Opinion
CV 99-640-BR
April 18, 2001
MICHAEL M. RATOZA CHRISTINE M. MCLAUGHLIN LAURA CALDERA TAYLOR, Ratoza Long, P.C. Portland, OR., Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
VICKI L. SMITH Lane Powell Spears Lubersky LLP Portland, OR., Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Post-Verdict Motion For Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (#158) and Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs (#157).
Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendant for copyright infringement, unfair competition in violation of federal statutes, and common law unfair competition arising out of Defendant's sale of fabric bearing images of the cartoon characters Betty Boop and Popeye. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' common law unfair competition claim in the course of pretrial motions. Following a jury trial, Plaintiffs prevailed on their remaining claims. Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs as well as Plaintiffs' Cost Bill were addressed at a hearing on April 13, 2001.
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees of $112,936 on their copyright claims, attorneys' fees of $6,037.50 on their claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes, and costs of $45 on their on their copyright claims for "Office Costs (Not Included In Cost Bill)." Plaintiffs' Cost Bill also is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' are awarded $1993.42 on their Cost Bill.
PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS' FEES
Plaintiffs seek $124,376.07 as attorneys' fees awarded for successfully prosecuting their federal statutory copyright and unfair competition claims. Plaintiffs do not seek attorneys' fees for prosecuting their unsuccessful common-law unfair competition claim, and Plaintiffs do not include in their pending request any attorneys' fees previously awarded to them in this case.
Defendant does not dispute the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by Plaintiffs' attorneys nor does Defendant contend the time spent by Plaintiffs' attorneys working on the copyright and unfair competition claims was unnecessary. Defendant argues, however, the Court should exercise its discretion and deny Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees on their copyright claims. In addition, Defendant contends Plaintiffs' claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes should not have been submitted to the jury and, therefore, the Court should not award Defendant attorneys' fees related to that claim because the "exceptional case" requirement for a discretionary award of attorneys' fees does not apply. Moreover, Defendant asserts Plaintiffs' counsel have not sufficiently distinguished the work they performed in support of Plaintiffs' copyright claims from their work related to the unfair competition in violation of federal statutes claims.
Apportionment of Fees
Defendant contends Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently apportion the attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting their different claims. Plaintiffs submitted the Declaration of Michael M. Ratoza in Support of Application for Attorney Fees (Ratoza Declaration) (#159) in which Ratoza, under oath, segregated the number of hours worked, the hourly rates charged, and the names of the attorneys who worked on Plaintiffs' claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes. See Ratoza Declaration, ¶ 5. Plaintiffs plainly seek recovery of $6,037.50 for such claims. Id. Plaintiffs have also precisely delineated the number of hours worked, hourly rates charged, and the names of attorneys, paralegals, and a law clerk that provided "General and Copyright Claims Services" for which Plaintiffs request an award of $112,936.00. Id. Plaintiffs also have itemized a series of "Office Costs (Not Included in Cost Bill)" for which they seek to recover $5,402.57. Id. Defendant does not contest the accuracy of the fee apportionment contained in the Ratoza Declaration. The Court, therefore, accepts Ratoza's fee apportionment and finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently identified and segregated the attorneys' fees related to prosecuting their claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes.
Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees on the Copyright Claims
17 U.S.C. § 505 provides in relevant part that "the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party" and "may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." See also McCullouch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 322 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The Copyright Act permits a district court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in its discretion"). Under § 505, Plaintiffs "may be awarded attorney's fees simply by virtue of prevailing in the action" as long as the amount is "reasonable." Frank Music Corp. v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a lodestar/multiplier approach for assessing the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees when an award is granted pursuant to a statute. D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 and 434 n. 9 (1983)). See also Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).
The lodestar/multiplier analysis is made up of two parts. First, "the court must determine a `lodestar' amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." D'Emanuele, 904 F.2d at 1383. "A district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are `excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045 (citation omitted). Twelve factors bearing on reasonableness are:
(1) the time and labor required,
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case,
(5) the customary fee,
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent,
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained,
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys,
(10) the `undesirability' of the case,
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and
(12) awards in similar cases.
Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997).
