Because this last issue is unlikely to reoccur at the new trial, it does not merit discussion.In turn, Ferranti relies on Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So.3d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), in which this Court held that because the plaintiff dropped a claim for specified damages, evidence that the plaintiff "allegedly misrepresented her ... injuries generally is inadmissible because it constitutes impeachment on a collateral issue." 92 So.3d at 861.

Affirmed. See Sebo v. American Home Assurance Co., Inc. , 208 So.3d 694 (Fla. 2016) ; Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo , 92 So.3d 859, 865–67 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) ; Wallach v. Rosenberg , 527 So.2d 1386, 1389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

In Mathis, which the trial court did not have the benefit of at the time it entered its order, this court held that “[t]he fact that the proposals only stated that they were made on behalf of [one defendant], but the releases indicated that all defendants would be released if the [plaintiffs] agreed to the proposals, did not create an ambiguity or transform the separate offers into undifferentiated joint offers.” Id. at 657–58 (citing Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So.3d 859, 871 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)). BCU argues and Mootry concedes that in light of Mathis, the trial court was incorrect in finding that the proposal constituted an undifferentiated joint offer.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the offer of judgment statute and rule. Wolfe v. Culpepper Constructors, Inc., 104 So.3d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ; Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So.3d 859, 869 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) ; Jacksonville Golfair, Inc. v. Grover, 988 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Under both the statute and rule, therefore, entitlement to fees and costs to a qualifying offeror is mandatory, if the statutory prerequisites have been met. Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Indeed,

We have previously held that proposals for settlement made by one plaintiff on separate defendants, conditioned on the dismissal of both defendants, were not ambiguous. See Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So.3d 859, 871 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (where interests of the defendants were coextensive, offer of judgment not invalidated because of plaintiff's promise to release remaining defendants as a nonmonetary term of the settlement); see also Andrews v. Frey, 66 So.3d 376, 378–79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (where defendants' liability is coextensive, one defendant's proposal to settle plaintiff's negligence and vicarious liability action against two defendants was valid for purposes of defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees and costs under the offer of judgment statute and rule, even though proposal conditioned acceptance on release of claims against defendant who was not an offeror under the proposal). But see Duplantis v. Brock Specialty Servs., Ltd., 85 So.3d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)(where vicarious liability is contested, plaintiff is entitled to separate offers from each defendant so that plaintiff may independently and intelligently assess and evaluate each offer).

We have previously held that proposals for settlement made by one plaintiff on separate defendants, conditioned on the dismissal of both defendants, were not ambiguous. See Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So. 3d 859, 871 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (where interests of the defendants were coextensive, offer of judgment not invalidated because of plaintiff's promise to release remaining defendants as a nonmonetary term of the settlement); see also Andrews v. Frey, 66 So. 3d 376, 378-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (where defendants' liability is coextensive, one defendant's proposal to settle plaintiff's negligence and vicarious liability action against two defendants was valid for purposes of defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees and costs under the offer of judgment statute and rule, even though proposal conditioned acceptance on release of claims against defendant who was not an offeror under the proposal). But see Duplantis v. Brock Specialty Servs., Ltd., 85 So. 3d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)(where vicarious liability is contested, plaintiff is entitled to separate offers from each defendant so that plaintiff may independently and intelligently assess and evaluate each offer).

This Court reviews the trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So.3d 859, 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). However, the jury's right to pass upon the question of an employer's liability in a FELA action “must be most liberally viewed.”

Counsel's arguments improperly suggested that the defendant should be punished for contesting damages at trial and that its defense of the claim in court was improper. See Carnival Corp. v. Pajares, 972 So.2d 973, 977–78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Revuelta, 901 So.2d 377, 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Chin v. Caiaffa, 42 So.3d 300, 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Health First, Inc. v. Cataldo, 92 So.3d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The closing argument was designed to inflame the emotions of the jury rather than prompt a “logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.”