Opinion
Index No. 154564/2022 Motion Seq. No. 001
06-28-2023
MARTIN HELMER, Plaintiff, v. A.J. CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P., UNIVERSITY INN PROPERTY, LLC C/O MADDUX HOTEL CORPORATION AND, GRADUATE HOTEL MINNEAPOLIS, GRADUATE MINNEAPOLIS OWNER, LLC, GRADUATE MINNEAPOLIS LESSEE, LLC., D/B/A GRADUATE HOTEL MINNEAPOLIS, A.J. CAPITAL PARTNERS Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DATE 04/06/2023
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
LORI S. SATTLER, J.S.C.
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL .
In this premises liability action, Graduate Minneapolis Owner, LLC and Graduate Minneapolis Lessee, LLC ("Moving Defendants") move for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) dismissing all claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff Martin Helmer ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion.
Counsel for movants also represent A.J. Capital Partners, however the motion papers do not seek any relief on that Defendant's behalf.
The Verified Amended Complaint ("Complaint") alleges that Plaintiff, while a guest at the Graduate Hotel Minneapolis in Minneapolis, Minnesota, slipped and fell, suffering injuries (NYSCEF Doc. No. 5, Complaint ¶ 52). Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against the hotel owners and other related entities. The Complaint alleges that Moving Defendants are incorporated in Minnesota. The Complaint does not allege a basis for jurisdiction and venue, and the Summons provides that the basis of venue is "Defendant's residence."
Moving Defendants now seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8). A plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence, through affidavits and relevant documents, to demonstrate jurisdiction (Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch, 149 A.D.3d 485 [1st Dept 2017]). However, on a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only make a "sufficient start" in demonstrating jurisdiction "since facts relevant to this determination are frequently in the exclusive control of the opposing party and will only be uncovered during discovery" (Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 185 A.D.3d 22, 30 [1st Dept 2020], citing Peterson v Spartan Indus., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 466-467 [1974]).
Moving Defendants submit documentation showing that they are both incorporated in Delaware (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 10, 11). They argue they are not subject to general jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 301 since they are neither incorporated in nor do they have their primary place of business in New York. They further contend they are not subject to specific jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) because the cause of action did not arise from their acts within New York State sufficient to establish a substantial relationship between their activity in New York and the alleged injury.
In opposition, Plaintiff submits an affirmation of counsel. The affirmation does not dispute that the Court lacks general jurisdiction over Moving Defendants. As to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff argues there is an articulable nexus between Moving Defendants' New York business transactions and Plaintiff's alleged injuries. He relies on the fact that he reserved his hotel room on the hotel's website while he was in New York. He further contends that the "Graduate Hotel transacts considerable business within New York State" because there is a Graduate Hotel New York, however the affirmation does not point to any business transacted specifically by Moving Defendants, Graduate Minneapolis Owner, LLC and Graduate Minneapolis Lessee, LLC, in connection with the New York location.
"To be subject to general jurisdiction under CPLR § 301, a defendant corporation must either be incorporated in New York or have its principal place of business in New York" (Brocco v Eastern Metal Recycling Terminal LLC, 211 A.D.3d 628 [1st Dept 2022], citing CPLR § 301; Daimler AG v Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 [2014]). Here, it is undisputed that Moving Defendants are neither incorporated in New York nor is their principal place of business in New York. Accordingly, the Court does not have general jurisdiction over Moving Defendants.
New York can nevertheless have specific jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1). In determining whether such jurisdiction exists, a court must decide "(1) whether the defendant 'transacts any business' in New York and, if so, (2) whether the cause of action 'arises from' such a business transaction" (Brocco, 211 A.D.3d 638, citing Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, 673 F.3d 50, 60 [2d Cir 2012]; Storch v Vigneau, 162 A.D.2d 241, 242 [1st Dept 1990]). There must be a "substantial relationship" or "articulable nexus" between a defendant's transactions within the State and the claim asserted (Seger v Amchem Prods, Inc., 206 A.D.3d 442, 443 [1st Dept 2022]). A non-domiciliary must commit an act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New York (Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 24 N.Y.3d 370, 377 [2014] [citations omitted]). A "remote and indirect relationship" such as unrelated business activities is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) (Storch, 162 A.D.2d at 242).
Plaintiff first argues that the fact that he was able to reserve his hotel room using a website while in New York State constitutes a business transaction sufficient to establish jurisdiction. However, the Court has specifically held that reserving a hotel room while in New York is "too remote to support the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction" where the injury occurred at a hotel out of state (Peldman v Kalahari Resorts, LLC, 208 A.D.3d 1107 [1st Dept 2022]; see also Stern v Four Points by Sheraton Ann Arbor Hotel, 133 A.D.3d 514 [1st Dept 2015]).
Plaintiff also argues that the presence of another Graduate Hotel in New York is sufficient to survive this motion to dismiss. Yet Plaintiff presents no evidence that Moving Defendants have any relationship with the Graduate Hotel that operates in New York, other than using the same name and website. Those connections alone are too remote and indirect to establish a substantial relationship between the negligence causes of action based on a fall in Minnesota and any business transactions in New York (see Leuthner v Homewood Suites by Hilton, 151 A.D.3d 1042, 1044 [2d Dept 2017] ["Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, even if there were other, separate hotels operating in New York under the licensed or franchised name Homewood Suites by Hilton, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in New York."]).
Plaintiff further fails to raise any facts that would necessitate jurisdictional discovery. The case Plaintiff relies on in support of its contention that additional discovery is needed was a medical malpractice action involving a medical provider in New Jersey which had at some point identified itself as having a principal place of business in New York, touted its proximity to New York in advertising, and had an agreement with New York City hospitals for the referral of patients to its facility (Robins v Procure Treatment Ctrs., Inc., 157 A.D.3d 606 [1st Dept 2018]). That case is inapposite to the facts presented here.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to make a "sufficient start" in demonstrating jurisdiction and it is hereby:
ORDERED that the motion of defendants Graduate Minneapolis Owner, LLC and Graduate Minneapolis Lessee, LLC to dismiss the Verified Amended Complaint herein is granted and the pleading is dismissed in its entirety as against said defendants and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly in favor of said defendants; and it is further ORDERED that the action is severed and continued against the remaining defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that the caption be amended to reflect the dismissal and that all future papers filed with the court bear the amended caption; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for the movants shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office, who are directed to mark the court's records to reflect the change in the caption herein.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.