Opinion
February 13, 1951. Rehearing Denied March 20, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Stanley Milledge, J.
J.W. Watson, Jr., Olavi M. Hendrickson and John D. Marsh, all of Miami, for appellant.
Morrow, Mayes Sutton and Franklin Parson, all of Miami, for appellee.
It appears by the record in this cause that W.T. Walker, appellee, for several years prior to 1949, operated a dry cleaning business in the City of Miami. During the month of July, 1949, the City of Miami, pursuant to Section 29 of Chapter 10847, Sp.Acts of 1925, being the charter of the City of Miami, prepared a budget of municipal expenditures and made an estimate of its revenue requirements for the ensuing fiscal year of 1949-1950. The budget, among many other things, contained the amount of $1,385,000.00 receivable and fixed in the budget by the City of Miami from occupational licenses for the fiscal year 1949-1950. The amount of occupational licenses assessed in the budget as against the appellee for operating a dry cleaning business for the period by the City of Miami was the sum of $73.80, which sum was paid by appellee and a license issued authorizing him to operate a dry cleaning business in the City of Miami for the fiscal year 1949-1950.
Pursuant to Section 30 of the Charter a public hearing was held by the City of Miami on the proposed appropriation as estimated by the City Manager prior to the enactment of an appropriation ordinance. The hearing was held as prescribed by the charter and the appropriation ordinance was enacted by the City of Miami for the fiscal year 1949-1950. The appellee obtained a license from the City of Miami to operate his dry cleaning business after the enactment of the appropriation ordinance, as provided in Section 30 of its charter, and a license issued to him when he paid to the City of Miami the sum of $73.80. The fiscal year of said city begins on July 1st of each year and ends on June 30th of the following year. Section 30, supra, provides that the city shall pass the appropriation ordinance within four weeks after the beginning of its fiscal year (which means not later than August 1st of each fiscal year).
On September 7, 1949, the City of Miami enacted emergency Ordinance No. 3852, which amended a previous ordinance relating to occupational licenses. Pertinent here is Section 1(a): "Wholesale. — Persons engaged in the business of cleaning or pressing, who shall perform cleaning or pressing work for any other person who is engaged or holds himself out as being engaged in the business of cleaning or pressing, as an agent or otherwise, or who solicits, receives or accepts such work to be performed from such person, shall for the purpose of this ordinance be considered a wholesaler and shall pay an annual occupational license fee of $250.00."
The appellee Walker, on May 8, 1950, was arrested by the City of Miami on a charge that he engaged in the business of a wholesale dry cleaning plant without first having obtained an occupational license or paid the sum of $250.00, as provided for in Ordinance No. 3852 enacted September 7, 1949. The appellee Walker petitioned the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, for a writ of habeas corpus and therein contended that Ordinance 3852 was invalid and void for various reasons. The issues presented were heard by the Honorable Stanley Milledge, Circuit Judge, who entered an order discharging the petitioner-appellee. The City of Miami appealed.
It is not disputed that the petitioner-appellee paid the sum of $73.80 to the City of Miami as a license fee to engage in the dry cleaning business for the fiscal year 1949-1950. This sum was paid pursuant to the general appropriation ordinance enacted under the charter of said city. If the City of Miami, under the guise of an emergency ordinance, has the power to levy an additional occupational tax against the petitioner's business after the general appropriation ordinance was enacted and the prescribed amount promptly paid, then what limitation of power, if any, would preclude the enactment of other and additional ordinances within the fiscal year? Such unrestrained taxing power by the city could destroy petitioner-appellee's dry cleaning business. The power of the city to further tax the dry cleaning business was exhausted when the appropriation ordinance was enacted as provided for in Section 30 of its charter. See State ex rel. Cole v. Keller, 129 Fla. 276, 176 So. 176.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL THOMAS, ADAMS, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.