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holding that defendants were estopped from asserting nonexhaustion where plaintiff relied on letter from defendants stating that he had "followed the correct procedure by notifying the Inspector General of [his] complaint"
Summary of this case from LANE v. DOANOpinion
9:96-CV-1998 (FJS/RFT)
October 7, 2002
COREY HEATH, Dannemora, New York, Plaintiff Pro Se.
JEFFREY P. MANS, AAG, Office Of The New York State Attorney General, Albany, New York, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Corey Heath brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on January 14, 1996, while he was incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility ("Coxsackie"), several corrections officers used excessive force against him and others failed to intervene and protect him. Plaintiff was subsequently hospitalized at Albany Medical Center Hospital ("AMCH") and treated for multiple injuries between January 14 and January 23, 1996. Upon release from AMCH, Plaintiff was transferred to Downstate Correctional Facility and then to Wende Correctional Facility ("Wende") on February 9, 1996. Plaintiff does not contend that his treatment at AMCH was deficient. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his ongoing need for medical and dental treatment while incarcerated at Wende. Named as Defendants are numerous corrections officers at Coxsackie and Wende and several medical staff at Wende.
Defendants moved for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims and Defendant Saddlemire's counterclaim for battery. Plaintiff thereafter cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims and also moved for appointment of counsel. On March 11, 2002, Magistrate Judge Treece issued a Report-Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) grant Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, (2) deny as moot Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Defendant Saddlemire's counterclaim for battery, (3) deny Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety, and (4) dismiss four unnamed "John Doe" Defendants from the case. The Report-Recommendation did not address Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel. After Magistrate Judge Treece issued his Report-Recommendation, Defendants sought leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment with respect to the excessive force and failure to protect claims based upon an intervening change in law. See Dkt. No. 119. The Court granted Defendants' request by Order dated May 14, 2002. See Dkt. No. 120. Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge Treece's Report-Recommendation. See Dkt. No. 118. Also before the Court is Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment with respect to the excessive force and failure to protect claims. See Dkt. No. 126.
II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review
The Court reviews de novo those findings and recommendations in a magistrate judge's report-recommendation to which a party has filed timely objections and for clear error those parts of the report-recommendation to which a party does not object. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). The Court "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B. Summary Judgment
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party based on the evidence presented, the legitimate inferences drawn from that evidence in favor of the non-moving party, and the applicable burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
The district court is admonished to liberally construe pleadings presented by a pro se plaintiff. See Gittens v. Garlocks Sealing Techs., 19 F. Supp.2d 104, 110 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam)) (other citations omitted). Nevertheless, proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a plaintiff from the usual requirements of summary judgment. See id.; Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("a pro se party's `bald assertion,' completely unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment." (citation omitted)).
C. Deliberate Indifference Claims
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment on the basis of the denial of medical care, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Plaintiff must establish both an objectively serious condition and a subjectively culpable state of mind on the part of the relevant Defendants. See id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff must therefore establish the existence of a condition that is objectively "urgent," i.e., "one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain." Id. (citation omitted). In addition, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants acted with a knowing disregard of an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). "Prison officials have broad discretion in determining the nature and character of medical treatment afforded to inmates." Ross v. Kelly, 784 F. Supp. 35, 44 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (citation omitted). Moreover, an inmate does not have the right to the treatment of his choice. See id. at 44-45 (citing Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1986)) (other citation omitted).
Magistrate Judge Treece found that Plaintiff did not suffer a "serious injury" and, moreover, that Plaintiff's disagreement with the nature and character of the treatment that he received is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants. He therefore recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims.
Plaintiff's objections generally attempt to call into question minor factual details without providing any concrete evidence to controvert Magistrate Judge Treece's findings. For example, Magistrate Judge Treece relied in part on an expert affidavit opining that discoloration of one of Plaintiff's teeth was caused by a 1995 dental procedure. Plaintiff objects on the ground that the discoloration was not noted until 1999. However, Plaintiff has offered no specific evidence linking the discoloration of the tooth to the January 14, 1996 incident. Moreover, even if the discoloration was linked to the January 14, 1996 incident, this fact alone does little to establish a "serious injury" or that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's condition. Upon a thorough review of relevant portions of the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff's objections do not call into question Magistrate Judge Treece's findings. Accordingly, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Treece's recommendation and grants Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claims on the ground that Plaintiff has not established that he suffered a "serious injury" or that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs.
