Opinion
A102658.
7-2-2003
HEATHER D., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Real Party in Interest.
By this petition for extraordinary writ (Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26, subd. (l)), Heather D. challenges an order of the Contra Costa County Superior Court setting a selection and implementation hearing to determine whether her parental rights to her son, Donovan, should be terminated. The challenged order was entered at the six-month review hearing. (§§ 366, subd. (a)(1) & 366.21, subd. (e).) In conjunction with the order, the juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence that returning Donovan to Heather would create a substantial risk of detriment to his well-being. In addition, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Heather "failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in" the court-ordered plan for reunification (§ 366.21, subd. (e)) and that reasonable services had been offered to her.
Heather contends the finding that reasonable services had been offered to her was not supported by substantial evidence. The record is otherwise, and we will deny the petition.
Heather initiated Donovans August 2002 removal from her custody with her call to the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau (Bureau) shortly after his birth. Heather sought help because she was suicidal and was having difficulty dealing with Donovan, whom she said was the product of a rape. Heather was detained pursuant to section 5150. A dependency petition was filed and, on October 23, 2002, the court sustained allegations that Heather was unable to care for Donovan due to her mental illness and substance abuse problems. Because Donovans father is a registered sex offender, the court also sustained an allegation that Heather had failed to protect the child from him.
At the dispositional hearing on November 14, 2002, the court ordered a six— month period of reunification services for Heather. The requirements included completion of a mental health evaluation, participation in and successful completion of individual counseling, a parent education class, an outpatient substance abuse program and an inpatient program if warranted, and participation in random drug and alcohol testing. The Bureau was required to perform case planning activities and make appropriate referrals. In addition, Heather was to have supervised visits with Donovan twice a month and monthly meetings with her caseworker.
A contested six-month review hearing was held May 2, 2003. Heather was then living in a group home with her fiance and his six-year-old child and was receiving supplemental security income. She had a pending job prospect. She also worked at the group home. She said that she had not used drugs since August 10, 2002; however, she did not commence drug testing until March 31, 2003. She had been given referrals for parenting classes and also for an outpatient drug treatment program, but when she called those programs her calls were not returned. The caseworker did not give her the referral until mid-March of 2003, but instead focused on getting Heather to begin drug testing. Heather had already completed a mental health assessment and was in therapy. The caseworker did not require an additional assessment. Heather stopped seeing her therapist in January 2003 and did not attend the therapy program recommended by him. She did not report these facts to her caseworker. The caseworker did not speak with the therapist until March of 2003.
Heather and the caseworker had only four face-to-face interviews during the six-month reunification period. The caseworker frequently contacted Heather by phone during the first three months and urged her get involved in her program. Heather had visited with Donovan five times. The agency supervising the visits suspended them after she missed several. Nonetheless, her caseworker contacted her and arranged a subsequent visit.
Heather argues that the Bureau should have contacted her therapist sooner and, based upon the assessment of her mental health, should have tailored services to her mental health needs. But Heather did not challenge the reunification plan at any time in the proceedings. In fact, on this record, the plan was well tailored to her demonstrated needs. Heather in fact was in therapy and chose to abandon it. She resisted her caseworkers efforts to focus her on the other aspects of her plan until the last minute. She had the opportunity to visit with Donovan on a regular basis, but did not do so.
It is well settled that the question "is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances." (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) The juvenile courts orders are supported by substantial evidence. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.)
We notified the parties when we issued our order to show cause and set this cause for oral argument that we would determine it on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; § 366.26, subd. (l) [precluding petitioner from challenging the orders terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing]; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 838 P.2d 250; Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720, 791 P.2d 290.)
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. The section 366.26 hearing is set for August 20, 2003. Therefore, this opinion is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(b)(3).)
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., and Margulies, J. --------------- Notes: Unless otherwise noted, further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.