Opinion
No. C99-1015.
December 22, 1999.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to defendant's June 7, 1999, motion to dismiss (docket number 4). Oral arguments was held on October 4, 1999. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is denied in part; and granted in part.
Motion to Dismiss
The defendant must surmount a major obstacle in order to persuade this court to dismiss the plaintiff's claim at so early a stage in the litigation. "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Thus, it is only in the "unusual case" where the complaint on its face reveals some insuperable bar to relief that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted. Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1982).
The Rule does not countenance dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. Neitzke, et al. v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
The issue is not whether plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but rather whether they are entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1989). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures alert him to the legal theory underlying the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action. Id. at 4496.
Statement of Facts
On February 27, 1998, Robyn G. Hedeman was appointed by the Eleanor Soulli, mayor of Marquette, Iowa, to be the city's police chief. Under Iowa Code § 372.4, it was the Mayor's duty to appoint the police chief.
At a special meeting on January 13, 1999, the Marquette City Council requested the resignation of Police Chief Hedeman. He refused to step down. At another special meeting on April 15, 1999, the City Council adopted Ordinance 282 which created in the City Council the authority to remove the Chief of Police. Immediately, the Council fired Mr. Hedeman. At the same April 15, 1999, meeting, the Mayor, acting pursuant to her authority under Iowa Code § 372.15, re-appointed Mr. Hedeman as Police Chief, and awarded him a one-year employment contract which was signed April 20, 1999.
At the regularly scheduled City Council meeting on April 20, 1999, the Council again fired Mr. Hedeman, and passed an agreement that merged the police force of Marquette with the police force of the neighboring City of McGregor. The agreement put the McGregor police chief in charge of police protection in both cities. Again, Marquette Mayor Soulli re-appointed Police Chief Hedeman to his post. When the agreement between the two cities took effect on April 21, 1999, Mr. Hedeman was removed and the McGregor chief of police took charge.
Mr. Hedeman claims that both times he was dismissed, the City Council failed to state a reason for dismissal; failed to file the order with the City Clerk; failed to provide him with a copy of the reasons for discharge via certified mail; and failed to grant him a public hearing in connection with his removal as required by § 372.15 of the Iowa Code. Following his second firing on April 20, 1999, the Council made what Mr. Hedeman describes as a vague reference to unsatisfactory job performance.
On April 28, 1999, Mr. Hedeman filed for injunctive relief with the Clayton County District Court trying to prevent the City Council from removing him. Mayor Soulli filed a petition for temporary injunction and order setting hearing with the same court. Awaiting the scheduled May 18, 1999, hearing for injunctive relief, Mr. Hedeman worked for the Marquette police force, beginning April 21, 1999, under the supervision of the new Marquette/McGregor chief of police. Then, on May 7, 1999, the Council again called a special meeting and removed Mr. Hedeman from the force.
Mr. Hedeman has filed suit in federal court, claiming violation of his due process liberty rights under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of his due process property rights under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983; tortious interference with his employment contract; constructive termination; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; intentional infliction of emotional distress; civil conspiracy to commit a tort; a request for back pay; and punitive damages.
Due Process Liberty Rights
The plaintiff claims that his due process liberty rights were violated when the Marquette City Council fired him as chief of police, and did not grant him a hearing in connection with the his job termination. He has filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state governments from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1. While a deprivation of "liberty" is most clear when a state takes an individual into custody, the state may also deprive a person of his or her liberty by making a charge that seriously damages the person's standing and reputation in the community. Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 560 F.2d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding a discharged police chief was deprived his due process liberty rights). While termination from state employment does not necessarily amount to a deprivation of a protected liberty interest, the Supreme Court has recognized such an interest where an employee's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him. Mascho v. Gee, 24 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1994). To establish such a claim, the employee must show defamation by a state official, and that the defamation occurred in the course of the termination of employment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1164, L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976). Defamation, for the purposes of a due process claim, occurs when a state official publically makes allegedly untrue charges against the employee that would stigmatize him so as to seriously damage his standing and associations in his community, or foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8th Cir. 1993); Mascho v. Gee, 24, F.3d 1037, 1039 (1994); Johnson v. City of West Memphis, 113 F.3d 842, 843 (8th Cir. 1997).
In order to establish a liberty interest in this plaintiff's good name, he would have to show that the reasons for discharge stigmatized him and that the defendants made the reasons public. Merritt v. Reed, 120 F.3d 124, 126 (8th Cir. 1997). In this case, the complaint states that the defendants refused to provide the plaintiff with any reasons for his dismissal, and made a vague reference about the plaintiff's unsatisfactory job performance. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to stigmatizing comments and examples were given at the hearing.
