Opinion
Cause No. 4:02-CV-0001-AS
January 2, 2003.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's, Subaru-Isuzu Automotive Inc. ("SIA" or "Defendant") motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Rhonda Heims ("Heims" or "Plaintiff"), a former employee of SIA filed her complaint against SIA on December 13, 2001. Plaintiff alleges that SIA subjected her to gender harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Plaintiff also alleges that SIA violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 14, 1989, SIA hired Heims as a Secretarial Assistant in the Information Services ("IS") Department. In April 1996, SIA expanded the IS Department's Systems Development Group ("SDG") staff by two positions, including a newly-created entry level programmer-trainee position. On the recommendation of SDG Section Manager, Joe Spate ("Spate"), and his immediate supervisor Bill Howard, SIA promoted Heims to the programmer-trainee position in July 1996. In approximately June 1998, Heims was moved from the Client Server Group to the Finance Group. The Finance Group which was later renamed Management Systems Group ("MSG"), included Mike Lavengood, Greg Grubbs, and Will Goodwin. These are the three males which Heims asserts were her comparators for purposes of her discrimination claims.
On or about November 1, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging retaliation and discrimination. Heims alleged that Bill Howard retaliated against her by denying her: 1) a promotion in 1998 after she assumed the responsibilities of her Group Leader; 2) opportunities to attend SAP training seminars in 1999 that other similarly situated males were allowed to attend; and 3) another promotion in 2000. Now before this Court is SIA's motion for summary judgment in their favor and against Heims as to all of the claims set forth in her Complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 164 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 1998). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1998). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts shows that there is a genuine [material] issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 1994); nor may that party rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995).
During its summary judgment analysis, the court must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, it is required to analyze summary judgment motions under the standard of proof relevant to the case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55. Applying the above standard, this Court now addresses defendant's motion.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Equal Pay Act Claim
1. Prima Facie Case
Plaintiff alleges that SIA violated the Equal Pay Act by paying her less than Mike Lavengood, Wilbur Goodwin, and Gregory Grubbs. The Equal Pay Act prohibits the payment of lower wages to employees of one gender "for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). In order to prevail on such a claim, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that: 1) different wages are paid to employees of the opposite sex; 2) the employees do equal work which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and 3) the employees have similar working conditions. Markel v. Board of Regents of Wisconsin System, 276 F.3d 906, 912-23 (7th Cir. 2002). Equal skill, equal effort, and equal responsibilities "constitute separate tests, each of which must be met in order for the equal pay standard to apply." 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14.
Plaintiff claims that SIA violated the Equal Pay Act by paying her less than similarly situated male employees in the MSG, and in particular, plaintiff complains about salaries paid to Lavengood, Goodwin, and Grubbs. While Plaintiff does complain about salaries paid to these three males th only job comparisons made by Plaintiff are in reference to Grubbs. Plaintiff argues that her job as compared to the job of Grubbs involved a common core of tasks and that many aspects of their jobs were identical. Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue exists as to whether Grubb's job was substantially different than Heims' job and that there is no evidence that the male employees had working conditions that were dissimilar to those of Heims.
SIA argues that the male employees Plaintiff has identified as comparators were not similarly situated. SIA contends that the differences in Plaintiff's and the males comparators' skills, experience, education, and job responsibilities doom Plaintiff's prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act. The Defendant points out that Plaintiff was not qualified to perform and did not perform the tasks performed by Lavengood, which included supervisory responsibilities, as well as responsibility for SIA's computer server administration and security administration. Likewise, the Defendant argues that there is no evidence of Plaintiff having similar duties to those of Goodwin. Goodwin was responsible for creating programs for the SAP system as well as maintaining and creating all reports and changes in the SAP system for SIA's financial and medical systems. Further, the Defendant argues that the responsibilities of Grubbs which include writing and creating conversion program reports, supporting a variety of mainframe applications, as well as being the first and only point of contact for all SAP related questions and problems, do not match the responsibilities of the Plaintiff, as she had none of these responsibilities.
In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's education and prior experience does not compare to that of her alleged comparators. All three males hold college degrees in computer-related fields, while Heims holds a degree from Indiana Business College in an executive secretarial studies program. Lavengood had fifteen years of experience in computer programming. Goodwin possessed forty years of prior computer work experience before he began working for SIA and is experienced in forty different computer languages, while Grubbs holds thirteen years of prior experience and is proficient in four different computer languages. Plaintiff possessed no prior computer-related work experience before she began her employment at SIA.
The facts do not show that Plaintiff, Heims, engaged in work which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility to that of her male comparators, which is a requirement in order to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act. To the contrary, SIA has pointed to numerous differences in the employees' duties and responsibilities. As stated in Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1989), the Plaintiff must establish that the work performed is substantially equal, not merely that she has an equal job title, job classification, or job description. Heims has not identified a similarly situated male who earned a higher salary than she did and therefore has not met the burden of sustaining her claim under the Equal Pay Act.
