We reject defendants' contention that the three prongs of that test were not met here. The claims against defendants and Collier all arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, namely the shooting of plaintiff after he fled from the police and his arrest (seeHeadley v. City of New York , 115 A.D.3d 804, 806, 982 N.Y.S.2d 149 [2d Dept. 2014] ; Thomsen v. Suffolk County Police Dept. , 50 A.D.3d 1015, 1018, 857 N.Y.S.2d 181 [2d Dept. 2008] ). Plaintiff further established that Collier is united in interest with the City by virtue of the City being vicariously liable for the claim of negligence against her in the absence of any allegation that Collier was acting outside of the scope of her employment (see General Municipal Law § 50-j [1] ; Krug v. City of Buffalo , 34 N.Y.3d 1094, 1095, 117 N.Y.S.3d 157, 140 N.E.3d 531 [2019] ; see generallyVerizon N.Y., Inc. v. LaBarge Bros. Co., Inc. , 81 A.D.3d 1294, 1296, 916 N.Y.S.2d 377 [4th Dept. 2011] ).

In light of our determination, the plaintiff's cross motion for a unified trial on the issues of liability and damages is no longer academic. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for a determination on the merits of the plaintiff's cross motion (see e.g.Horowitz v. 763 E. Assoc., LLC , 125 A.D.3d 808, 811, 5 N.Y.S.3d 118 ; Headley v. City of New York , 115 A.D.3d 804, 807, 982 N.Y.S.2d 149 ). DILLON, J.P., COHEN, CONNOLLY and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.

Given these facts, we find that the individual trustees "knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against [them] in the absence of [defendant's] mistake" and, therefore, find that defendant established its entitlement to the benefit of the relation back doctrine ( De Sanna v. Rockefeller Ctr., Inc., 9 A.D.3d at 599, 780 N.Y.S.2d 651 ; seeBuran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d at 182, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 ). Accordingly, Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims for fraud/fraud in the inducement and breach of fiduciary duty against the individual trustees, and it should have granted defendant's cross motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action against the individual trustees pursuant to General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 (see CPLR 203[f] ; Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d at 182, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 ; De Sanna v. Rockefeller Ctr., Inc., 9 A.D.3d at 599, 780 N.Y.S.2d 651 ; see alsoHeadley v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804, 806–807, 982 N.Y.S.2d 149 [2014] ; Thomsen v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 50 A.D.3d 1015, 1018–1019, 857 N.Y.S.2d 181 [2008] ; compareMatter of Sullivan v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Mamakating, 151 A.D.3d 1518, 1520, 58 N.Y.S.3d 692 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 906, 70 N.Y.S.3d 446, 93 N.E.3d 1211 [2017] ; Branch v. Community Coll. of the County of Sullivan, 148 A.D.3d at 1411, 48 N.Y.S.3d 861 ; Matter of Ayuda Re Funding, LLC v. Town of Liberty, 121 A.D.3d at 1475–1476, 996 N.Y.S.2d 379 ). Defendant's original answer and its answer to the first amended complaint specifically reference the conduct of "the [t]rustees" with respect to its counterclaim alleging a breach of fiduciary duty.

Thus, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint on this ground. In light of our determination, the other branches of the defendant's motion are no longer academic, and we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a determination on the remaining branches of the defendant's motion (seeMidorimatsu, Inc. v. Hui Fat Co., 99 A.D.3d 680, 683, 951 N.Y.S.2d 570 ; cf.Stein v. Doukas, 128 A.D.3d 805, 805–806, 7 N.Y.S.3d 904 ; Headley v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804, 807, 982 N.Y.S.2d 149 ). MASTRO, J.P., LEVENTHAL, BARROS and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.

In this case, the petitioner has not shown that the restrictions SARA imposed, as applied to him, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. "[I]ssues regarding whether there are better or wiser ways to achieve the law's stated objectives are policy decisions belonging to the legislature and not the court" (Matter of Williams v. Department of Corr. & Community Supervision, 136 A.D.3d at 149, 21 N.Y.S.3d 678).In light of our determination, the remaining requests for relief in the petition/complaint are no longer academic. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings on the remaining requests for relief in the petition/complaint (see e.g. Horowitz v. 763 E. Assoc., LLC, 125 A.D.3d 808, 811, 5 N.Y.S.3d 118 ; Headley v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804, 807, 982 N.Y.S.2d 149 ; Lazarre v. Davis, 109 A.D.3d 968, 969–970, 972 N.Y.S.2d 80 ).

In light of our determination, the plaintiffs' cross motion for a unified trial on the issues of liability and damages is no longer academic. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination on the merits of the plaintiffs' cross motion (see e.g. Headley v City of New York, 115 AD3d 804, 807; Lazarre v Davis, 109 AD3d 968, 969-970; Midorimatsu, Inc. v Hui Fat Co., 99 AD3d 680, 683). To the extent that the plaintiffs seek relief regarding Affraim's separate motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, we note that the Supreme Court did not decide that motion in the order appealed from.

As for the cross motion to mark the action settled, the court notes that "[t]o be enforceable, stipulations of settlement must conform to the requirements of CPLR 2104 [which as relevant here provides]... that such an agreement be "in writing and signed by the parties (or attorneys of the parties) to be bound by it" (Headley v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804, 807 [2d Dept 2014]). Emails exchanged between attorneys which identify the attorneys' email account have been held to constitute signed writings within the meaning of CPLR 2104 (Philadelphia Ins. Indem. Co. v Kendall, 197 A.D.3d 75, 80 [1st Dept 2021] [holding that "if an attorney hits 'send' with the intent of relaying a settlement offer or acceptance, and their email account is identified in some way as their own," the parties' counsel's emails create a binding settlement agreement]; see also, Jimenez v Yanne, 152 A.D.3d 434, 434 [1st Dept 2015] [finding that email communications between the parties' attorneys were "sufficiently set forth an enforceable agreement to settle plaintiffs' personal injury claims"]).

Notably, "although CPLR 2104 says subscribed, not signed, subscription is defined as '[t]he act of signing one's name on a document; the signature so affixed'" (Matter of Philadelphia Ins. Indem. Co. v Kendall, 197 A.D.3d 75, 78 n2 [1st Dept 2021], quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1655 [10th ed 2014]; see also Bonnette v Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 3 N.Y.3d 281, 286 [2004] ["The plain language of the statute directs that the agreement itself must be in writing, signed by the party (or attorney) to be bound"]). As such, a writing not signed by the party or attorney to be bound will not constitute an enforceable settlement (Kataldo, 161 A.D.3d at 1060; Headley v City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804, 807 [2d Dept 2014]; Matter of Morse Hill Assoc, LLC, 50 A.D.3d 906, 907-908 [2d Dept 2008]).

Furthermore, to be enforceable against a party, a settlement agreement must be in writing and signed by that party or the party's attorney or made between counsel in open court. (CPLR 2104; see Bonette v. Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 3 N.Y.3d 281 [2004]; Headley v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804 [2d Dept 2014].) Thus, petitioners were required to provide the documentation requested by the clerk to be entitled to entry of judgment.

In situations where the statute of limitations has expired, amendment is possible if the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a basis for application of the relation back doctrine pursuant to CPLR 203. See Headley v. City of New York, 115 A.D.3d 804, 806, 982 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 [2nd Dept, 2014]. "For the rule allowing relation back to the original date of filing under CPLR 203(c) to apply