Denial of a liberty interest requires more than just being fired. Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995). Not even a direct claim of incompetence is enough to impinge a liberty interest. Id. Also, the plaintiff here states in his complaint that the city council embarked on a "calculated and concerted effort" to remove him from the position of police chief, and that the council's actions were "arbitrary and capricious." Merely labeling a governmental action as arbitrary and capricious, in the absence of the deprivation of life, liberty or property, will not support a substantive due process claim. Id. There is no general liberty interest in being free from capricious government action. Id. See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir. 1999).
While claims such as plaintiff's were difficult to prevail on, the question here is simply whether plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. He has.
Due Process Property Rights
The plaintiff also claims that his due process property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution were violated when he was fired as police chief for the City of Marquette, and thereby deprived of property without due process of law. No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1. For a property interest to arise, a government employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment, as opposed to a mere subjective expectancy. Batra v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nebraska, 79 F.3d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1996). See Pace v. Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 262 (8th Cir. 1996).
To obtain relief under the due process clause, the plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of a property interest in his job, and this property interest may be established by an ordinary contract. Welbern v. Hunt, 874 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir. 1989). While this property interest arises typically from statutory or contractual limitations on the employer's ability to terminate an employee, a property interest can also be created by implied contract arising out of customs, practices and de facto policies. Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 1992). When such a property interest exists, the employee is entitled to a hearing or some related form of due process prior to termination. Id.
A public employee with a protected property interest in continued employment receives due process if there is notice and an opportunity to respond to charges of misconduct before his termination and if post-termination administrative review procedures are available. Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 1999). The process need not be elaborate, but a public employee is entitled to notice and a name-clearing hearing when fired under circumstances imposing a stigma on his professional reputation. Id.
In this case, the plaintiff claims that he had a contractual property right in his continued employment with the City of Marquette, and that he was not afforded notice or a pre-termination hearing. The defendants argue that the plaintiff was an "at-will" employee who could be fired at any time for any lawful reason, or for no reason at all. Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1989). Because of the plaintiff's "at-will" status, the defendants claim the plaintiff had no property right in continued employment and was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing. For purposes of this motion, plaintiff's claims of a one-year contract are taken as true.
The Mayor-Council form of government in the City of Marquette is governed by Iowa Code § 372.4 which gives the mayor the duty to appoint the chief of police "except where an intergovernmental agreement makes other provisions for police protection or as otherwise provided in § 400.13 [civil service]." See Iowa Code § 372.4 which specifically refers to the appointment of the police chief, stating, the mayor "shall appoint the marshal or chief of police." In State ex rel Johnson v. Allen, 569 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1997), the court has concluded that the Legislature did not intend to "require" the mayor to appoint the police chief. Id. The court has said the decision about how police protection is to be provided to the city's residents is left to the city council. The city council can instruct the mayor to appoint the police chief, the council can follow civil service procedures, or the council can enter into an intergovernmental agreement to provide police protection.
Once the mayor is authorized to appoint a police chief, the mayor has a duty and an obligation to do so. Marquette Mayor Eleanor Soulli under her authority in Iowa Code § 372.4 carried out her duty by naming the plaintiff as police chief on February 28, 1998. He was given another contract on April 15, 1999, for the next year.
The termination of an existing contractual relationship is plainly considered a property interest . . . for due process purposes. Moore v. Warwick Public School District No. 29, 794 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1986). Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause, but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require the deprivation of property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id. The Supreme Court consistently has held that, absent the necessity of quick action by the state under exigent circumstances, some kind of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of property interest. Id. The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff had a property right in his continued future employment with the City of Marquette, and the defendants deprived him of his constitutional due process property right by failing to provide him with notice and a pre-termination hearing. The defendant's motion to dismiss this due process property claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is denied because the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Tortious Interference with Employment Contract
The plaintiff, in his complaint, claims a cause of action against the defendant members or employees of the city council for tortious interference with the valid employment contract between the mayor and the plaintiff. The defendants claim that no third-party is alleged to have interfered with the contract in this case and that the defendants have discretionary function immunity.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977) states the following:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary loss resulting to the other from failure of the third person to perform the contract.Grahek v. Voluntary Hosp. Co-Op., 473 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1991). Thus, the plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff had a valid contract; (2) the defendants knew of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the contract; (4) the interference caused the contracting parties not to perform the contract with the plaintiff; and (5) the amount of the plaintiff's damages. SW Agency Inc., v. Foremost Insurance Co., 51 F. Supp.2d 959, 971 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
The employment contract here is between the city and the plaintiff. This tort is not committed by parties to the contract; rather, the tortfeasor (the defendant city council members for the City of Marquette) must interfere with the contract between another (the mayor of Marquette) and a third party (the plaintiff, former police chief of Marquette). Grahek, supra, at 35. Not every discharge made in breach of a contract of employment will subject the person who initiated the discharge to liability in tort. Hunter v. Board of Trustees of Broadlawns Medical Center, 481 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Iowa 1992). However, an employee who, in bad faith, interferes with a contract between the employer and a third party is not immune to liability for tortious interference. Bosssuyt v. Osage Farmers' Nat. Bank, 360 N.W.2d 769, 778-79 (Iowa 1985).