Second, "a court may adjust the lodestar upward or downward using a `multiplier' based on factors not subsumed in the initial calculation of the lodestar." Id. (footnote and citations omitted). The lodestar amount is presumed to be the reasonable fee, "and thus a multiplier may be used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts that the lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant expressly briefed the application of a lodestar analysis to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees. Nevertheless, the Court will consider the twelve factors bearing on reasonableness in its review of Plaintiffs' fee petition.
Plaintiffs' counsel devoted 664.55 hours to prosecuting the copyright claims. See Rataoza Declaration, ¶ 5 and Exhibit 1. The Court concludes the amount of time and labor expended by Plaintiffs' counsel in support of the copyright claims is reasonable under the circumstances. Under the guidance of Defendant's former counsel, Defendant was not responsive in providing or conducting discovery in this action and Defendant did not come forward with evidence to support its defenses early in the case, requiring significantly more effort on the part of Plaintiffs' counsel. Additionally, substantive and discovery motions arose that required time-consuming briefing and argument by Plaintiffs' counsel during the course of the action.
The issues raised in Plaintiffs' copyright claims were typical and common questions that usually arise in copyright actions of this type rather than novel or difficult issues. Id. at ¶ 11(b). Defendant aggressively contested the issue of who bears the burden of proof on the issue of "first sale" and, therefore, this required a heightened level of analysis and skill in the extensive briefing and arguments Plaintiff presented on this question. Nevertheless, the Court concludes this action required legal counsel with an ordinary level of skill, knowledge, and proficiency in copyright matters to properly perform necessary legal services.
Plaintiffs' counsel stated the time demands in this action prevented the responsible attorneys and staff from taking other cases during the month of January 2001 and the first week of February 2001. Id. at ¶ 11(d). Plaintiffs' counsel also was required to defer working on other matters.
With respect to the customary fee, Plaintiffs have submitted the affidavit of an intellectual property lawyer. See Declaration of Julianne Ross Davis (Davis Declaration)(#160). Davis attests "the hourly rates for plaintiffs' attorneys is reasonable and consistent with the hourly rates charged in this community for similar work by similarly experienced copyright counsel." Id. at ¶ 4. Ratoza also avers the fees requested are reasonable, usual, and customary in the Portland, Oregon, legal community for work of this nature. Ratoza Declaration, ¶¶ 4 and 11(e). Defendant does not disagree.
Plaintiffs state their attorneys' fees are neither fixed nor contingent, but are based on time expended and costs incurred. Id. at ¶ 11(f). Defendant argues, "on information and belief," the fee arrangements between many character/merchandising licensors and their counsel permits the attorney to keep the amount recovered in litigation as the attorneys' fee. Defendant contends, therefore, an award of fees to Plaintiffs would constitute an improper windfall. Defendant, however, has introduced no evidence supporting its windfall argument; therefore, the Court finds Defendant's contention is speculative at best and gives it no weight.
The Court finds no evidence that time limitations imposed by Plaintiffs or the circumstances of this case materially affected Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Accordingly, this factor has no weight in the analysis.
Plaintiffs' evidence of actual damages was not compelling; therefore, the amount involved in Plaintiffs' copyright claims was contingent on the jury's award of statutory damages. The jury ultimately awarded statutory damages of $10,000 for copyright infringement of the Betty Boop character and $50,000 for copyright infringement of the Popeye character. Plaintiffs also point out they successfully obtained injunctive relief in this action. Id. ¶ at 11(h). In light of the $60,000 in statutory damages awarded and the injunctive relief Plaintiffs obtained, the Court concludes the amounts and relief involved, as well as the results obtained, support the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' petition for attorneys' fees on their copyright claims.
Ratoza states in his declaration he has been a member of the Oregon State Bar in good standing since 1976, he is rated "AV" by Martindale-Hubbell, he has a positive reputation in the legal community and extensive experience and recognized ability in litigating copyright cases. Id. at ¶¶ 9 and 11(i). Defendant does not dispute Ratoza's statements, and the Court finds the experience, reputation, and ability of Plaintiffs' attorneys support the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' fee request on the copyright claims.
With respect to "undesirability of the case," the Court finds this matter was not undesirable, thus, it is unnecessary to assess an enhanced fee to encourage legal counsel to undertake similar claims in the future. Again this factor has no weight in determining Plaintiffs' fee request.
