Hearn v. Hearn

18 Citing cases

  1. Bacon v. Kouri

    696 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    The record in this case includes a transcript and statement of facts but does not include findings of fact and conclusions of law. Under these circumstances, the court's judgment implies all necessary fact-findings in support of its judgment, and in our review, we must consider only that evidence that is most favorable to the issue and disregard that which is contrary thereto. Carter v. William Sommerville and Son, 584 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. 1979); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). Accordingly, each of Mr. Bacon's points of error will be considered in light of such rule. In points of error number one and two, Mr. Bacon contends there is either no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the trial court's order.

  2. Devine v. Devine

    490 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)   Cited 2 times

    Appellant's sole and only point of error alleges the court abused its discretion in entering the order providing for payments of $37.50 for each of the two children under the age of eighteen because, he says, the order had the effect of raising his child support payments in that it required him to pay practically the same amount for two children as he had theretofore been paying for the support of four children. Appellant does not dispute that the trial court is mantled with wide discretion in setting the amount of child support payments to be made, and the law is well settled that we may not review the support orders of the trial court unless it affirmatively appears that the trial court abused that discretion. Beaird v. Beaird, 380 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1964, no writ); Middlesworth v. Middlesworth, 380 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1964, no writ); Nelson v. Nelson, 436 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1969, no writ); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler, 1969, no writ); and see Ann., Child Support Award — Excessiveness, 1 A.L.R.3d 382, sec. 4. In passing on the question of whether an abuse of discretion was shown where the record, as here, contains no findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must "consider only that evidence which is most favorable to the judgment and disregard that which is contrary thereto."

  3. In re Finch

    130 B.R. 753 (S.D. Tex. 1991)   Cited 17 times
    Reaching the same result under Texas community property law

    These cases are based on language that is no longer present in the current version of the pertinent statute and, in any event, only applied to the ex-spouse's interests in separate property. See Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 3.63; Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 4638 (repealed 1969); Hailey, 331 S.W.2d at 303; Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 144-45 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ); Duncan v. Duncan, 374 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1964, no writ); Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ); McKnight, Division of Marital Property, supra, at 445. Subsequent Texas cases make clear that in divorce proceedings, a trial court can vest all interest in a parcel of community property in one spouse, thus divesting the other spouse of any interest in that particular property.

  4. Massey v. Massey

    807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1991)   Cited 89 times
    Holding unambiguous deeds reciting consideration proved conveyances were bargained-for-exchanges and parol evidence was inadmissible to establish the transactions were actually intended to be gifts

    As set out in the trial court's judgment, the factors considered by the Campbell court are among those considered by the trial court in the division of the Masseys' estate. See also Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1969, no writ). Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's division of the marital estate of the parties, we overrule point of error number one.

  5. Conner v. Bean

    630 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App. 1982)   Cited 14 times
    Affirming award for anticipatory breach of contract in wife's suit on contractual alimony agreement

    The courts in Texas are vested with wide discretion in the division of property in suit for divorce and may divide the property in such a way as the court deems right, just and proper. Roye v. Roye, 404 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1966, no writ); Dobbs v. Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 144, 145 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). As stated in Miller : "The trial court, in dividing the property in divorce suit, may take into consideration a number of things including the difference in earning power, capacity and abilities, probable future need for support, fault in breaking up the marriage, and the benefits the innocent spouse would have received from a continuation of the marriage.

  6. In re Marriage of Rutherford

    614 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    We agree with Mrs. Rutherford that the trial court may, in the exercise of sound discretion, award attorney's fees to a defendant-spouse in a divorce action by virtue of its general equity jurisdiction. Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1976, no writ); Zaruba v. Zaruba, 498 S.W.2d 695, 700-01 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism'd); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1969, no writ). By his point of error and arguments thereunder, Mr. Rutherford does not contend the trial court abused its discretion, nor does he demonstrate that the court did, in fact, abuse its discretion.

  7. J.M. and G.M., in Interest

    585 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)   Cited 23 times
    Noting that the divorce decree ordered the father to pay for a college education for each of the children; to remain responsible for one-half of their medical and dental expenses; and to pay all tuition costs

    The trial court's order will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1969, no writ); Brito v. Brito, 346 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1961, writ ref'd n. r. e.). While the trial court has wide discretion in fixing the amount of child support payments and while each case must stand on its own facts, the determination of that amount must be supported by evidence that the parent obligated for child support is able to pay, and can pay, the amount specified in the order. See Anderson v. Anderson, 503 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1973, no writ); Danburg v. Danburg, 433 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1968, no writ); Ramey v. Ramey, 425 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1968, writ dism'd); Angel v. Todd, 368 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1963, no writ); Madden v. Madden, 365 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1963, no writ).

  8. Poynter v. Haik

    580 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)   Cited 2 times

    Such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has clearly abused its discretion. Lambert v. Lambert, 545 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st) 1976, no writ); Jackman v. Jackman, 533 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1975, no writ); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1969, no writ). In determining the duty of a parent to support a child after a divorce, it is to be borne in mind that such duty corresponds to his or her overall financial ability and the needs of the child.

  9. Thompson v. Thompson

    572 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that "appellant will not be permitted, at this later [support modification] hearing, to raise for the first time the contention that he is not the father of the child"

    Both parents have an obligation of support towards their children and this duty must be considered in light of their financial abilities to pay such support, having due regard for all their lawful obligations. Gully v. Gully, 111 Tex. 233, 231 S.W. 97, 100 (Tex.Sup. 1921); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, n. w. h.). The trial court's judgment may not be disturbed unless a clear showing of abuse of discretion is made. Labowitz v. Labowitz, 542 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, n. w. h.); Hearn v. Hearn, supra; Brito v. Brito, supra.

  10. Ondrusek v. Ondrusek

    561 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)   Cited 10 times

    Such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has clearly abused its discretion. Dennis v. Dennis, 512 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1974, no writ); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 515 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); Hearn v. Hearn, 449 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). The record discloses that at the time of the hearing on the motion for contempt Mrs. Ondrusek was gainfully employed with a gross monthly salary of $450.00 and a net take-home pay of $362.68 per month.