Heinzman v. Coon

1 Citing case

  1. Young v. Griffin

    292 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 2 times

    In the next phrase or sentence 'and it is My desire at her death all the property belonging to She and I at My death,' we must determine whether or not the word 'desire' as used is mandatory or precatory and in doing so we must construe that word in connection with all the remaining parts of said will. We have concluded that the word 'desire' is precatory, because we can not say that he intended the use of the word 'desire' to be anything other than the expression of a wish because he used it in connection with all of the property of both himself and his wife at the time of his death. If he had used it in connection with his property only, and based upon the part of his property only that remained on hand at the date of the death of Mrs. Young, then, and in that event, we think the courts have held that the word 'desire' when so used, is mandatory. Arrington v. McDaniel, Tex.Com.App., 14 S.W.2d 1009; Langehennig v. Hohmann, Tex.Com.App., 139 Tex. 452, 163 S.W.2d 402; Heinzman v. Coon, Tex., 290 S.W.2d 219. It is a well-settled rule of law that life estates in personal property are not favored, 31 C.J.S., Estates, ยง 133, p. 151.