Opinion
4-9-1951
HELVEY v. SAX et al. Civ. 17734.
William M. Taylor, Coachella, for appellant. Newby, Holder & Newby, Los Angeles, for respondent Budrovic. Newman & Newman, Los Angeles, Earl Redwine, Riverside, for respondent Carreon. Jonah Jones, Jr., Long Beach, for respondent Dunlap.
HELVEY
v.
SAX et al.
April 9, 1951.
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1951.
Hearing Granted June 4, 1951. *
William M. Taylor, Coachella, for appellant.
Newby, Holder & Newby, Los Angeles, for respondent Budrovic.
Newman & Newman, Los Angeles, Earl Redwine, Riverside, for respondent Carreon.
Jonah Jones, Jr., Long Beach, for respondent Dunlap.
HANSON, Justice pro tem.
The initial question we are called upon to decide, and which we regard as being decisive, is whether a decree quieting title to three separate parcels of real estate should have been rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, where his alleged title to each parcel rested only on a quitclaim deed, without any showing by him as to any antecedent title, or that his grantor was ever in possession of the permises, or that his title, as well as that of defendant claimant owner, originated from a common grantor.
The question, we think is answered by well-established principles of law that require little, if any elaboration, to show their application to the case before us.
In this state the long-established rule is that in a quiet title suit the plaintiff may recover only upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of the title of the defendant. Rockey v. Vieux, 179 Cal. 681, 178 P. 712. Accordingly, if a defendant challenges the title of the plaintiff, the latter is not entitled to a decree even if he proves that the defendant has no title, unless he proves title in himself. Rockey v. Vieux, supra. Moreover, where a plaintiff, as here, relies upon a paper title alone, he must by proof trace his title (1) to the government, or (2) to a predecessor shown to have been in possession of the premises at the time of the conveyance made by him or (3) that the plaintiff and the defendant both claim through a common grantor. Rockey v. Vieux, supra.
In the instant case the plaintiff utterly failed to offer any proof to sustain any one of the three alternatives mentioned, unless it can be said that the named grantees in the tax deeds derived their titles, as did the plaintiff, from the persons to whom the real estate was assessed. That any such argument is unsound seems to us to be entirely self-evident. However, we pause briefly to expose the fallacy of any such contention.
While a fee-simple title holder is the owner of his land, nevertheless, the land is subject to the paramount power of the state, as the sovereign to tax it; to sell it for nonpayment of the tax; and to issue a tax deed to evidence the sale. The phrase, 'the State' as here used necessarily includes every public agency vested by the State with the taxing power. Where the charge is a tax on the land alone, as is the case here, and the law contemplates no resort may be had against the assessed owner or his personal estate, the tax as levied is in rem and not in personam. Hence, the title granted by a tax deed pursuant to a valid sale of the land for nonpayment of such a tax conveys not merely the title of the person assessed, but a new, complete and paramount title to the land in fee simple absolute, created by an independent grant from the state (or its agencies) as the sovereign. Hefner v. Northwestern Mutual, etc., Co., 123 U.S. 747, 8 S.Ct. 337, 31 L.Ed. 309. For a long list of additional cases see note to 75 A.L.R. 416; 51 Am.Jur. 937. The power thus exercised by the state or its agencies is derived from its exclusive paramount sovereign authority and not by reason of any grant to it from the owner of the realty. The state or its agencies in no sense acts by, through or under the owner, but entirely independent of the owner's title and in a direct sense adverse to it. Hence a purchaser at a valid tax sale who receives a tax deed derives his title from the state. In short, he obtains his title from a source other than from the owner. The owner is in no sense a grantor. The cases so holding, See 75 A.L.R. 416, are legion, but so far as we are advised we have no square decision on the point in this state. In the case of Dorn v. Baker, 96 Cal. 206, 31 P. 37, there is language to the effect that the holder of a tax deed derives his title from the owner rather than from the state. The statement was unnecessary to the decision. It is enough to distinguish the case to point out that the tax in that case was levied against land, the legal title to which was in the state, and hence the tax necessarily could not attach against the fee owned by the state, but at most against such right as the alleged owner had in the property, i. e., a school land certificate the state had issued acknowledging partial payment of the consideration and an agreement on its part to convey upon the payment of the remaining consideration. San Pedro, etc., R. R. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 179 P. 393; State Land Settlement Bd. v. Henderson, 197 Cal. 470, 241 P. 560.
Another case in this state which contians language we are unable to approve is Syme v. Warden, 114 Cal.App. 707, 300 P. 863. In that case, which was an action to quiet title, the plaintiff introduced in evidence a deed to him from the administratrix of the estate of one Petri, deceased; a written lease of the property by plaintiff to one Delight; testimony by Delight that he had taken possession of the property under the lease and was still in possession. Additionally, there was testimony that Petri was in possession of the property prior to and up to the date of her death. The defendants relied upon tax collector's deeds, showing that at the time of the assessments Petri was in possession and was the person to whom the property was assessed. Accordingly, as the court held, the plaintiff established a prima facie case warranting judgment in his favor when he proved the execution and delivery of a deed from the grantor while in possession. However, the court then went on to say that Petri was a common source of title; that the interest, if any, the holders of the tax titles acquired was merely the title of the decedent Petri; and that a tax deed conveyed only such interest in the land as the taxpayer had in it. These observations of the court, in our opinion, are contrary to accepted principles of the law.
Regardless of what we have so far said concerning the failure of the plaintiff to prove his own case we are of the opinion that the judgment below must be affirmed upon the ground that the plaintiff failed to sustain his challenge to the title of the various defendants. The plaintiff assails the defendants' tax titles on several grounds, among others, that the lands received no benefits by being included in or taxed by the Water District which levied the taxes. The short answer to this contention is that the assessed owners, through whom the plaintiff claims, failed to challenge the tax levy as they were required to do under the provisions of the Water Acts applicable to the case. Acts 9124 and 6178. As we regard the briefs of the respondents as being a complete answer to the alleged errors assigned by appellant on this phase of the case, we see no point in extending this opinion by, in effect, reiterating what is therein set forth.
At the close of the case below the court ordered judgment for the plaintiff as to the defendants who had defaulted, but judgment in favor of the contesting defendants. As the formal written judgment which was signed did not give judgment to the plaintiff against the defaulting defendants, plaintiff assigns this as error of the trial court, when in fact the error was due to the inattention of counsel for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the appellant is entitled to a corrected judgment. Accordingly, the judgment is ordered modified to the extent indicated, but in all other respects the judgment is affirmed with all the costs here and below imposed upon plaintiff other than the costs preliminary to default by the defaulting defendants which are ordered to be assessed by the trial court against the defaulting defendants as provided by statute.
The judgment as modified herein is affirmed.
WHITE, P. J., and DRAPEAU, J., concur. --------------- * Subsequent opinion 237 P.2d 269.