Opinion
80429-COA
02-18-2022
MICHAEL RYAN HEIGHT, Appellant, v. AMI BAUTISTA-MAY, Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
Michael Ryan Height appeals from an order denying a motion to set aside a stipulated decree of divorce under NRCP 60(b)(1). Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Denise L. Gentile, Judge.
Judge Gentile presided over the underlying proceeding, but Height's motion for NRCP 60(b) relief and motion for reconsideration of the order denying such relief were heard by Senior Judge Valorie J. Vega, although Judge Gentile signed the resulting orders.
During the underlying proceeding, Height and respondent Ami Bautista-May reached a settlement, which was read into the record in open court and entered in the district court's minutes in the form of an order. The district court subsequently entered a stipulated divorce decree that was prepared by Bautista-Mays counsel even though Height refused to sign it. Height then moved to set aside the portion of the divorce decree that distributed the parties' community estate under NRCP 60(b)(1), asserting that it was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The district court summarily denied the motion. Height now appeals that decision.
On appeal, Height challenges the denial of his NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, observing that the district court only made limited findings to support its decision. The district court has broad discretion in ruling on NRCP 60(b) motions, and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 469, 469 P.3d 176, 179 (2020). Under NRCP 60(b)(1), the district court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order on grounds of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." When determining whether there are grounds for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief, the district court must consider four factors: "(1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith." Yochum v. Davis, 98 Nev. 484, 486, 653 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1982), overruled in part by Epstein v. Epstein, 113 Nev. 1401, 1405, 950 P.2d 771, 773 (1997).
As the Nevada Supreme Court recently held in Willard, "district courts must issue explicit and detailed findings, preferably in writing, with respect to the four Yochum factors to facilitate this court's appellate review of NRCP 60(b)(1) determinations." 136 Nev. At 471, 469 P.3d at 180. Our review of NRCP 60(b)(1) determinations "necessarily requires district courts to issue findings pursuant to the pertinent factors in the first instance." Id. at 470-71, 469 P.3d at 180 (citing Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. 424, 433, 254 P.3d 623, 629 (2011)). "Without an explanation of the reasons or bases for a district court's decision, meaningful appellate review, even a deferential one, is hampered because we are left to mere speculation." Jitnan, 127 Nev. at 433, 254 P.3d at 629.
Here, the district court did not have the henefit of Willard's explicit findings requirement when it decided Height's NRCP 60fl})(1) motion. However, even prior to Willard, the district court was required to at least consider the four Yochum factors, which it does not appear to have done, either contemporaneously on the record or in its order. Indeed, in his NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, Height discussed the Yochum factors by referencing the supreme court's decision in Lesley v, Lesley, 113 Nev. 727, 941 P.2d 451 (1997), which applied the Yochum factors. However, the district court did not discuss these factors during the hearing that followed or in its order denying the motion, and its only oral or written finding relevant to the Yochum factors was that Height's motion was timely. See Yochum, 98 Nev. at 486, 653 P.2d at 1216 (indicating that when the district court evaluates an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, it must evaluate whether the moving party promptly applied to remove the judgment and whether he or she intended to delay the proceedings). Thus, we conclude that reversal and remand is required and instruct the district court to reevaluate Height's motion for NRCP 60(b)(1) relief, in accordance with Willard, by analyzing and issuing factual findings for each of the Yochum factors.
In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion with respect to the merits of Height's NRCP 60(b)(1) motion.
Having considered the parties' remaining arguments, we conclude that they either lack merit or need not be reached given our disposition of this appeal.
Gibbons, C.J., Tao, J., Bulla, J.
Hon. Denise L. Gentile, District Judge
Hon. Valorie J. Vega, Senior Judge
Larry J. Cohen, Settlement Judge