Ratoza reports he has represented Plaintiffs for "approximately ten years." Id. at ¶ 11(k). The length of Ratoza's service as local counsel for Plaintiffs and the positive value and benefit to Plaintiffs of these years of service weigh in favor of awarding Plaintiffs their requested attorneys' fees.
Ratoza has submitted an excerpt from Nimmer on Copyright that summarizes a representative sample of fees awarded by courts to prevailing copyright claimants. Id. at ¶ 11(l) and Exhibit 2. The information supplied by Plaintiffs, which is unrefuted by Defendant, shows awards in similar cases support Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees request on their copyright claims. Other factors to consider in deciding to award attorneys' fees in a copyright case are: frivolousness, motivation, objective reasonableness of factual and legal arguments, and the need for compensation and deterrence. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs assert they are entitled to a full award of their fee request because: They were victorious on the merits and, therefore, their claims were not frivolous; there was no suggestion, evidence, or finding that Plaintiffs had an improper motive in pursuing their copyright claims; each of the elements of Plaintiffs' copyright infringement claims were proven and Plaintiffs' claims were found to be factually reasonable; Plaintiffs' legal arguments on infringement were found to be reasonable; and an award of attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs will compensate them for their costs of serving as a private attorney general, encourage future private enforcement of infringement claims, and deter future infringements. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs assessment of these factors and adopts Plaintiffs' arguments regarding these considerations.
Defendant acknowledges an award of attorneys' fees for copyright infringement is "within the discretion of the court." Nevertheless, Defendant contends the following factors should persuade the Court not to award fees under the Copyright Act: Plaintiffs delayed six months in notifying Defendant about the infringement after it was first detected, thus making it more difficult for Defendant to trace the merchandise and establish its "first-sale" defense, and, after conducting an inquiry, Defendant reasonably concluded the Betty Boop and Popeye merchandise came from a licensed and authorized source.
The Court disagrees Plaintiffs' delay in contacting Defendant about the copyright infringement was unreasonable. In this instance, Defendant does not contend Plaintiffs' copyright claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations nor does the Court conclude Defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Defendant had ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery in support of its "first sale" defense, but Defendant did not do so diligently with former counsel. Defendant also did not establish its defense of "first sale" at trial.
As noted, Defendant contends the burden of proof of the absence of a "first sale" should be on the plaintiff; i.e., the defendant is not required to bear the burden of proving a "first sale" has taken place. Defendant points out it litigated the issue of who bears the burden of proof of "first-sale" in good faith, and the "objective reasonableness" of Defendant's position should mitigate in favor of the Court's exercise of discretion to deny Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees.
Relevant case law holds the burden of establishing a "first sale" rests on the defendant in a copyright action. See American Intern. Pictures, Inc., v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 663 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers Elec. Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)). Moreover, no matter how the Ninth Circuit ultimately rules on this burden-of-proof issue, the Court does not agree that Defendant's contentions warrant a denial of Plaintiffs' request for reasonable attorneys' fees on their successful copyright claims.
Defendant also argues the Court should exercise its discretion to "follow the American rule"; i.e., each party should bear their own attorneys' fees. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1994) (court discusses the "American Rule" and observes "unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney's fees"). In Fogerty, however, the Court expressly stated "§ 505 is one situation in which Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of attorney's fees in the court's discretion." Id. The Court finds unpersuasive Defendant's argument that Fogerty directs the Court to exercise its discretion and to find each side should bear its own attorneys' fees arising from the litigation on Plaintiffs' copyright claims.
The Court concludes Plaintiffs' counsel and counsel's staff reasonably expended the following hours in prosecuting Plaintiffs' copyright claims: Attorney M. Ratoza — 276.5 hours, Attorney L. Taylor — 246.85 hours, Attorney C. McLaughlin — 68.05 hours, Paralegal I. Rasanen — 14.3 hours, Paralegal K. Carman — 1.8 hours, and Law Clerk A. Glinski — 57.4 hours.
