13. A tenant at sufferance (month to month tenant) has only naked possession and has no privity with the landlord. Heller v. Goss, 80 Ill.App.3d 716, 35 Ill.Dec. 933, 400 N.E.2d 70 (1st Dist. 1980). The only distinction between a tenant at sufferance and a trespasser is that the tenant originally had the landlord's permission to enter.
We also note that, in assessing a motion under section 9-106, we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts. Heller v. Goss, 80 Ill. App. 3d 716, 719 (1980). ¶ 18 Before we address the text of section 9-106, we first examine some preliminary sections of the FED Act.
We also note that, in assessing a motion under section 9–106, we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts. Heller v. Goss, 80 Ill.App.3d 716, 719, 35 Ill.Dec. 933, 400 N.E.2d 70 (1980).¶ 18 Before we address the text of section 9–106, we first examine some preliminary sections of the Forcible Entry Act.
( Harris Trust Savings Bank v. Donovan (1991), 145 Ill.2d 166, 582 N.E.2d 120.) While a motion for judgment on the pleadings admits well-pleaded facts, it does not admit mere conclusions unsupported by allegations of specific facts. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 400 N.E.2d 70. Section 24 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
The right of a tenant at sufferance is limited to possession only, which the landlord may terminate at any time, without notice. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719. • 2 The failure of a tenant to vacate the premises following the expiration of a lease term may create a tenancy at sufferance or a holdover tenancy.
See Baker-Wendell, Inc. v. Edward M. Cohon Associates, Ltd. (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 924, 427 N.E.2d 317; David, 75 Ill. App.3d 449. • 3 It is well settled that where such examination of the pleadings discloses the existence of issues of one or more material facts, evidence must be taken to resolve such issues ( Bank Trust Co. v. Arnold N. May Builders, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 454, 456-57, 413 N.E.2d 183; see also Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 400 N.E.2d 70), and the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied ( Triangle Sign Co. v. Weber, Cohn Riley (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 839, 843, 501 N.E.2d 315; see generally Christensen v. Wick Building Systems, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill. App.3d 908, 381 N.E.2d 1189; Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. McCormick (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 423, 331 N.E.2d 832; Affiliated Realty Mortgage Co. v. Jursich (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 146, 308 N.E.2d 118), since a judgment on the pleadings is proper if only questions of law and not of fact exist after the pleadings have been filed. Walker, 65 Ill.2d at 552-53.
• 2, 3 Johnson asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the failure of Standard to properly serve notice. If the determination was made that Johnson had a tenancy for a determinable period of time, then plaintiff needed to serve proper notice. ( Stanmeyer v. Davis (1944), 321 Ill. App. 227, 53 N.E.2d 22.) If, on the other hand, a determination was made that Johnson was a tenant at sufferance he had only naked possession, terminable whenever the landlord desired, with no requirement that notice be given or that a demand for possession be made. ( Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 400 N.E.2d 70.) Where a lease does not expressly fix the beginning of the term the entire contract will be examined to ascertain the intention of the parties. ( DePauw University v. United Electric Coal Cos. (1939), 299 Ill. App. 339, 20 N.E.2d 146.)
All well-pleaded uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719, 400 N.E.2d 70; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544. Defendant argues that section 1989(a) requires a finding of an actual intent to defraud and therefore a genuine issue of fact remains.
• 1 Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 176-77; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 969, 975, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 560.) All well-pleaded, uncontradicted facts contained in a movant's affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 719; Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 255, 261. It is uncontradicted that (1) defendant signed the installment judgment note for $20,989.13 and plaintiff agreed that no action to recover for the account would be filed until the note came due; (2) plaintiff did file suit against defendant on the account before the note matured; and (3) defendant paid the $20,989.
To state a cause of action for conspiracy, plaintiffs must allege the combination of two or more persons who act in concert to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by criminal or unlawful means. ( Heller v. Goss (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 716, 721, 400 N.E.2d 70.) An allegation of fraud, conspiracy or collusion must show the facts upon which the allegation is based, and not mere conclusions of the pleader. In re Estate of Hansen (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 283, 294, 248 N.E.2d 709.