Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-002013-MR
12-07-2012
BENJAMIN C. HELLARD APPELLANT v. CLARK TAYLOR, WARDEN; AND TIM J. FORGY, ADJUSTMENT OFFICER APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Benjamin Hellard, Pro Se Wheelwright, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Allison R. Brown Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-00059
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: KELLER, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. TAYLOR, JUDGE: Benjamin C. Hellard brings this pro se appeal from a September 14, 2011, Order of the Oldham Circuit Court dismissing Hellard's petition for declaratory judgment. We affirm.
Hellard is an inmate at the Luther Luckett Correction Complex. In 2010, Hellard was charged with violating various prison rules and policies and was found guilty in three separate disciplinary proceedings by an adjustment officer. As a result, Hellard was placed in disciplinary segregation and assessed a forfeiture of good-time credit. In January 2011, Hellard filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Oldham Circuit Court seeking restoration of his good-time credit. By order entered September 14, 2011, the circuit court upheld the disciplinary proceedings and dismissed the petition. This appeal follows.
Hellard argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition for declaration of rights. Specifically, he seeks reversal of the charges of disrespective or threatening language and violent demonstration. He also seeks restoration of a total of 120 days of good-time credit. In support thereof, Hellard argues that he was denied the right to present certain evidence and that the adjustment officer failed to make sufficient findings of fact.
In a prison disciplinary proceeding, it is well-established that an inmate is not entitled to a "full panoply" of rights. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). Instead, due process is satisfied if the inmate receives advance written notice of the charges, an opportunity to call witnesses and to present evidence as consistent with safety and correctional goals, and a written statement of the evidence and reasons for the disciplinary action. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985). And, our Courts review the factual findings of disciplinary action for "some evidence." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. Thus, if some evidence exists in the record, the disciplinary action will not be disturbed. Id.
In this case, the circuit court succinctly and eruditely set forth its reasoning for upholding the disciplinary actions against Hellard. Because we can neither add to nor subtract therefrom, we adopt the circuit court's reasoning:
[Hellard] was provided advance written notice of the charges against him, an opportunity to present a defense, and was provided a written statement by the fact-finder detailing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken. The adjustment officer's written findings summarize the evidence he relied upon and create a record sufficient to allow for meaningful review. The facts in this action satisfy procedural due process in the prison disciplinary context. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-567 (1994); Superintendent Mass. Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and "the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); see also Baxter v. Palmingiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1976). A much lower evidentiary standard applies in the prison disciplinary context than in a criminal prosecution. The statement by Officer Shinault that [Hellard] threw his ID at him, and asked him for money and his social security number and the statement by Officer Entrican that [Hellard] stated he would kill him for his father provided some evidence to support the finding that [Hellard] committed the disciplinary infractions. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456; Smith v. O'Dea, 839 S.W.2d 353, 368 (Ky. App. 1997). The adjustment officer clearly listed, in his written findings, the evidence relied upon and the reasons for his conclusions.
[Clark Taylor, Warden, and Tim J. Forgey, Adjustment Officer] violated no due process right held by [Hellard] under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitition. . . .
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed Hellard's petition for declaration of rights.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Benjamin Hellard, Pro Se
Wheelwright, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Allison R. Brown
Frankfort, Kentucky