2. Factors Other Than Sex
Furthermore, even if Heims could meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case in violation of the Equal Pay Act, as already demonstrated above, the differences in pay in this case was based on factors wholly unrelated to sex, including job duties, educational background, and work experience. Under the Equal Pay Act, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has an opportunity to show that the pay disparity is based on one or more of the following: 1) a seniority system; 2) a merit system; 3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or 4) any other factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The fourth defense is a broad, catch-all exception in which salary differentiation can be legitimately based on differences in levels of education or experience in the particular job field. See, Dey v. Colt Construction Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994).
3. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff further alleges that SIA's failure to compensate at the exact same level as Grubbs is a willful violation of the Equal Pay Act that would entitle her to an extra year of damages. Heims claims that there is evidence that the employer knew that she was not being paid her "market value" in spite of her high qualifications and stellar record and thus a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether such violation was willful. However, between 1996 and 2001, SIA awarded Heims annual merit increases ranging between 5 and 11 percent. Heims' wages were increased in the amount of $7,280.78 in just over three years, which amounts to an increase of close to 30 percent. These increases do not seem to comport with evidence of a willful violation of the Equal Pay Act to support an extension of the two year limitation period. Therefore, SIA is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim.
B. Title VII Claim
1. Time Barred
SIA argues that most of Plaintiff's allegations with respect to gender discrimination, gender harassment, and retaliation are time-barred. Specifically, three complaints alleged by Plaintiff which fall outside the applicable 300-day period including: 1) denial of a promotion and/or job growth in 1998 and 1999; 2) denial of SAP training in 1998 and/or 1999; and 3) being paid less than male employees (prior to January6, 2000). The statutory period for filing a Title VII charge of discrimination with the EEOC in deferral states such as Indiana is 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act. Risk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 F. Supp.2d 1135, 1140 (S.D.Ind. 1999). Additionally, the Defendant argues that to the extent Plaintiff is asserting Title VII claims or seeking damages based upon any other acts or omissions that allegedly occurred prior to January 6, 2000, her claims are barred.
Heims contends that the continuing violation theory is applicable to the case at hand. The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff to get relief for a time-barred act by linking it with an act that is within the limitations period. For purposes of the limitations period courts treat such a combination as one continuous act that ends with the limitation period. Risk, 48 F. Supp.2d at 1141. One of the theories under this doctrine allows a plaintiff to show a continuing violation where an employer covertly follows a practice of discrimination over a period of time. Id. at 1142. Plaintiff claims that complaints of not receiving overtime pay in 1994, as well as her failure to receive promotions and equal pay from 1998 forward, give rise to a genuine issue of whether a continuing violation has occurred preventing application of the 300-day rule.
However, SIA argues that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (2002) rejected the application of the continuing violation doctrine to discrete acts of discrimination. The Court distinguished between discrete acts of discrimination and hostile work environment claims. Id. at 2073-74. Discrete acts, "such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire, are easy to identify." Id. at 2073. As to Plaintiff's first allegation that she was denied a promotion, the Court in Morgan explicitly designated that the denial of a promotion is an easily identifiable act which cannot be resurrected under the continuing violation doctrine. Similarly, the alleged denial of training opportunity would be categorized as a discrete act. Finally, receipt of lower pay checks does not revive past allegedly discriminatory conduct. See, Snider v. Belvidere Township, 216 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2000).
The continuing violation doctrine, according to Morgan, does not apply to the three specific allegations asserted by Heims. The denial of a promotion, denial of training, and the fact that she was paid less than male employees does not pass muster under Morgan to allow application of the continuing violation theory. Therefore, these specific claims, and claims asserted upon acts or omissions that allegedly occurred prior to January 2000 are time-barred.
2. Prima Facie Case
Heims alleges that she was wrongfully denied training, promotions, job growths, and that she was paid less than male employees. She also claims that she was treated differently than male employees. Plaintiff contends that her testimony as well as the record are direct evidence of an intent on the part of her employer to discriminate. Plaintiff testified that she was denied opportunities for training which other male employees received. She also testified that she was denied promotions despite her stellar record. Heims further points to the fact that the record shows she was paid less than her male comparators. Under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff must show either an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant or circumstantial evidence that provides the basis for an inference of intentional discrimination. Gorence v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 242 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2000). All that is required is evidence from which a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that the defendant treated the plaintiff differently because the latter was a member of a protected class. Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1995). In Troupe, three different types of circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination were identified. Heims argues that the proposed claims fall within the third type under Troupe.
The Seventh Circuit has noted in Gorence that the third type of circumstantial evidence in a direct case is substantially the same as the evidence required under McDonnell-Douglas. Gorence, 242 F.3d at 762. Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This requires the Plaintiff to produce evidence that: 1) he or she was a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for the job in question or was meeting SIA's legitimate performance expectations; 3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) SIA treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. See Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 742-43 (7th Cir. 1999).
a. Compensation Claim
With respect to Plaintiff's claim that she was discriminated against and suffered an adverse employment action based on the fact that she was paid less than male employees that were similarly situated, there is no evidence. As discussed, Plaintiff's claim ignores the fact that her salary disparity was based on differences in education, experience, and job responsibilities between herself and Grubbs. Heims has not shown that SIA acted with any kind of discriminatory intent, nor that SIA treated similarly situated male employees more favorably or that she was compensated less than any male comparator because of her sex.
b. Denial of JobGrowth/Training
Denial of a monetary perk, such as a bonus does not constitute an adverse employment action if it is wholly within the discretion of the employer to grant or deny and is not a component of the employee's salary. See Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996). Similarly, the denial of job growth would not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. Job growths are irregular and not part of the employee's salary and are wholly discretionary. Plaintiff was recommended for job growths in 1998, 1999, and 2000. However, job growths are awarded on a limited basis and most employees submitted for job growths each year do not receive one.
