Opinion
FSTCV186035118S
09-17-2019
Patricia HEALING v. Daniel BARSANTI
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Hon. Edward T. Krumeich, II
Plaintiff Patricia Healing ("Healing") has moved for summary judgment on the First Count of the Complaint against defendant Daniel Barsanti ("Barsanti") in which she asserted a claim for contribution for a payment she made of $454, 320 to settle a litigation brought by the Connecticut Community Bank d/b/a Westport National Bank ("WNB") to enforce a debt guaranteed by Healing and Barsanti. Defendant has asserted that the claim for contribution should be barred under the clean hands doctrine. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
The Standards for Deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment
"The standards ... [for] review of a ... motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case ..." DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 115-16 (2012), quoting H.O.R.S.E. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Washington, 258 Conn. 553, 558-60 (2001). (Citations omitted.)
"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ..." Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318 (2006).
Once the movant for summary judgment has satisfied the initial burden of showing the absence of a material issue of fact, the burden shifts to the opponent to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact: "it is then ‘incumbent upon the party opposing summary judgment to establish a factual predicate from which it can be determined, as a matter of law, that a genuine issue of material fact exists’" Iacurci v. Sax, 313 Conn. 786, 799 (2014), quoting Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 251 (1990).
The Right to Contribution
There is no dispute that WNB sued both Healing and Barsanti to enforce the debt guaranteed by them and Healing paid WNB $454, 320 to settle the action; Barsanti did not contribute to the settlement.
Connecticut recognizes a common-law right of contribution in favor of a co-guarantor who has satisfied a joint debt and paid more than his or her contributive share of the whole outstanding obligation. See Lestorti v. DeLeo, 298 Conn. 466, 473-81, 487 (2010).
Under Connecticut law, the right of contribution between coguarantors is based on the theory of implied contract ... When two or more persons guarantee the debt of another, they simultaneously enter into ‘an implied promise on the part of each to contribute his share if necessary to meet the common obligation.’ ... ‘[T]his right is an existing obligation running from the inception of the relation[ship] ...’ Nevertheless, ‘its enforcement does not accrue ... until the actual payment of the common debt.’ Lestorti, 298 Conn. at 473. (Citations omitted.)
The right to contribution is limited to amounts paid by the co-guarantor in excess of his or her contributive share of the whole outstanding obligation. See Lestorti, 298 Conn. at 474.
A coguarantor, however, is not entitled to contribution for any amount paid to the creditor toward the common debt. Rather, under Connecticut law, a guarantor’s right of contribution from a coguarantor arises only when the guarantor ‘has paid in excess of his share of the whole [outstanding] obligation, ’ and the amount of contribution he is entitled to collect is limited to "the amount he has paid in excess of his share of the whole [outstanding] obligation’ ... The reason for this limitation is that, in Connecticut, ‘[a] guarantor, as between himself and his co-guarantors, is a principal for the portion of the debt which he ought to pay and is a surety [or secondary obligor] for the remainder ...’ ... Thus, when a coguarantor has made a payment to the creditor in an amount that is less than his share of the whole outstanding obligation, he has no right to contribution from the other coguarantors. 298 Conn. at 474-75. (Citations and footnotes omitted.)
Healings’ contributive share of the amounts paid to settle the action with WNB and to obtain release of the debt guaranteed by her and Barsanti was fifty percent of $454, 320 and therefore, unless there is a viable defense to the claim, Healing has the right to collect contribution from Barsanti in the amount of $227, 160, which represents the excess paid by her above her contributive share.
The Unclean Hands Defense
Barsanti does not contest the facts underlying Healings’ contribution claim. Instead he argues that she should not be entitled to collect the contribution demanded from him because she has "unclean hands" and accuses Healing of deliberately cutting him off from the source of funds he could have used to pay his share of the debt and argues that the damages due him for Healings’ alleged tortious conduct exceeds the contribution amount. Neither of the assertions state a viable defense to the contribution claim.
"The doctrine of unclean hands expresses the principle that where a plaintiff seeks equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been fair, equitable and honest as to the particular controversy in issue ... Unless the plaintiff’s conduct is of such a character as to be condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded people, the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply ..." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lorson, 183 Conn.App. 200, 222 (2018), quoting Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 310 (2001). "The doctrine [of unclean hands] generally applies [only] to the particular transaction under consideration, for the court will not go outside the case for the purpose of examining the conduct of the complainant in other matters or questioning his general character for fair dealing. The wrong must ... be in regard to the matter in litigation ... Though an obligation be indirectly connected with an illegal transaction, it will not thereby be barred from enforcement, if the plaintiff does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case ..." R.S. Silver Enterprises, Inc. v. Pascarella, 163 Conn.App. 1, 22 (2016), citing Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. at 310-11. (Citations omitted.)
In R.S. Silver, Inc. v. Pascarella, 163 Conn.App. at 21-23, the Appellate Court concluded the source from which the corporate investor obtained funds for his participation agreement with the real estate investment partnership did not have any bearing on the investor’s breach of contract claim against the partnership, and therefore, striking of unclean hands special defense, which argued that the funds arose from bankruptcy fraud, was warranted.
The transaction which gave right to a right of contribution was the guaranty that each party gave on the WNB credit line to their jointly owned business. That was when Barsanti entered into an implied agreement with Healing to contribute if necessary to meet the common obligation. See Lestorti, 298 Conn. at 473. Although the payment in excess of her contributive share to settle the action with WNB was when the right to enforce accrued, the obligation to contribute was pre-existing. Id. The alleged misconduct that Barsanti asserts deprived him of a source of funds to contribute to settlement was unrelated to the particular transaction under consideration and so cannot be the basis of an unclean hands defense. That Barsanti may recover more than the contribution due to Healing if he prevails on his counterclaims is similarly irrelevant to her claim for contribution.
Conclusion
Healing has met her burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact and she is entitled to contribution from Barsanti in the amount of $227, 160 as a matter of law. Barsanti has not demonstrated that there are genuine issues of material fact relating to defense of this claim remaining to be tried. Summary judgment on Count I of the Complaint is granted.