Heigert v. Riedel

6 Citing cases

  1. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, Inc.

    235 Ill. 2d 155 (Ill. 2009)   Cited 94 times
    Refusing to extend the rationale of Pippin to allow a medical malpractice action by a nonpatient third party

    None of the foregoing cases argued by plaintiffs involved a malpractice action by a nonpatient third party and are therefore distinguishable from the case before us. Defendants have cited Heigert v. Riedel, 206 Ill. App. 3d 556 (1990), and Britton v. Soltes, 205 Ill. App. 3d 943 (1990), to support the view that a physician's duty should not be extended to nonpatient third parties. In Heigert plaintiff was a nurse who contracted tuberculosis from a patient.

  2. Piercy v. Whiteside Cnty.

    No. 14 CV 7398 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2016)   Cited 5 times
    Finding the allegations supporting the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim were sufficient to also support his IIED claim

    Piercy must also plead and ultimately prove that there was a physician-patient relationship. Heigert v. Riedel, 206 Ill. App 3d. 556, 563, 565 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Williams argues that Piercy "does not allege a physician-patient relationship, nor does [he] allege any act of negligence on the part of Dan Williams."

  3. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center

    373 Ill. App. 3d 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 4 times

    Since Kirk, our colleagues in the appellate court have been wary of finding that other types of relationships are of the same intimate nature as that presented in Renslow, expressing uncertainty regarding whether the supreme court considered that relationship to be sui generis. See, e.g., Charleston v. Larson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 540, 548-49, 696 N.E.2d 793, 799 (1998); Britton v. Soltes, 205 Ill. App. 3d 943, 945-46, 563 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1990); Heigert v. Riedel, 206 Ill. App. 3d 556, 563-64, 565 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1990). While the Illinois Supreme Court has reiterated its holding that the concept of transferred negligence is a limited exception to the customary rule barring malpractice liability to nonpatient third parties, the court has never declared the special relationship between mother and infant in Renslow to be sui generis.

  4. Garrison v. Choh

    308 Ill. App. 3d 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 32 times
    Noting that the legislature never intended for the attorney affidavit and health care professional's report to be considered part of the complaint for all purposes

    We hold that it does not. In Heigert v. Riedel, 206 Ill. App.3d 556, 558, 565 N.E.2d 60, 62 (1990), the court stated "the courts have yet to decide whether the materials required by section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure [citation] are sufficiently analogous to `exhibits' in the conventional sense to fall within this rule." The Heigert court did not resolve that question because the defendants/appellants, who had raised it in the trial court, did not argue it on appeal. Noting that the defendants cited to factual matters contained in the written doctor's report attached to the complaint in support of their argument that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action, the court assumed that the section 2-622 materials were to be treated as exhibits and taken as true for purposes of that appeal.

  5. West v. Adelmann

    630 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 1 times

    To maintain a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must have either a direct physician-patient relationship between himself and the doctor or show there exists a special relationship between defendant and the patient. Kirk, 117 Ill.2d at 531; Reynolds v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 334, 338, 576 N.E.2d 1041; Heigert v. Riedel (1990), 206 Ill. App.3d 556, 562-63, 565 N.E.2d 60; Britton v. Soltes (1990), 205 Ill. App.3d 943, 944, 563 N.E.2d 910. See also O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hospital (1990), 137 Ill.2d 332, 338-39, 561 N.E.2d 18; Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital (1977), 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250.

  6. Ventura v. Picicci

    227 Ill. App. 3d 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 4 times
    In Ventura, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant paid her son's living expenses, gave him money to buy cocaine and the gun used in the incident, and posted the son's bail, and the court held these facts insufficient to support the plaintiff's claim that the defendant owed her a duty.

    ( Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill.2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37.) Whether defendant owed a duty to plaintiff is a question of law for the court to determine considering the reasonable foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that burden on defendant. ( Heigert v. Riedel (1990), 206 Ill. App.3d 556, 565 N.E.2d 60.) Generally, a person does not have a duty to control the conduct of another to prevent harm to a third person unless a special relationship is shown. ( Johnson, 119 Ill.2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37.) The special relationships giving rise to such a duty are parent-minor child, master-servant, possessor of land-licensee, and a person in charge of another with dangerous propensities, as listed in sections 315 through 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Johnson, 119 Ill.2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37.