The Court concludes Plaintiffs' counsel and counsel's staff reasonably charged the following hourly rates on work performed in support of Plaintiffs' copyright claims: Attorney M. Ratoza — $250 per hour, Attorney L. Taylor — $125 per hour, Attorney McLaughlin — $125 per hour, Paralegal I. Rasanen — $50 per hour, Paralegal K. Carman — $50 per hour, and Law Clerk A. Glinski — $65 per hour.
In calculating the "lodestar" by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing parties' attorneys reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, the Court finds Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable fee award of $112,936.00 on their copyright claims. The Court concludes this amount is neither unreasonably low or high and, therefore, the circumstances do not warrant application of a multiplier to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward.
Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees on the Claims For Unfair Competition in Violation of Federal Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) permits the court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "in exceptional cases." Although the term "exceptional" is not defined in the statute, "generally a trademark case is exceptional for purposes of an award of attorneys' fees when the infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful." Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Sealy, Inc., v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiffs emphasize the jury made a specific finding that "Defendant acted willfully and with malice, or that Defendant acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiffs' rights" with regard to the Popeye character. See Verdict (#154), Question 15. Plaintiffs argue, therefore, because the "properly instructed jury found that the Defendant's infringement of Plaintiffs' rights in the Popeye character was willful, this case is exceptional and Plaintiffs should be awarded their reasonable Lanham Act attorney's fees."
Defendant contends the facts of this case do not fit the "exceptional case" requirement for even a discretionary award of attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act. Defendant asserts the jury finding was most logically a finding that Defendant acted "in reckless disregard" based on the subsequent sales of the Popeye fabric only. Defendant contends this is consistent with the jury's discussion with the Court after the verdict was returned. Moreover, Defendant avers there was no evidence Defendant "intended" for the Popeye fabric to end up back on the floor of its store after receiving the original notice from Plaintiffs' counsel. Defendant argues the mental state requirement for an award of attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act is not met here.
Plaintiffs' assert that a verdict cannot be challenged based upon the post-verdict opinion of a juror. See Hard v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The near-universal and firmly established common law rule in the United States flatly prohibited the admission of juror testimony to impeach a verdict"). See also Fed.R.Civ. Evid. 606(b) (Inquiry Into Verdict or Indictment). Plaintiffs maintain the statement of one lone juror after the verdict was rendered is irrelevant in this proceeding.
An award of attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act is in the discretion of the court. Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1409 (citations omitted). The evidence at trial showed Defendant continued to display and to sell the Popeye fabric after Plaintiffs notified Defendant that it was infringing on Plaintiffs' rights. Additionally, the jury determined Defendant acted willfully and maliciously or with reckless disregard of Plaintiffs' rights with respect to the Popeye character. In the exercise of its discretion, therefore, the Court finds exceptional circumstances exist that justify an award of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on its claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes.
The Court's considerations regarding Plaintiffs' copyright infringement claims apply with equal force to Plaintiffs' claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes. With respect to the following factors the Court expressly adopts the analysis discussed above in assessing a reasonable fee award on Plaintiffs' Lanham Act claims: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the `undesirability' of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, (13) frivolousness, (14) motivation, (15) objective reasonableness of factual and legal arguments, and (16) the need for compensation and deterrence.
Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant have provided information concerning awards in similar trademark infringement cases, and the Court will not consider that factor in evaluating Plaintiffs' Lanham Act fee request. With respect to the results obtained, the Court notes the jury found Defendant had not infringed the Betty Boop trademark in a willful and malicious or reckless manner. Nevertheless, in light of the jury's finding regarding Defendant's willful infringement of the Popeye trademark and the jury award of $50,000 in actual damages regarding Popeye, the Court concludes the amount involved and the results obtained support the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' entire fee request for their claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes.
Plaintiffs' counsel also has significant experience litigating trademark infringement cases and has an excellent reputation and acknowledged ability in trademark matters. See Ratoza Declaration, ¶¶ 9 and 11(i). The Court concludes Plaintiffs' counsel reasonably expended the following hours in prosecuting Plaintiffs' unfair competition in violation of federal statutes claims: M. Ratoza — 5.25 hours, L. Taylor — 28.3 hours, and C McLaughlin — 9.5 hours. The Court finds Plaintiffs' counsel reasonably charged the following hourly rates on work performed in support of Plaintiffs' unfair competition in violation of federal statutes claims: Ratoza — $250 per hour; Taylor — $125 per hour; and McLaughlin — $125 per hour.
