Heller v. Goss

11 Citing cases

  1. In re Sauk Steel Co.

    133 B.R. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)   Cited 24 times

    13. A tenant at sufferance (month to month tenant) has only naked possession and has no privity with the landlord. Heller v. Goss, 80 Ill.App.3d 716, 35 Ill.Dec. 933, 400 N.E.2d 70 (1st Dist. 1980). The only distinction between a tenant at sufferance and a trespasser is that the tenant originally had the landlord's permission to enter.

  2. Spanish Court Two Condo. Ass'n v. Carlson

    2012 Ill. App. 2d 110473 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)

    We also note that, in assessing a motion under section 9-106, we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts. Heller v. Goss, 80 Ill. App. 3d 716, 719 (1980). ¶ 18 Before we address the text of section 9-106, we first examine some preliminary sections of the FED Act.

  3. Spanish Court Two Condo. Ass'n v. Carlson

    979 N.E.2d 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 7 times

    We also note that, in assessing a motion under section 9–106, we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts. Heller v. Goss, 80 Ill.App.3d 716, 719, 35 Ill.Dec. 933, 400 N.E.2d 70 (1980).¶ 18 Before we address the text of section 9–106, we first examine some preliminary sections of the Forcible Entry Act.

  4. Caruso v. Kafka

    638 N.E.2d 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    ( Harris Trust Savings Bank v. Donovan (1991), 145 Ill.2d 166, 582 N.E.2d 120.) While a motion for judgment on the pleadings admits well-pleaded facts, it does not admit mere conclusions unsupported by allegations of specific facts. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 400 N.E.2d 70. Section 24 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:

  5. Bransky v. Schmidt Motor Sales, Inc.

    222 Ill. App. 3d 1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 18 times

    The right of a tenant at sufferance is limited to possession only, which the landlord may terminate at any time, without notice. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719. • 2 The failure of a tenant to vacate the premises following the expiration of a lease term may create a tenancy at sufferance or a holdover tenancy.

  6. TDC Development Corp. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n

    561 N.E.2d 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 15 times
    Indicating that "construction of a contract presents a question of law . . . for the trial court's determination"

    See Baker-Wendell, Inc. v. Edward M. Cohon Associates, Ltd. (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 924, 427 N.E.2d 317; David, 75 Ill. App.3d 449. • 3 It is well settled that where such examination of the pleadings discloses the existence of issues of one or more material facts, evidence must be taken to resolve such issues ( Bank Trust Co. v. Arnold N. May Builders, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 454, 456-57, 413 N.E.2d 183; see also Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 400 N.E.2d 70), and the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied ( Triangle Sign Co. v. Weber, Cohn Riley (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 839, 843, 501 N.E.2d 315; see generally Christensen v. Wick Building Systems, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 908, 381 N.E.2d 1189; Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. McCormick (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 423, 331 N.E.2d 832; Affiliated Realty Mortgage Co. v. Jursich (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 146, 308 N.E.2d 118), since a judgment on the pleadings is proper if only questions of law and not of fact exist after the pleadings have been filed. Walker, 65 Ill.2d at 552-53.

  7. Standard Mgmt. Realty Co. v. Johnson

    510 N.E.2d 986 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 14 times
    Opening statement by counsel held not to be a judicial admission that defendant was a tenant for a specified period

    • 2, 3 Johnson asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the failure of Standard to properly serve notice. If the determination was made that Johnson had a tenancy for a determinable period of time, then plaintiff needed to serve proper notice. ( Stanmeyer v. Davis (1944), 321 Ill. App. 227, 53 N.E.2d 22.) If, on the other hand, a determination was made that Johnson was a tenant at sufferance he had only naked possession, terminable whenever the landlord desired, with no requirement that notice be given or that a demand for possession be made. ( Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 400 N.E.2d 70.) Where a lease does not expressly fix the beginning of the term the entire contract will be examined to ascertain the intention of the parties. ( DePauw University v. United Electric Coal Cos. (1939), 299 Ill. App. 339, 20 N.E.2d 146.)

  8. Hall v. Riverside Lincoln Mercury — Sales

    148 Ill. App. 3d 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming the lower court's discretionary power to award attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff

    All well-pleaded uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719, 400 N.E.2d 70; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544. Defendant argues that section 1989(a) requires a finding of an actual intent to defraud and therefore a genuine issue of fact remains.

  9. Builders Plumb. Supply Co. v. Zambetta

    492 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 9 times

    • 1 Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 176-77; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) All well-pleaded, uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261. It is uncontradicted that (1) defendant signed the installment judgment note for $20,989.13 and plaintiff agreed that no action to recover for the account would be filed until the note came due; (2) plaintiff did file suit against defendant on the account before the note matured; and (3) defendant paid the $20,989.

  10. Douglass v. Wones

    120 Ill. App. 3d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that `under these circumstances the bank . . . generally cannot be a holder in due course as against the drawer if it has permitted the presenter to withdraw or otherwise use the proceeds of the check without taking precautions to determine the authority of the person to receive them'

    To state a cause of action for conspiracy, plaintiffs must allege the combination of two or more persons who act in concert to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by criminal or unlawful means. ( Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 721, 400 N.E.2d 70.) An allegation of fraud, conspiracy or collusion must show the facts upon which the allegation is based, and not mere conclusions of the pleader. In re Estate of Hansen (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 283, 294, 248 N.E.2d 709.