District courts regularly “enter contribution and indemnity bar orders [under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877 and 877.6] in CERCLA cases if the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Cooper Drum, 2020 WL 2504331, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2020); see also Heim v. Heim, No. 5:10-cv-03816-EJD, 2014 WL 1340063, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) (“Under federal law, particularly in CERCLA cases such as this, district courts have approved settlements and entered bar orders.”)

In approving a settlement between fewer than all of the parties in a multiparty litigation, a federal court may enter a bar order precluding subsequent claims for contribution and indemnity by non-settling parties. See Heim v. Heim, No. 5:10-CV-03816-EJD, 2014 WL 1340063, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014). "[C]ourts review settlements and generally enter contribution and indemnity bar orders in CERCLA cases if the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate." Coppola v. Smith, No. 1:11-CV-1257 AWI BAM, 2017 WL 4574091, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2017) (collecting cases); AmeriPride Services Inc. v. Valley Indus., 2007 WL 1946635, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2007), (citing United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1424, 1432-33 (W.D. Wash. 1990)) ("Under federal law, particularly in CERCLA cases such as this, district courts have approved settlements and entered bar orders.").

Though plaintiff may have sufficiently plead the intent requirement as to defendant's dumping of concrete, it has not pleaded defendant intended to dump concrete "washout," which contains the hazardous substance at issue. See Heim v. Heim, No. 5:10-CV-03816-EJD, 2014 WL 1340063, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) ("[T]o satisfy the intent requirement, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated that the plaintiff must prove the manufacturer entered into the relevant transaction with 'the specific purpose of disposing of a hazardous substance.'" (citation omitted)).

Cf., e.g., National Steel, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53078 at *34-*40 (separate analysis between state law and federal law) with Whitehurst v. Heinl, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49147, *8-*15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (simply applying § 877 and § 877.6 to CERCLA claims without discussion of federal common law). However, a number of courts consult § 877 and § 877.6, and either § 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA") or § 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA") in analyzing settlement agreements in CERCLA cases. E.g. Coppola, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86277 at *16-*25; Heim v. Estate of Heim, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46297, *12-*26 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014); Tyco Thermal Controls LLC v. Redwood Industrial, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91842, *11-*35, *41-*46 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010); Valley Indus., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51364 at *6-*12. The UCFA and the UCATA are "model acts . . . that advocate competing methods of accounting for a settling party's share when determining the amount of a nonsettling defendant's liability."

Cf., e.g., National Steel, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53078 at *34-*40 (separate analysis between state law and federal law) with Whitehurst v. Heinl, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49147, *8-*15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (simply applying § 877 and § 877.6 to CERCLA claims without discussion of federal common law). However, a number of courts consult § 877 and § 877.6, and either § 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA") or § 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA") in analyzing settlement agreements in CERCLA cases. E.g. Coppola, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80087 at *15-*26; Heim v. Estate of Heim, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46297, *12-*26 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014); Tyco Thermal Controls LLC v. Redwood Industrial, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91842, *11-*35, *41-*46 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010); Valley Indus., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51364 at *6-*12. The UCFA and the UCATA are "model acts . . . that advocate competing methods of accounting for a settling party's share when determining the amount of a nonsettling defendant's liability."

It appears that Defendant ATDS seeks an order determining the good faith of its settlement under § 877.6(a)(2), which sets out detailed procedures for what an application for determination of good faith settlement must include, but states that "this paragraph shall not apply to settlements in which a confidentiality agreement has been entered into regarding the terms of the settlement," as is the case here. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(a)(2); see ECF No. 77-1 at 4. "A hearing is not required because nonsettling parties were afforded an opportunity to respond to the request for good faith determination." Heim v. Heim, Case No.: 5:10-CV-03816-EJD, 2014 WL 1340063, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014); Res-Care Inc. v. Roto-Rooter Servs. Co., No. C 09-3856 EDL (DMR), 2011 WL 3610701, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2011) ("In the absence of any opposition, the court may approve the motion without a hearing."); see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(a)(2). An analysis of good faith requires "the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries."