Heins v. Board of Trustees

11 Citing cases

  1. Illiano v. Mineola Union Free School Dist

    585 F. Supp. 2d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)   Cited 77 times
    Finding gender-based hostility when the Defendants' comments and epithets included telling the Plaintiff she could “be one of his girls” and that he “could have [her] anytime he wanted to,” and by maintaining “an inappropriate relationship with his other [employee] by ‘constantly placing his hands on [her] body’ and speaking to her with profane and sexually suggestive language.”

    However, there is a dispute as to whether the statements were in fact true. See Ciuffetelli v. Apple Bank For Savings, 208 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Heins v. Board of Trustees, 237 A.D.2d 570, 571, 655 N.Y.S.2d 996, 996 (2d Dep't 1997)) ("Truth is an absolute defense to an action based on defamation"). The individual Defendants maintain that their statements were true because the Plaintiff was asked to resign for misuse of her work email account.

  2. Greenberg v. Spitzer

    155 A.D.3d 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 97 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing trial court's application of the privilege as to statements that "went beyond merely summarizing or restating the ... proceedings" because, "[w]hen viewed in context, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the statements provided substantially accurate reporting of the ... case"

    In addition, where, as here, the plaintiff is a public figure, the plaintiff is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defamatory statements were published with actual malice (see Mahoney v. Adirondack Publ. Co., 71 N.Y.2d at 39, 523 N.Y.S.2d 480, 517 N.E.2d 1365 ). "Truth is an absolute defense to an action based on defamation" ( Heins v. Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Greenport, 237 A.D.2d 570, 571, 655 N.Y.S.2d 996 ; see Goldberg v. Levine, 97 A.D.3d 725, 726, 949 N.Y.S.2d 692 ). The test to determine whether a statement is substantially true "is whether [the statement] as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced" ( Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537 ; see Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc., 135 A.D.3d 87, 94, 21 N.Y.S.3d 6 ).

  3. Gutierrez v. Mcgrath Mgmt. Servs., Inc.

    152 A.D.3d 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 13 times

    "The complaint must set forth the particular words allegedly constituting defamation" ( Arvanitakis v. Lester, 145 A.D.3d 650, 651, 44 N.Y.S.3d 71 ; see CPLR 3016[a] ). Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim (see Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d at 39, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1 ; see Heins v. Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Greenport, 237 A.D.2d 570, 571, 655 N.Y.S.2d 996 ). Here, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was "held up to public contempt, ridicule, disgrace, and prejudice" by the posting of certain notices at the condominium complex by the Vista defendants.

  4. Goldberg v. Levine

    97 A.D.3d 725 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 30 times

    Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by the defendant demonstrated that the defendant's statements that hazardous or toxic substances were located on the plaintiff's property were substantially true. “Truth is an absolute defense to an action based on defamation” ( Heins v. Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Greenport, 237 A.D.2d 570, 571, 655 N.Y.S.2d 996;see Kamalian v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 29 A.D.3d 527, 528, 814 N.Y.S.2d 261). Thus, the documentary evidence submitted by the defendant conclusively establishes a defense to the claim as a matter of law ( see Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190).

  5. Matter of Pelekanos v. City of New York

    264 A.D.2d 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 11 times

    Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The law is well established that a potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h (1) is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality ( see, General Municipal Law § 50-h; Best v. City of New York, 97 A.D.2d 389, affd 61 N.Y.2d 847, for reasons stated below; Patterson v. Ford, 255 A.D.2d 373; Heins v. Board of Trustees, 237 A.D.2d 570; Arcila v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 231 A.D.2d 660; Schrader v. Town of Orangetown, 226 A.D.2d 620). The petitioner here does not dispute the fact that a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h was adjourned six times at her request or that she failed to appear on the scheduled hearing date of March 30, 1998, despite being advised that it was the last hearing date available before April 4, 1998, the expiration of the Statute of Limitations for commencing an action to recover damages for personal injuries. Since the petitioner failed to provide an adequate excuse for her noncompliance with the respondent's demand for an examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h (1), the Supreme Court properly denied the petition, made on the eve of the expiration of the Statute of Limitations, to compel the defendant to hold a hearing ( see, Matter of Dickey v. City of New York, 167 A.D.2d 238).

  6. Patterson v. Ford

    255 A.D.2d 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 10 times

    The record establishes that pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, a hearing was timely noticed, that it was adjourned multiple times at the plaintiff's request, and that the plaintiff served a summons and complaint upon the appellants before the hearing was held. The law is well established that a potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h (1) is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality ( see, Heins v. Board of Trustees, 237 A.D.2d 570; Arcila v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 231 A.D.2d 660; Schrader v. Town of Orangetown, 226 A.D.2d 620). Accordingly, the appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them should have been granted. Mangano, P. J., Joy, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

  7. McVea v. Honsaker

    66 Misc. 3d 1210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

    By commencing the action on July 3, 2019, Plaintiff violated GML § 50-h(5). "The law is well established that a potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h (1) is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality (citing, Heins v. Board of Trustees , 237 AD2d 570 ; Arcila v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport , 231 AD2d 660 ; Schrader v. Town of Orangetown , 226 AD2d 620 )." Patterson v. Ford , 255 AD2d 373 [2d Dept 1998].

  8. Jennings v. Wall St. Journal

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 31059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)

    Applying these legal principles, I find that the documentary evidence submitted by the defendants demonstrated that the subject statement published in its paper was substantially true. As previously mentioned herein, "[T]ruth is an absolute defense to an action based on defamation" (Heins v. Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Greenport, 237 A.D.2d 570, 571, 655 N.Y.S.2d 996; see Kamalian v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 29 A.D.3d 527, 528, 814 N.Y.S.2d 261).

  9. Amato v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Parks & Recreation

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 30097 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)

    Substantial truth is an absolute defense to a defamation action, even when a derogatory statement has been made. Proskin v Hearst Corporation, 14 AD3d 782, 783 [3d Dept 2005]; Heins v Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Greenport, 237 AD2d 570 [2d Dept 1997]. Thus, the cause of action was correctly dismissed.

  10. Designer Limousines v. Town of N. Hempstead

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 51266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)

    The law is well established that a potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h (1) is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality. See, Heins v. Board of Trustees, 237 AD2d 570 (2d Dept. 1997); Arcila v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 231 AD2d 660 (2d Dept. 1996); Schrader v. Town of Orangetown, 226 AD2d 620 (2d Dept. 1996). The Plaintiff's proffered excuses for delaying the hearing mandated by statute are insufficient to overcome the requirement.