8 landlord may enact “house rules” which are reasonably related to the safety and comfort of tenants. As recognized in the HUD Handbook for section 8 housing (excerpts annexed as petitioner's Ex. H), a rule “that all visitors sign in when entering the building” is a “reasonable house rule” (Ex. H at p. 6–18). In contrast, the Handbook cautions landlords that they “must be careful not to develop restrictive rules that limit the freedom of tenants” (Ex. H at p. 6–17). Most importantly, house rules must be “fair” and “reasonable” (Ex. H at p. 6–18). The rules should not be “excessive or extreme” ( id ). They should be “within the bounds of common sense” ( id ).
“Common sense” suggests that the subject “sign in/out” rule, as applied to tenants by building management only during limited hours each day, represents an unreasonable and excessive restriction. The rule, as presently enforced by the landlord, fails to rationally further the landlord's legitimate interest in protecting the security and comfort of tenants in the development.
Unlike visitors and guests, tenants are neither strangers nor likely security risks. According to petitioner's counsel, the “sign in/out” rule is designed “to monitor entry and to ensure entry is limited to persons with legitimate business or social purposes.” While a sign in/out rule for visitors and guests rationally furthers that purpose, it is difficult to understand how that purpose is furthered by also applying the rule to tenants.
To the extent petitioner may have a legitimate interest in “monitoring entry” by tenants, it equally hard to see how that purpose is rationally furthered by a rule that is applied sporadically and inconsistently from day to day and hour to hour. In any event, that purpose is already being protected by stationing a security guard in the lobby at designated times, and by requiring tenants to secure entry to the building by using a “key fob” provided by the landlord. No rational explanation is provided by petitioner as to how adding a “sign-in” requirement for tenants somehow enhances security in the building.
In these circumstances, without condoning respondent's stubborn refusal to follow the sign-in rule for tenants, the subject violations do not appear to rise to a level allowing the landlord to charge respondent with a “material” breach of his lease, sufficient to warrant his eviction under the applicable HUD regulations governing section 8 lease terminations. The HUD regulations, read together with the HUD handbook, establish “substantive and procedural requirements” and “are intended to be mandatory, and are so treated by New York courts.” See Greene Avenue Associates v. Cardwell, 191 Misc.2d 775, 777–8 (Civ Ct Kings Co., 2002). Landlords in section 8 housing developments do not have the unfettered right to evict a tenant for any and all rules violations. Rather, the alleged violations must be viewed, and adjudicated, in the context of these regulatory requirements.
In pertinent part, the applicable HUD regulations (see 24 CFR 880 .607) and the HUD Handbook provisions governing lease terminations (excerpts annexed as petitioner's Ex. D) provide that a tenant's lease may be terminated for “material noncompliance” only if the landlord proves “[s]ubstantial lease violations” or certain types of “[r]epeated minor violations” (see petitioner's Ex. D at p. 8–11, 8–12). In order to warrant an eviction for “repeated minor violations,” such minor violations must (a) disrupt the livability of the project, (b) adversely affect the health or safety of any person or any tenant's right to quiet enjoyment, (c) interfere with project management, or (d) have an adverse financial effect on the project. (see petitioner's Ex. D at p. 8–12 to 8–13).
Petitioner's current allegations involve neither “substantial lease violations” by respondent, nor the type of “repeated minor violations” that could reasonably justify an eviction under the above-cited regulatory criteria. Respondent's violations have not disrupted the livability of the project, they have not adversely affected health and safety, and have had no adverse financial effect. To the limited extent respondent's refusals can be deemed to have “interfered with project management,” such an argument presupposes that the “sign in/out rule” rationally furthers the legitimate interests of management. As noted above, the rule, in its current form, and as applied to tenants, is unreasonable and excessive, and thus violates HUD guidelines for section 8 housing.
Consequently, based upon the stipulated facts presented, the Court concludes that respondent's repeated violation of the “sign in/out” rule, by itself, does not provide petitioner with a proper factual and legal basis for seeking to evict respondent from his section 8 apartment. In so concluding, the Court has no intention of trying to interfere with building management's security decisions generally. The landlord may continue to promulgate and enforce house rules which may include a “sign in/out” requirement for visitors and strangers. Tenants who fail to follow the rules may very well face sanctions which may include lease termination and eviction. But in the absence of some clearer proof that the current rule, as applied to tenants in its present form, reasonably furthers a substantial legitimate security interest, the alleged violations by respondent are not enough to support an eviction under the HUD rules governing evictions from section 8 housing.
Finally, the Court's ruling on this point is not intended to preclude continued judicial oversight of respondent's conduct, pursuant to the stipulation of settlement. Given respondent's prior history and his continued conflicts with building management, a follow-up conference will be held on November 15, 2012, before the undersigned in Civil Part 2 (room 260), to address whether further Court involvement in the landlord/tenant relationship is appropriate or necessary.
SO ORDERED.