Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. 05CC06867, William M. Monroe, Judge.
Denis R. Hebert, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
South Bay Legal Group and Gregory M. Williams for Defendant and Respondent.
SILLS, P. J.
Denis Hebert, an attorney, filed a complaint against Carl Latting, his former client, to recover unpaid fees. Latting answered, claiming the fees were excessive. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the dispute went to binding arbitration. The arbitrator awarded Hebert the entire amount of billed but unpaid fees. Latting petitioned the superior court to vacate the arbitration award. The court did so, and Hebert appeals. We reverse.
FACTS
Latting retained Hebert to represent him in matters arising out of the dissolution of his marriage. The parties signed a retainer agreement, whereby Latting promised to pay Hebert $235 per hour for legal services, plus costs and interest on any unpaid balance. Hebert sent Latting monthly billing statements detailing time spent and services rendered.
As of March 31, 2006, Latting’s attorney fees, costs and interest totaled $79,406.96, of which he had paid $12,643.00, leaving a balance owing of $66,763.96. Hebert filed a complaint for breach of contract and common counts to recover the unpaid fees. In response, Latting claimed the fees were exorbitant: “I can’t understand why Mr. Hebert thinks I owe him $79,000.00 for the services he rendered for me, which he tried to get from my ex, but got denied. . . . [¶] . . . I do not agree with this price.” Latting requested binding arbitration before the Orange County Bar Association’s Mandatory Fee Arbitration Committee. The case was assigned to A. Lee Adair as arbitrator. At the hearing, Latting presented the testimony of an expert, family law attorney Richard Heston, and his ex-wife’s attorney, Julie Duncan.
The arbitrator awarded Hebert the full amount he requested. As explained in the statement of decision, the arbitrator found there was a “valid and enforceable” retainer agreement and the billings appeared “complete and accurate.” The arbitrator found the “gist” of Latting’s dispute was his belief that the fees were exorbitant and “the $12,000 he had already paid should more than cover the work performed by Mr. Hebert.” The arbitrator commented, “[T]he billings were attacked as a whole simply on the grounds that they were ‘exorbitant’ and were not ‘reasonable, customary, and appropriate.’ None of the $66,763.96 billed were admitted by Mr. Latting to be proper charges leaving the Arbitrator with an ‘all or nothing’ decision to make. . . . Without some specific guidance from the Client as to specific charges which should be removed or eliminated, and why, this Arbitrator cannot simply pick a figure out of the air . . . .” Latting filed a petition to set aside the arbitrator’s award on the ground of actual bias. Latting asserted both Duncan and Heston “testified that specific charges were excessive[] and should have been reduced by the arbitrator.” Heston submitted a declaration stating he gave specific testimony that many of the billed charges were excessive or improper and should be removed.
Latting claimed, “During the arbitration . . ., I noticed that the arbitrator Mr. A. Lee Adair spent considerable time talking with plaintiff Mr. Hebert during the arbitration. Mr. Adair did not ask me many questions, and did not even make eye contact with me when I gave my statements. He seemed not to hear me. I felt as if I was invisible. As if he was deliberately ignoring me. I am an African American, and I felt as if Mr. Adair was ignoring me because of my race.” Latting continued, “The stated reason for the decision was not true, and based on the way he made me feel during the arbitration, I believe that Mr. Adair was actually biased against me because of my race, and his decision was the result of this bias.”
In its tentative ruling, the trial court found Latting had failed to establish actual bias. “With the burden falling on defendant, he has failed to establish facts supporting his position that bias existed. He sums up his position by stating he is African American and believes he was ignored for that reason. Whether an award is tainted by such bias is a fact question to be determined by the court reviewing the award. An ‘appearance of bias’ is insufficient.” But it also found “[the arbitrator’s] reasoning appears to clearly miss the necessary issues raised by [Latting] of individual billing being excessive and unreasonable requiring it to be discounted from the outstanding . . . balance.” [¶] . . . [¶] The arbitrator’s decision simply that one of the parties should pay the other sum of money here was not sufficiently determinative of all items embraced in the submission.” The court set aside the award, then advised the parties to “agree on a compromise. . . . I suggest you work it out and put it behind you.”
At oral argument, Hebert pointed out the only basis for Latting’s petition to set aside the arbitration award was bias, and the tentative ruling specifically found actual bias was not established. After several exchanges between Hebert and the trial court, the court stated, “[N]umber one, the bias was that [the arbitrator] did not really pay attention to what was being said by . . . [Latting] because [he] was Black or African American, and, secondly, that the expert witness and all present at the hearing heard that there were many specific billing errors and discrepancies that were raised and pointed out, and the arbitrator just ignored them.” The court then ruled, “The court’s tentative is the court’s final.”
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hebert contends the trial court erroneously set aside the award for the arbitrator’s failure to find on necessary issues, because the only issue submitted to the arbitrator was how much Hebert should be paid. We agree.
Parties agree to private arbitration because they want their dispute to be “‘resolved without necessity for any contact with the courts,’” primarily to avoid the “‘delays incident to a civil action.’” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Thus, an important component of arbitration is the finality of the award. “‘Even in the absence of an explicit agreement, conclusiveness is expected; the essence of the arbitration process is that an arbitral award shall put the dispute to rest.’ [Citation.]” It has thus been observed that, ‘The parties [to an arbitration] can take a measure of comfort in knowing that the arbitrator’s award will almost certainly mean an end to the dispute.” [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 10.)
To ensure the finality of arbitration awards, judicial intervention is minimal; neither the merits of the dispute nor the arbitrator’s reasoning can be reviewed. In fact, the award can be reviewed only for errors enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a): “[T]he court shall vacate the award if the court determines any of the following: [¶] (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means. [¶] (2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators. [¶] (3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator. [¶] (4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted. [¶] (5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title. [¶] (6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision. . . .”
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Latting claimed the award should be set aside on the grounds of actual bias, a violation of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(3). But the trial court found no evidence of bias. Instead, it found the arbitrator failed to determine all necessary issues, as required by section 1283.4, thus constituting a violation of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5): “other conduct of the arbitrator contrary to the provisions of this title.” We find no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination.
The trial court’s final order is embodied in his tentative ruling. There, it found Latting had failed to prove actual bias.
“[I]t is presumed that all issues submitted for decision have been passed on and resolved, and the burden of proving otherwise is upon the party challenging the award. [Citations.]” (Rodrigues v. Keller (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 838, 842.) If the decision awards a sum of money to one party payable by the other, it has resolved “‘all items embraced in the submission.’” (Id., at p. 843.)Furthermore, an arbitrator is not required to state reasons or find facts to support his or her award, and “[i]t is not appropriate for courts to review the sufficiency of the evidence before the arbitrator [citation] or to pass upon the validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning [citation].” (Ibid.)
Here, the issue before the arbitrator was whether the billed fees were excessive. The arbitrator decided they were not. Latting’s assertion that the arbitrator failed to consider the evidence he presented is nothing more than an attack on the merits of the award. Even if the award is incorrect, it cannot be disturbed. “[T]he residual risk to the parties of an arbitrator’s erroneous decision represents an acceptable cost – obtaining the expedience and financial savings that the arbitration process provides – as compared to the judicial process.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 13.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting the petition to set aside the arbitration award is reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter a new order confirming the award. Appellant is entitled to costs of appeal.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., ARONSON, J.