Although questions about the reasonableness of hypotheses are generally to be decided by the jury which heard the evidence, hearsay testimony of a deputy and the testimony of Hunter that he himself committed the crime do not create a reasonable hypothesis of Walker's guilt. Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 161, 162 (1) ( 625 SE2d 766) (2006). The State also argues that, while evidence of stolen articles in Walker's vehicle supports a finding of the requisite intent, lack of such evidence does not automatically mean no intent may be inferred, citing Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149, 150 (2) ( 358 SE2d 298) (1987). In Heflin, however, the defendant admitted that he attempted to break into an area in an automobile in which valuables might be stored.
Whether a defendant has the requisite intent to commit a crime is a question for the jury. See Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149, 150 (2) ( 358 S.E.2d 298) (1987). See Pound v. State, 230 Ga. App. 467, 468 (2) ( 496 S.E.2d 769) (1998).
The record shows that Helton entered the victim's car, opened the glove compartment, and was examining one of the victim's books when he was discovered. Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149, 150 (2) ( 358 S.E.2d 298) (1987). Judgment affirmed. Johnson, P.J., and Smith, J., concur.
Shields v. State, 202 Ga. App. 659, 661 (3) ( 415 S.E.2d 478) (1992). As stated in Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149, 150 (2) ( 358 S.E.2d 298) (1987), "`[a]s a general rule the state must, of necessity, rely on circumstantial evidence in proving intent.' Kinney v. State, 155 Ga. App. 95 (1), ( 270 S.E.2d 209) (1980). While evidence that valuables were present in the trunk is sufficient to support a finding of the requisite intent ( Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 400 (1), ( 306 S.E.2d 695) (1983)), lack of such evidence does not automatically result in a lack of evidence from which intent may be inferred.
Hawkins completed the offense concerning the automobile at the time he entered the pickup truck with the intent of taking the items stored inside it. See Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149 ( 358 S.E.2d 298) (1987). In addition to intent, theft by taking requires the actual appropriation of goods.
Any error in admitting the officer's testimony was manifestly harmless since the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that defendant entered the automobile with the requisite unlawful intent. See OCGA ยง 16-8-18; Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149, 150 (2) ( 358 S.E.2d 298). 2.
]' [Cit.]" Heflin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 149 (1) ( 358 S.E.2d 298) (1987). We find appellant's assertion indistinguishable from that raised in Heflin, in which we held: "The State complied with its obligations under the United States Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ake [, supra], and appellant did not make a showing that additional psychiatric study was necessary.
Id. at *6-7. Also in 1987, the Second District decided State v. Heflin (1987), 1987 Ohio App. Lexis 6360 [(March 30, 1987), Montgomery App. No. 9716]. There the court affirmed a denial of a motion for separate trials where defendants gave different alibi defenses but did not make statements implicating the other.