New York applies a "transactional analysis" approach in deciding res judicata issues. O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N Y2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (1981); Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 27-31, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647-49, 379 N.E.2d 172, 174-76 (1978); see also Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1984). "[O]nce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy."
Courts still have the responsibility to decide questions of law, even if the particular case also involves a political issue or legislative matter. (See, e.g., Matter of Board of Educ. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 535, 538; Matter of Anderson v. Krupsak, 40 N.Y.2d 397, 403; see also, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 39, appeal dismissed 459 U.S. 1138; cf., Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14, cert denied 470 U.S. 1084.) "To do otherwise would only undermine the function of the judiciary as a coequal branch of government."
Aurecchione, however, has already litigated the substance of her dispute to judgment in the state proceedings; hence, principles of res judicata would seem to bar her from now pursuing a claim under Title VII based on the same dispute. See, e.g., Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) ("A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action."); Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1984) ("a claim that could have been asserted under a given set of facts in a concluded action is barred from being asserted under the same set of facts in a subsequent action"). I am thus skeptical that Aurecchione will be able, in an amended complaint as suggested by the majority, to state a viable claim with respect to her already litigated employment dispute or as to a free-standing right to attorneys' fees that could enable her to be found a "prevailing party" under Title VII within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
However, the operation of this broad bar is limited to situations where the initial forum had the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation. Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 141 (1985); see McLearn v. Cowen Company, 48 N.Y.2d 696, 698, 422 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61, 397 N.E.2d 750, 751-52 (1979). In other words, only if a claim could have been litigated in a prior proceeding will it later be precluded on grounds of res judicata.
The second argument was based on Port Chester's alleged failure to comply with the notice of claim provisions contained in the contract. Although the district court's failure to consider these arguments would not preclude us from relying on them as grounds for affirmance, see Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 141 (1985), we are satisfied that, because both arguments invoke unresolved factual issues, neither of them presents a proper ground for summary judgment disposition. In sum, we hold that the district court's grant of summary judgment was error.
Although the district court based its dismissal of the complaint on other grounds, we are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Staten Island R.R., 792 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 927, 93 L.Ed.2d 978 (1987); Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 141 (1985); 6 J. Moore J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], at 56-1561 (2d ed. 1985). Turning next to appellants' claims against the City, the first cause of action identified by the district court is that appellants were not afforded a prompt hearing to review the denial of their application for the initial two medallions.
This bar against later claims based upon the same cause of action is, however, subject to certain limitations, one of which is that it will not be applied if the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation. Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 141 (1985); see McLearn v. Cowen Company, 48 N.Y.2d 696, 698, 422 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61, 397 N.E.2d 750, 751-52 (1979); Salwen Paper Co., Profit Sharing Retirement Trust v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 385, 391, 424 N.Y.S.2d 918, 922 (2d Dep't 1980). Where "formal barriers" to asserting a claim existed in the first forum it would be "unfair to preclude [the plaintiff] from a second action in which he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from presenting in the first." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c) comment c (1982).
An appellate court may affirm a district court's decision on any basis for which a sufficient record exists to permit findings of fact and conclusions of law. Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 141 (1985). Here, RLEA requested declaratory and injunctive relief to preserve the status quo pending negotiations between SIRC and the unions over the collective bargaining agreements.
The court in which the first action was brought must have been willing and able to consider the theory that is advanced in the second action. Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1984); Salwen Paper Co., Profit Sharing Retirement Trust v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 72 A.D.2d 385, 391, 424 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1980). Before examining the previous state litigation that Sadore successfully argued in the district court was a bar to Bottini's federal action, it will be helpful to look at Congress's objectives in Title VII.