In calculating the "lodestar" by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing parties' attorneys reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, the Court finds Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee award of $6,037.50 on their claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes. The Court concludes this amount is neither unreasonably low or high and the circumstances do not warrant application of a multiplier to adjust the "lodestar" amount upward or downward.
PLAINTIFFS' COSTS
Costs generally are awarded to the prevailing party in a civil action as a matter of course unless the Court otherwise directs. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). The Court does not have discretion to award any amount of costs but must limit an award of costs to those defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987)). See also In re Melridge, Inc. Securities Litigation, 154 F.R.D. 260, 261 (D.Or. 1994).
Defendant objects to the following items on Plaintiffs' Cost Bill: (1) fees of the court reporter in the amount of $1038.75, and the portion of "fees for exemplification and copies of papers" in the lump sum amount of $1,711.53 that is designated on Plaintiffs' Attachment B of the Cost Bill as "Photocopies." Defendant questions whether the itemized expense of transcripts comprises costs for transcripts "necessarily obtained for use in the case." Defendant argues an adequate showing of necessity has not been made. In reply, Plaintiff has filed a supplemental declaration by Ratoza that provides further details about and segregation of the requested costs. See Supplemental Declaration of Michael M. Ratoza in Support of Cost Bill (#170).
Section 1920 authorizes the Court to tax as costs "[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case." Plaintiffs argue the depositions of Mark Abramoff, Nancy Dietrich, and Howard Dietrich were necessary and used at trial. Plaintiffs reduced their Cost Bill in the amount of $170.20 for the cost of the Mike Kiger deposition, which they did not use during the trial. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiffs used the Abramoff and both Dietrich depositions at trial for purposes of cross-examination and, therefore, awards Plaintiffs' requested court reporter fees in the amount of $868.55 (i.e., the requested amount of $1,038.75 minus $170.20 equals $868.55).
Section 1920 permits the Court to award as costs "[f]ees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case." In support of their request for an award of $1,711.53 for photocopies, Plaintiffs rely on Haagen-Daz, 920 F.2d at 588. In that case the Ninth Circuit ruled the district court judge "who was intimately familiar with the case" had not abused his discretion in awarding copying costs for one-half of the papers copied by the plaintiff. The appellate court noted the trial judge found the photocopies for which he awarded costs had been necessarily obtained for use in the case even though they were not offered as evidence in support of the plaintiffs' successful motion for summary judgment. Id.
In this instance, Plaintiffs did not prevail on their summary judgment motion. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court declines to award Plaintiffs $1,711.53 for the costs of making photocopies because the cost of photocopying normally is not a cost fairly shifted to the losing party in fee-bearing litigation.
Plaintiffs request an award of $3,875.15 in their Cost Bill. Taking into account the above reductions, the Court awards Plaintiffs $1993.42 (i.e., $3,875.15 minus $1,711.53 and minus $170.20 equals $1993.42).
Plaintiffs also request recovery of $5,402.57 as "Office Costs (Not Included in Cost Bill)" pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505 for costs such as office supplies, telephone charges, on-line computer research, delivery service costs, VHS tape duplication, facsimile expenses, and the costs of obtaining certified copies of Plaintiffs' copyright registrations. Again most of these costs constitute normal office overhead that typically is not shifted to the losing party in fee-bearing litigation.
Plaintiffs' counsel used the VHS tape as an entertaining introduction at trial, but it was not necessary to Plaintiffs' case. Only the cost of obtaining certified copies of Plaintiffs' copyright registrations was necessary to the prosecution of Plaintiffs' copyright claims. Accordingly, no award of costs is allowed for Plaintiffs' requested office costs except the $45 relating to the cost of obtaining certified copies of Plaintiffs' copyright registrations.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Post-Verdict Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs (#158) is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees of $112,936 on their copyright claim, attorneys' fees of $6,037.50 on their claims for unfair competition in violation of federal statutes, and $45 in costs on their claims for "Office Costs (Not Included In Cost Bill)." Plaintiffs' Cost Bill (#157)is also GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded $1993.42 on their Cost Bill.
IT IS SO ORDERED.