Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2018-0115
07-03-2019
CONNIE SUE HEATH, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. JOHN ELLIOTT MAYER JR., Defendant/Appellant.
COUNSEL Lou Spivack P.C., Tucson By Louis M. Spivack Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee John Elliott Mayer Jr., Tucson In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. C20164760
The Honorable Kenneth Lee, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Lou Spivack P.C., Tucson
By Louis M. Spivack
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee John Elliott Mayer Jr., Tucson
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Vásquez and Judge Eckerstrom concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 John Elliott Mayer appeals from the trial court's entry of default judgment against him and his solely owned limited liability corporation, Consolidated Industrial Group, LLC ("Consolidated"), and in favor of Connie Sue Heath. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Consolidated Industrial Group, LLC was a party below but did not file a notice of appeal. --------
Background
¶2 Because Mayer has provided no statement of facts with citations to the record as required by Rule 13(a)(5), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., we glean the pertinent facts from Heath's answering brief and our own review of the record. See Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, n.2 (App. 2011). In a January 2016 divorce proceeding between Mayer and Heath, a Michigan court enjoined both parties from, among other things, transferring any property titled in either of their names. In April of that year, however, Mayer transferred real property located in Tucson to Consolidated. In September 2016, a judgment of divorce was entered by the Michigan court, granting Heath a lien against the Tucson real property. Heath thereafter filed a complaint in Pima County Superior Court alleging actual and constructive fraud related to Mayer's transfer of the property to Consolidated.
¶3 For the next several months, Mayer filed numerous motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, none of which were granted. The repeated motions led the trial court to deem Mayer a vexatious litigant and ban future motions to dismiss on the basis of its jurisdiction without first obtaining the court's permission. In May 2018, Heath moved for entry of final judgment and an injunction by default, alleging Mayer had "consistently refused to participate productively in th[e] proceeding," had "refused to comply with Court orders," and had "filed multiple non- sensical pleadings." The court granted the motion the following month and voided the deed transferring the Tucson real property to Consolidated. Mayer appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Discussion
¶4 On appeal, an opening brief must contain an argument that includes the appellant's "contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to portions of the record on which the appellant relies." Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A). Failing to conform to the requirements of Rule 13 constitutes abandonment and waiver of the claim. Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009).
¶5 While we note that Mayer is not represented by counsel on appeal, "a party who conducts a case without an attorney is entitled to no more consideration from the court than a party represented by counsel, and is held to the same standards expected of a lawyer." Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp., 199 Ariz. 284, ¶ 16 (App. 2000). Accordingly, although we have attempted to "discern and address [Mayer's] arguments, . . . we consider waived those arguments not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority." In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, ¶ 6 (2013); see Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13. We therefore do not consider any of his illogical and incoherent claims, including, for example, that his Eleventh Amendment rights have been violated and that courts in Arizona and Michigan "are involved in extensive fraud."
¶6 To the extent Mayer's opening brief can be generously read to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction in this matter, he has similarly waived any argument that the court's findings of both personal and in rem jurisdiction were improper. In his brief, Mayer asserts, among other things, that because his "eight ancestors fought against the British Crown and were treatised [sic] as free sovereign and independent in Article 1 of The Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783," a court "attempting to negate [his] sovereign status is violating the Supreme law of the land." He further claims the court lacked jurisdiction because he is "not the fictitious person John Mayer," and he seems to imply that neither Arizona nor Michigan are, in fact, states. These arguments, and the remainder of his brief, are spurious and absurd. Finally, we assume transcripts and other items apparently missing from the record support the court's findings and conclusions. Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) (when a party "fails to include necessary items" on appeal, "we assume they would support" the court's ruling).
Fees and Costs
¶7 Heath requests her reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., on the grounds that Mayer's appeal "is completely unsupported by any law in Arizona or in any other jurisdiction, state or federal, and that his filing the appeal was, in fact, frivolous." Because Mayer's appeal "indisputably has no merit," Price v. Price, 134 Ariz. 112, 114 (App. 1982), we award Heath her reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 25 and upon her compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
Disposition
¶8 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's entry of judgment is affirmed.