Hecke v. Cooper

Full title: STEVEN J. HECKE, Plaintiff, v. JAMES B. COOPER, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

Date published: Oct 8, 2008

CAUSE NO. 1:08-CV-023 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2008)

Opinion

CAUSE NO. 1:08-CV-023.

October 8, 2008

OPINION AND ORDER

RUDY LOZANO, District Judge

This matter is before the court on the "Prisoner Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983," filed by pro se Plaintiff, Steven J. Hecke, on January 18, 2008. For the reasons set forth below, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

BACKGROUND

DISCUSSION

pro se42 U.S.C. section 1983 28 U.S.C. section 1915A 12 See Lagerstrom v. Kingston463 F.3d 621624

Hecke's complaint is captioned "Prisoner Complaint 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law. However, in this case, Hecke's complaint is against a Deputy United States Marshal. Therefore it is a reasonable inference that he is alleging that James B. Cooper was acting under color of federal law. Such claims arise pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court is cognizant of the principle that:

A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice").

Erickson v. Pardus, 550 U.S. ___, ___; 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Although pro se complaints are given additional leeway, "on a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (quotation marks omitted)).

Hecke is correct that "[a] pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process requires no less." Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, "no process is required if he is placed in segregation not as punishment but for managerial reasons . . . [and a]s long as the purpose was indeed a preventive rather than a punitive one, he would not be entitled to notice and a hearing." Id.

Based upon the complaint in this case, it is clear that Hecke was placed in segregation for preventative or managerial reasons, rather than punishment. First, Hecke himself does not allege that his isolation was punishment for his behavior or actions. Indeed, Hecke states that he did not violate a jail rule: "I have not violated the Jail's regulations." (Compl., p. 3; see also DE #4 for a clearer copy.) Second, in response to an inmate request form submitted by Hecke, a jail official responded that "you are not being held in segregation for discipline reasons." ( Id.) Third, Heck's own attorney wrote him a letter explaining why he was in segregation:

I checked with the Jail Commander's Office regarding the reason you have been put in the isolation unit a/k/a "the hole". The Commander's Office put you there because the Marshals requested that you be placed on a level where you have no access to the phone. They also requested that you have no visitors. It is my experience that typically this happens because phone calls are monitored from the jail and the Government expects a security breach of some kind. The Marshals would not tell me specifically why they requested it in your case. In fact, the Marshals made no comment on your move. I hope this answers your question.

(Compl., p. 5.)

The Court therefore concludes that Hecke was not being punished when he was isolated and denied phone and visitation rights. Rather, Hecke was placed in segregation for managerial reasons, possibly for a potential security breach. Although Hecke complains about these limitations, "[t]he very object of imprisonment is confinement . . . [a]nd, as our cases have established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration." Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citations omitted). Pre-trial detainees do not have a constitutional right to either visitation, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586-587 (1984), or telephones, State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1145 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus it was not a violation of Hecke's Constitutional rights when he was placed in segregation without a due process hearing. Therefore, this case does not state a claim and will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.