In addition to factual objections, Plaintiff asserts that Magistrate Judge Treece erred in failing to address an equal protection argument based on the alleged denial of dental treatment while Plaintiff was confined in the SHU. However, neither Plaintiff's complaint nor his motion papers raise an equal protection claim. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had raised an equal protection claim, he has not demonstrated that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates.
D. Defendant Saddlemire's Counterclaim for Battery
Defendants additionally moved for summary judgment with respect to Defendant Saddlemire's counterclaim for battery set forth in Defendants' amended answer. See Dkt. No. 74. Magistrate Judge Treece recommended that the Court deny the motion as moot based on the Court's prior Order striking defendants' amended answer. See Dkt. No. 87. Defendant Saddlemire has not objected to this portion of the Report-Recommendation. Finding no clear error, the Court accordingly adopts Magistrate Judge Treece's recommendation and denies as moot Defendant Saddlemire's motion for summary judgment.
E. Defendants' Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment
As noted above, Defendants obtained leave to file a supplemental motion for summary judgement based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his excessive force and failure to protect claims. Since this is a jurisdictional issue, the Court will consider Defendants' supplemental motion before addressing Magistrate Judge Treece's recommendation with respect to Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the merits of these claims.
Defendants correctly assert that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court recently held that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims, reversing prior practice in this Circuit. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, —, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992 (2002) ("[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life . . . .") (citation omitted). Defendants further point out that inmates are generally required to follow the three-step grievance process set forth in 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.7 ("section 701.7") to resolve disputes. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hahn, 209 F. Supp.2d 344, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (inmates must follow three-step process set forth in section 701.7 to exhaust remedies as required by the PLRA). Defendants thus contend that Plaintiff is barred from asserting an excessive force claim in the present action because he failed to avail himself of the procedures set forth in section 701.7 following the January 14, 1996 incident. The PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available [to inmates] are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). New York has instituted a series of procedures known as the Inmate Grievance Program ("IGP") for resolving complaints about prison conditions. See generally 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.1 et seq. (McKinney 2002). Section 701.1 states that the IGP "is intended to supplement, not replace, existing formal or informal channels of problem resolution." 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.1(a). In addition, the IGP itself contains several methods for resolving inmate complaints. Compare 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.7 (setting forth formal procedure for resolution of grievances) with 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.11 (setting forth an informal expedited review process for allegations of harassment); see also Gadson v. Goord, No. 98-CV-1224, 2002 WL 982393, *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 2002) (noting multiple dispute resolution schemes within the IGP). Several courts have nevertheless held that the process set forth in section 701.7 is the only remedial structure that satisfies the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 209 F. Supp.2d at 347 (inmate who failed to comply with the three-step grievance process set forth in section 701 had not exhausted administrative remedies for purposes of the PLRA). However, the Second Circuit has noted that "[r]esolution of the matter through informal channels satisfies the [PLRA's] exhaustion requirement, as, under the administrative scheme applicable to New York prisoners, grieving through informal channels is an available remedy." Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 43 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Notably, at least one court has entertained the possibility that informal complaints leading to an investigation by the Inspector General satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. See Perez v. Blot, 195 F. Supp.2d 539, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting additional discovery regarding plaintiff's efforts to pursue informal administrative remedies). In sum, prosecuting a grievance pursuant to section 701.7 is the usual, but not the only, administrative remedy available to aggrieved inmates.