The court has recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with an employment contract where an employee discharges another employee in violation of the employment contract. Hunter, supra, at 518. In his complaint, the plaintiff claims that the valid employment contract between the mayor of Marquette and the plaintiff was tortiously interfered with by the members of the city council (the other employees). Also, the plaintiff claims that the defendants knew of the contract; intentionally and wrongly interfered with it; that the actions of the city council was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff; and that he suffered damages as a result of the council's actions. The complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Tort Claim — Discretionary Function Exception
The Supreme Court of Iowa has determined that the legislature intended the Iowa State Torts Claim Act to have the same effect as the Federal Tort Claims Act because the Iowa act was modeled after the federal act. Goodman v. City of Le Claire, Iowa, 587 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa 1998). As a result, Iowa has given great weight to relevant federal decisions interpreting the federal act. Id. In United States v. Varig Airlines, 467, U.S. 797, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 81 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1984), the court isolated two factors useful in determining when the acts of government employees are protected by the discretionary function exception. First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case. Then, the basic inquiry is whether the challenged acts of the government employee are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.
In Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 100 L. Ed.2d 531 (1988) (federal licencing of oral polio vaccine), the Court employed a two-step analysis for determining whether the challenged conduct falls within the discretionary function exception. In examining the nature of the conduct, a court must consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. Then, even if the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991) (day-to-day banking management requires discretionary judgment).
The basis for discretionary function exception was Congress' desire to prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. Berkovitz, supra,_at 536-537, 108 S. Ct. at 1959, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 541. In other words, the discretionary function exception insulates government from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. See McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985); Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1993) (Police discretion to set up partial roadblock); Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1998) (Forest Service's discretion on allocating resources in a multiple fire situation).
In this case, this court must determine whether the members of the Marquette City Council were covered by the discretionary function exception when the Council fired Mr. Hedeman from the Marquette police force. It must be remembered that plaintiff was fired three times. The court must first determine whether there was discretion or judgment involved, and then whether the Council's judgment was based on considerations of public policy.
The discretionary function immunity does not apply if the acts complained of do not involve permissible exercise of policy discretion. Berkovitz, supra, at 546. In this case, it is difficult for the court to see how the first two firings of Mr. Hedeman from the police force fall within the protected discretionary functioning of the Marquette City Council. If the decision to fire Mr. Hedeman from the Marquette police force was not based on a social, economic or political policy, then the immunity does not apply. However, the decision to enter into the intergovernmental agreement is precisely the type of policy decision for which discretionary function immunity will apply. The complaint therefore calls into question two firings that are not protected by discretionary function immunity and one that is.
Constructive Termination
The plaintiff claims that there is a cause of action for constructive discharge because the defendants forced the plaintiff to take a wage reduction, change his working environment and look for new employment.
The Eighth Circuit has articulated the standard for constructive discharge. To constitute constructive discharge, the employer must deliberately create intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing the employee to quit and the employee must quit. Johnson v. Bunny Bread, 646 F.2d 1250, 1255 (8th Cir. 1981). Additionally, an employee must not be unreasonably sensitive; constructive discharge arises only when a reasonable person would find the conditions of employment intolerable. Bunny Bread, supra, at 1255-56. The Eighth Circuit has found that "frustration and embarrassment . . . do not make work conditions sufficiently intolerable as to constitute constructive discharge." West v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that frustration and embarrassment at not being promoted did not constitute constructive discharge). See Gartman v. Gencorp Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1997) (requesting an employee to resign or accept a transfer to plant with uncertain future was not objectively intolerable, as required to support constructive discharge claim).
The plaintiff claims a constructive discharge occurred by reason of newly implemented city policies, such as restricting the plaintiff's overtime; eliminating the department mailbox; reporting his arrival and departure from city limits; and requiring prior approval for all expenditures. While the plaintiff claims constructive discharge, the plaintiff did not quit; his police chief job was eliminated by virtue of the intergovernmental agreement, and he was fired from the police force.
