Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC342903. Ralph W. Dau, Judge.
Sheuvonda Bratton Hempen, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, David Chaney, Chief Assistant Attorney General, James M. Schiavenza, Assistant Attorney General, Richard J. Rojo, Martin Ageson, and Molly S. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents Honorable William Chidsey, Jr., Honorable Drew Edwards, and Norma Garza.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Ralph L. Rosato, Assistant County Counsel, and Emery El Habiby, Deputy County Counsel for Defendants and Respondents Kathy Van Dyke and County of Los Angeles.
CHAVEZ, J.
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff and appellant Sheuvonda Bratton Hempen (plaintiff) challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her lawsuit against the County of Los Angeles (County) and various County employees and judicial officers after the trial court sustained demurrers to plaintiff’s first amended complaint and issued separate orders dismissing the action with prejudice as against the various defendants. We affirm the trial court’s orders dismissing the action.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sued, on her own behalf and on behalf of other “interested parties,” the County of Los Angeles (County), Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge William Chidsey, Jr. (Chidsey), Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Drew Edwards (Edwards), Norma Garza, a deputy clerk of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, and Kathy Van Dyke (Van Dyke), a senior deputy public conservator for the County of Los Angeles, for alleged acts and omissions in connection with three different court proceedings – issuance of a search warrant that led to a search of plaintiff’s home and person (the search warrant), issuance of a mental health conservatorship order for plaintiff’s son (the conservatorship), and a civil lawsuit against another defendant, Moune Jackson (the Jackson lawsuit), who is not a party to this appeal. Chidsey purportedly issued the search warrant. Edwards issued the conservatorship order, and Van Dyke purportedly investigated matters concerning the conservatorship proceeding for plaintiff’s son. Garza was the deputy court clerk responsible for the Jackson lawsuit.
Plaintiff asserted causes of action against Chidsey, Edwards and Garza for judicial negligence, public safety, public corruption, corruption, treason, war crimes, terrorist, terrorist acts, reckless endangerment, and undue mental anguish and emotional distress. Against the County and Van Dyke, plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, mental anguish/emotional distress, retaliation, reckless endangerment, and discrimination.
Defendants Chidsey, Edwards and Garza demurred on the grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to assert the claims of others, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review orders of other trial courts, plaintiff failed to comply with the filing requirements of the California Tort Claims Act, plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to support any of the alleged causes of action, and the doctrine of judicial immunity barred plaintiff’s claims. The trial court sustained the demurrer, without leave to amend, for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On April 25, 2006, the trial court granted the ex parte application for a judgment dismissing the action against Chidsey, Edwards, and Garza.
Defendants County and Van Dyke demurred on the grounds that they were immune from liability under Government Code sections 820.2 and 815.2, the complaint was uncertain and failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, plaintiff failed to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, and plaintiff failed to provide any statutory basis for her claims. On March 9, 2006, the trial court sustained the demurrer, based on failure to state a cause of action, but granted plaintiff leave to amend within 10 days. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within 10 days of the trial court’s order, and the County and Van Dyke filed an ex parte motion for an order dismissing the action. On August 11, 2006, the trial court issued an order dismissing the action against the County and Van Dyke.
Plaintiff filed separate appeals with respect to the trial court’s April 25, 2006, and August 11, 2006 orders and subsequently moved to consolidate those appeals. We granted the motion to consolidate.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) The legal sufficiency of the complaint is reviewed de novo. (Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 790.)
II. Tort Claims Act
The California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.) provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.” (§ 945.4.) Presentation of a claim is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action against a public entity and is therefore an element that a plaintiff must prove in order to prevail. (Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119-1120.) Failure to plead facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the statutory claim presentation requirements subjects a claim against a public entity or against a public employee based on acts or omissions within the scope of employment to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (State v. Superior Court (Bodde)(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239; Briggs v. Lawrence (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 605, 612-613.)
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges no facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the California Tort Claims Act. The failure to do so precludes plaintiff from maintaining any cause of action against the County. The trial court accordingly did not err by sustaining the County’s demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Bodde, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1239.)
Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants, Chidsey, Edwards, Garza, and Van Dyke, all of whom are employees of public entities, are based solely on acts or omissions within the scope of their employment. The claims against Chidsey are based on his issuance of an allegedly illegal search warrant. The claims against Edwards are based on his issuance of an order in a conservatorship proceeding. The claims against Garza are based on her involvement, in her capacity as a deputy court clerk, in a civil action brought by plaintiff. The claims against Van Dyke are based on her investigation, as a senior deputy public conservator, of matters concerning a conservatorship proceeding. With regard to the claims asserted against these defendants, plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claims presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act. The trial court therefore properly sustained the demurrers of the individual defendants, based on plaintiff’s failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Briggs v. Lawrence, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 612-613.)
Plaintiff’s causes of action against Chidsey and Edwards are also barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity, which “bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and . . . applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction.” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851, fn. omitted.)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.