Included with Plaintiff's response are several letters addressed to various prison officials complaining that several Corrections Officers used excessive force against Plaintiff while others failed to protect him during the January 14, 1996 incident. The first letter, dated March 15, 1996, and addressed to Superintendent Mantello of Coxsackie C.F., was prepared by counsel at the Legal Aid Society in response to Plaintiff's request. See Dkt. No. 129, Exhibit "B." Plaintiff prepared two additional letters on June 23, 2002, addressed to the Inspector General and Commissioner of the State Commission of Correction. See id. at Exhibit "A." Significantly, the Commission of Correction replied to Plaintiff's letters, stating "You have followed the correct procedure by notifying the Inspector General of your complaint." Id. at Exhibit "C." Moreover, it appears that both the Superintendent at Coxsackie Correctional Facility and the Inspector General's Office instituted investigations based on Plaintiff's complaints. See id. at Exhibits "B" and "C."
It is clear that Plaintiff took several steps to seek redress for his grievances, including writing letters to prison officials, securing counsel, and, ultimately, instituting this lawsuit. Plaintiff's efforts resulted in an investigation by both the Superintendent of the Coxsackie Correctional Facility and the Inspector General of the Commission of Correction. Under these circumstances, it cannot fairly be said that Plaintiff has failed to avail himself of available administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. That he did not avail himself of the section 701.7 grievance process is not dispositive. Cf. Marvin, 255 F.3d at 43 n. 3. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies within the meaning of the PLRA.
Even assuming that the procedures set forth in section 701.7 constitute the only satisfactory administrative remedy under the PLRA, Plaintiff contends that he is excused from failing to avail himself of that process. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he relied on the letter from the Commission of Correction stating that he was following the "correct procedure" for pursuing his grievance. Cf. O'Connor v. Featherston, 01 CIV. 3251, 2002 WL 818085, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2002) (inmate may fulfill PLRA's exhaustion requirement where he (1) relies on prison officials' representations that correct procedure was followed or (2) makes a "reasonable attempt" to exhaust administrative remedies). Therefore, since Plaintiff relied on the representations of prison officials, the Court finds that Defendants are estopped from arguing that Plaintiff should have followed different procedures.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies within the meaning of the PLRA and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff's failure to avail himself of the section 701.7 procedures is excused because he reasonably relied on the representations of prison officials.
F. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on his Excessive Force and Failure to Protect Claims
Having denied Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment on the excessive force and failure to protect claims, the Court will now consider Plaintiff's original cross-motion for summary judgment on the merits of these claims. Magistrate Judge Treece found that disputes as to material facts exist with respect to the excessive force and failure to protect claims and thus recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not objected to Magistrate Judge Treece's recommendation. Having reviewed the Report-Recommendation and having found no clear error, the Court accepts Magistrate Judge Treece's recommendation and denies Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment.
G. "John Doe" Defendants
Magistrate Judge Treece recommended that four John Doe Defendants be dismissed from the case, noting sua sponte Plaintiff's unexcused delay in identifying these Defendants and his failure to timely serve process. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' lack of cooperation in the discovery process is to blame for his failure to identify and serve the four John Doe Defendants. While it appears from the Docket that discovery in this case did not proceed smoothly, it also appears that Plaintiff ultimately had ample discovery. Specifically, while several of Plaintiff's requests for additional time were ultimately denied, Defendants were nevertheless ordered to comply with Plaintiff's discovery requests. See Dkt. No. 68. Accordingly, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Treece's recommendation and orders the four John Doe Defendants dismissed from the case.
H. Appointment of Counsel
Magistrate Judge Treece did not address Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel appended to his cross-motion for summary judgment. The record reveals that Plaintiff has made numerous requests to have counsel appointed and each request has been denied. Notably, prior to filing his cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff once more moved to have counsel appointed. See Dkt. 95. In denying that request, Magistrate Judge Treece ordered the Clerk to return to Plaintiff any further motions to appoint counsel unless and until a trial date was scheduled. See Dkt. No. 99. Accordingly, the Court will not address Plaintiff's attached motion requesting counsel and any further requests will not be considered until such time as a trial date is scheduled.
III. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering Magistrate Judge Treece's Report-Recommendation, Plaintiff's objections, Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff's response thereto, relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Treece's Report-Recommendation, dated March 11, 2002, is ADOPTED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the deliberate indifference claims is GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Defendant Saddlemire's counterclaim for battery is DENIED as moot; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that the four "John Doe" Defendants are dismissed from the case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the parties are to await instructions from the Court regarding the scheduling of a trial date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.