Far more importantly, a constructive discharge is not a theory of recovery or a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is a way for an employee to claim he suffered an adverse employment action (discharge) when the employee, in fact, resigned. Here, the plaintiff does not even claim he resigned; he claims he was fired. Count IV fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy
The plaintiff claims he was wrongfully terminated in violation of a clearly defined public policy. As the law now stands in Iowa, the general rule is still that an "at-will" employee may be discharged at any time, for any reason, or no reason at all. Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1994). The court has recognized two exceptions to this general rule: Where the discharge is in clear violation of a "well-recognized and defined public policy," and where the contract is created by an employer's handbook or policy manual. Id. The public-policy exception is based on the theory that the law should not allow employees to be fired for reasons that violate public policy. Id. at 567. The court has found an implied cause of action for wrongful termination when, for example, the reason for discharge was an employee's refusal to violate the law; when an employee refuses to take a polygraph test; when an employee cooperates with law enforcement; when an employee files a partial unemployment claim; or when an employee threatens to file a worker's compensation claim.
In the pleadings of this case, the plaintiff claims that the city council terminated his employment as a result of his request for reimbursement of accrued compensatory time, and back wages owed for his performance of duties as acting police chief from February 27, 1998, to May 27, 1998, when he was paid at normal police officer rates, rather than the rate established for the chief of police. The plaintiff claims he was terminated contrary to federal law and Iowa law guaranteeing his right to make this financial claim.
Although the Iowa Supreme Court has not specifically stated that it violates public policy to discharge an employee for making a wage claim, it probably does. This claim, although inconsistent with others made by plaintiff ( see Montgomery v. Deere, 169 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 1999), concurring opinion warns of the danger of short-gunning employment claims) probably states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Claim for Wages
The plaintiff has made a claim for back wages owed to him for performing his duties as police chief from February 27, 1998, through May 27, 1998. In his pleadings, plaintiff says the City Council has acknowledged that the wages are due, but he had not been paid.
According to the Iowa Code § 91A.4, "when the employment of an employee is suspended or terminated, the employer shall pay all wages earned. . . ." Also, if there is a dispute concerning the amount of wages due, the employer shall pay all wages conceded to be due, less lawful deductions, specified in Iowa Code § 91A.5. Payment of wages shall not relieve the employer of any liability for the balance of wages claimed by the employee. Iowa Code § 91A.7. As a result, the defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss this claim is denied because the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The plaintiff claims a cause of action for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress due to the defendant's actions which damaged his reputation and professional image.
In order to succeed with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show that the defendants' conduct was intentional, extremely egregious and outrageous. Van Baale v. City of Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1996) (firing police officer after assuring him he would not be fired if he pleaded guilty to charges was not sufficiently outrageous). In some cases, it is simply easier to discover what kinds of behavior the Iowa Supreme Court has held insufficiently outrageous to sustain the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Taggert v. Drake University, 549 N.W.2d at 802 (Iowa 1996) (dean's yelling sexist and condescending comment at professor and verbally berating her, even if threatening, did not constitute outrageous conduct); Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d at 546-47 (Iowa 1995) (allegedly defamatory comments, writings, and statements leading to loss of church membership not sufficiently outrageous to sustain the tort); and Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d at 119 (Iowa 1985) (deliberate campaign to badger and harass employee not outrageous although "petty and wrong, even malicious").
Here, the plaintiff apparently got caught in a political power struggle between the mayor and the city council. The vague reference to the plaintiff's unsatisfactory job performance and the public nature of his firing may have been uncomfortable or embarrassing, but the plaintiff's complaint contains insufficient allegations to support the necessary elements of egregious and outrageous conduct by the defendants. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss this claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is granted.
Civil Conspiracy to Commit a Tort
The plaintiff claims in his complaint that he is entitled to relief because there was a civil conspiracy to commit a tort by denying him due process liberty and property rights, tortiously interfering with the plaintiff's appointment agreement; wrongfully terminating the plaintiff; constructively terminating the plaintiff; denying the plaintiff wage claims; and intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the plaintiff.
Technically speaking, there is no civil action for conspiracy. Wilson Co., Inc., v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 181 F. Supp. 809, 819 (N.D. Iowa 1960). While a conspiracy is generally defined as a combination of two or more persons getting together to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy charged, but the tort working the damage to the plaintiff. Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996). It is not the agreement itself, but the injury to the plaintiff that gives rise to the cause of action.
The plaintiff cites no authority to allow this claim for the tort of civil conspiracy, and this court has found none either. As a result, the defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is granted because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
Punitive Damages
The plaintiff seeks punitive damages from the defendants for denial of his constitutional rights. The defendant cites Iowa Code § 670.4(5) which provides immunity to the municipal defendant from punitive damages on state claims. Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar and extreme conduct. An award of punitive damages against a municipality "punishes" only the taxpayers who took no part in the commission of a tort. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2758 (1981). Punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff and are likely to be accompanied by an increase in taxes or reduction in public services for the citizens footing the bill. Id. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of the blameless or unknowing taxpayers. Id. Municipalities should not be exposed to punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of its officials. Id. In this case, the City of Marquette is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED
The defendants motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that plaintiff's claims for constructive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy and his claim for punitive damages against the municipality are dismissed. The motion is otherwise denied.