Heib v. Town of Big Flats

5 Citing cases

  1. Sant v. Continental Life Insurance

    291 P. 1072 (Idaho 1930)   Cited 18 times
    In Sant v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 49 Idaho 691, 291 P. 1072, suit was brought upon an accident policy by the administrator of the estate of the beneficiary, who died as the result of injuries sustained while riding on a road grader drawn by horses.

    ( Vincent v. Taylor Bros., 180 App. Div. 818, 168 N.Y. Supp. 287, 288.) The term "vehicle" includes a threshing machine and separator. ( Heib v. Town of Big Flats, 66 App. Div. 88, 73 N.Y. Supp. 86.) "Tanks which are known as sprinkling carts mounted on wheels and driven through the streets, held to be vehicles."

  2. Turner v. Purdum

    289 P.2d 608 (Idaho 1955)   Cited 17 times
    In Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P.2d 608, this Court held that the violation of statutory provisions relating to lights on vehicles is negligence per se. See also, 21 A.L.R.2d 12.

    Any farm implement, mounted on wheels, is a "vehicle" within the meaning of Sec. 49-501(a), Idaho Code, when drawn upon a public highway by a tractor or other motive power. Trussell v. Ferguson, 122 Neb. 82, 239 N.W. 461; Vincent v. Taylor Bros., 180 App. Div. 818, 168 N.Y.S. 287; Heib v. Town of Big Flats, 66 App. Div. 88, 73 N.Y.S. 86; Sant v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 49 Idaho 691, 291 P. 1072; People v. Rapini, 107 Colo. 363, 112 P.2d 551, 134 A.L.R. 545; Vande Zande v. Better Farms, Inc., 250 Wis. 191, 26 N.W.2d 541. The violation of statutory provisions requiring lights on vehicles is negligence per se. Linde v. Emmick, 16 Cal.App.2d 676, 61 P.2d 338; Furuta v. Randall, 17 Cal.App.2d 384, 62 P.2d 157; Shimizur v. Kurtz, 43 Cal.App.2d 471, 111 P.2d 1; Tendoy v. West, 51 Idaho 679, 9 P.2d 1026.

  3. Peterson v. King County

    90 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1939)   Cited 14 times
    In Peterson v. King County, 199 Wn. 106, 90 P.2d 729, there was presented the question of whether the definition of the terms "vehicle" and "motor vehicle," as contained in Laws of 1921, chapter 96, § 2, p. 252, or the definition of those terms contained in Laws of 1927, chapter 309, § 2, p. 767, was in force.

    In upholding a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court said: "Under the definition of a vehicle given in the authorities cited by appellant . . . that it is in substance `an instrumentality for transporting persons or things from place to place,' the grader at the time of the accident was being so used. ( City of St. Louis v. Woodruff, 71 Mo. 92; Heib v. Town of Big Flats, 66 App. Div. 88, 73 N.Y. Supp. 86; White v. Loades, 178 App. Div. 236, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1023.) The deceased was apparently as much `in' the grader as one could be, and there is no dispute that it was horse drawn and that it was disabled to some extent, though not wrecked, but the terms `wrecked' or `disabled' are in the policy, in the alternative.

  4. Berg v. Hetzler Bros

    179 App. Div. 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)

    " (U.S.R.S. § 4.) "The word `vehicle' * * * shall be deemed to include wagons * * * sleighs or other conveyances for persons or property." (New York City Charter; Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. City of New York, 194 N.Y. 19.) The term "vehicle" includes a threshing machine and separator. ( Heib v. Town of Big Flats, 66 App. Div. 88.) A covered sleigh drawn by horses and used for carrying passengers and property is a vehicle. ( Marselis v. Seaman, 21 Barb. 319, 323.)

  5. Vandewater v. Town of Wappinger

    69 App. Div. 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902)   Cited 5 times

    While the evidence is not disputed that the traction engine itself is within the limit of weight fixed by the statute, the appellant contends that the water tank, mounted upon a separate wagon and coupled to the engine by a short pole, constitutes a part of the load of the vehicle, and is to be taken into consideration in determining the liability of the town. We are inclined to the opinion that if the evidence had shown that the engine and water tank were both upon the bridge at the time of the accident, it would be within the spirit of the law to hold that the two constituted a single vehicle with its load, and it may be that it would be proper, as suggested in Heib v. Town of Big Flats ( 66 App. Div. 88), to take into consideration the added weight put upon the engine by reason of the load it was called upon to draw, though this does not appear to comport with the dictum of the Court of Appeals in Bush v. D., L. W.R.R. Co. ( 166 N.Y. 210, 217), but the evidence warrants the conclusion that only the front wheels of the engine were upon the bridge at the time of its collapse, and, hence, it cannot be said that the breaking of the bridge was caused by the transportation over it of a load exceeding four tons. ( Bush v. D., L. W.R.R. Co., supra.) The weight put upon the bridge is a matter of affirmative defense; it was so recognized and acted upon by the defendant, and yet the evidence fails to disclose that the bridge fell by reason of its being called upon to sustain a weight, either actual or constructive, equaling or exceeding four tons.