Plaintiff also alleges the existence of an adverse employment action regarding the denial of training. Plaintiff did not establish that she was provided with less training than Grubbs. An adverse employment action must materially alter the terms and conditions of employment. Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d 482 at 488. This is simply not the case with regard to the alleged denial of training. Even so, there is still the missing element of proof that she and Grubbs were similarly situated. She simply claims she was not provided with as much training as she wanted, which is not enough to establish an adverse employment action.
Plaintiff also claims that she suffered an adverse employment action in that she was restricted to her desk and monitored more closely than Grubbs for tardiness. However, Heims fails to demonstrate how these alleged acts constitute an adverse employment action. There is no evidence that Heims was disciplined or that the conditions of her employment were materially altered. Moreover as stated numerous times there is no evidence that she and Grubbs were similarly situated, rather, to the contrary there is evidence that they were not.
3. Pretext
To show pretext in the employer's stated reason for an adverse employment action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is a lie or lacks factual basis. Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 2000). Heims has not offered any evidence to suggest that SIA's reasons for any disparity between herself and her male comparators is a lie. In regards to her salary, she is not similarly situated to her male comparators in terms of education, or experience which lends reason for the disparity of salaries. There is also no evidence that Heims received less training than her male comparators. And finally, in regards to job growths, neither Howard nor Spate possessed the final authority to approve those job growths, for which they recommended her. SIA's Operations Committee approved all job growths and promotions. Plaintiff's assertions do not in any way establish that SIA lied or did not honestly believe in its reasons for the alleged discriminatory conduct. For the foregoing reasons, SIA is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.
C. Retaliation Claim
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that: 1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) there is a causal link between the protected expression and adverse action. Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 164 F.3d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1998). If Plaintiff makes the prima facie showing, the burden shifts to SIA to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action and once it does so, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing SIA's reasons are pretextual and that its actual reason was retaliatory. Dey v. Colt Const. Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1994). As discussed above, Heims did not establish that she suffered an adverse employment action with respect to the terms and/or conditions of her employment in regards to training, job growth, or compensation. Even assuming arguendo that Heims had satisfied the first two elements of a prima facie case of retaliation, there is still not a causal link between the protected expression and adverse action. Nowhere does Plaintiff attempt to claim that a specific complaint was followed by an adverse employment action. Furthermore, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons have already been provided by SIA for the alleged actions and the issue of pretext has already been addressed and rejected by this Court. Therefore, SIA is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim.
D. Gender Harassment Claim
1. EEOC Charge
Plaintiff's gender harassment claim fails due to the fact that it is outside the scope of her EEOC charge. Plaintiff's EEOC charge referenced specific allegations related to Plaintiff's pay, training, promotions, and job growths. Within those complaints, no inference is made with respect to gender harassment. While an EEOC claimant may pursue a claim not contained in her EEOC charge, a plaintiff may only do so if the allegations in the complaint are "like or reasonably related" to those in the EEOC charge. See Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Co., 31 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff claims that her EEOC charge is broad enough to encompass gender based discipline that would have prevented her advancement and contributed to the refusal of advancement, promotions, training, and equal pay. The alleged incidents of gender harassment involve attendance and conduct. In contrast, Plaintiff's allegations in her EEOC charge involve specific instances related to pay, promotion, and training. The allegations in Heims' complaint which refer to gender based discipline or harassment are not "like or reasonably related" to the complaints raised in her EEOC charge and therefore fall outside the scope of the EEOC charge.
2. Prima Facie Case
Even assuming Plaintiff's gender harassment claim is within the scope of her EEOC charge, the Defendant still claims she fails to establish her prima facie case. In order to establish a prima facie case for gender harassment, Plaintiff must establish that: 1) she was a member of a protected group under Title VII; 2) she was harassed by her employer; 3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions of her employment; and 4) male employees were not subjected to similar treatment. Cline v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 650, 656 (N.D.Ill. 1990). Plaintiff claims that certain heated exchanges and repeated abusive behaviors in regards to her tardiness and conduct constituted a hostile work environment. However, it is not uncommon for an employer to reprimand certain behaviors and tardiness, and if such happened, is not sufficiently severe or persuasive enough to create a hostile work environment, rising to the level of gender harassment. Furthermore, the incidents which Plaintiff complains of did not result in any type of discipline or in an adverse employment action and did not alter her job responsibilities or the conditions of her employment. Therefore, SIA is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of gender harassment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's, Subaru-Isuzu Automotive Inc., motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in all respects, on each of the claims asserted by Plaintiff, Rhonda Heims.