Head v. State

15 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. State

    340 Ga. App. 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 3 times

    Jackson does not contend in this appeal that the results of his blood test should be suppressed because an unqualified person drew his blood for the purpose of testing it for drugs. See Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 363 (5), 271 S.E.2d 452 (1980) (stating "legislature is authorized to classify and treat alcohol differently from other drugs and defendant cannot complain if drug users are not entitled to have qualified persons conduct the tests"). Compare Carr v. State, 222 Ga.App. 776, 777–778 (1), 476 S.E.2d 75 (1996) (stating in dicta that blood drawn for purpose of determining alcohol and drug content must meet "qualified person" requirement of OCGA § 40–6–392 (a) (2) ).

  2. Chastain v. State

    400 S.E.2d 329 (Ga. 1991)   Cited 27 times

    Exceptions to this rule permit evidence of independent crimes committed by the defendant to be admitted for the limited purposes of showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and/or course of conduct. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 364 ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980). There are two conditions to admissibility.

  3. Cunningham v. State

    255 Ga. 35 (Ga. 1985)   Cited 33 times

    Once the identity of the defendant is shown to be the same as that of the perpetrator of an independent crime of sufficient similarity that proof of that crime tends to prove the offense charged, evidence of the independent crime may be introduced to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749 ( 312 S.E.2d 40) (1983); Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360 ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980); Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977). Identity of the appellant as the perpetrator of both incidents was shown.

  4. Burke v. State

    248 Ga. 124 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 31 times

    " Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360 (7) ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980), relied on by the defendant, is inapposite as it refers to the admissibility of independent evidence of separate crimes rather than statements by the defendant himself which are part of an incriminating statement relevant to the crime on trial. We find no error.

  5. State v. Peabody

    277 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 15 times

    It follows that the failure to hear evidence on a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence outside of the presence of the jury should not be per se reversible error either. 4. It can also be said that the Court of Appeals' holding in this case is inconsistent with numerous cases applying the Johnson v. State nonconstitutional-error rule in determining whether the improper admission of evidence is reversible. See, e.g., Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360 (9) ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980); Drake v. State, 245 Ga. 798 (3) ( 267 S.E.2d 237) (1980); Herron v. State, 155 Ga. App. 791 (2) ( 272 S.E.2d 756) (1980); Kirkland v. State, 141 Ga. App. 664 ( 234 S.E.2d 133) (1977). In the seminal case of Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 ( 230 S.E.2d 869) (1976), we adopted as the standard for determining nonconstitutional error in criminal cases whether it is "highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment."

  6. Barnes v. Greater Georgia Life Insurance Company

    243 Ga. App. 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 7 times

    The trial court did not err in granting Greater Georgia Life Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 362(3) ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980).Prine v. State, 237 Ga. App. 679, 680(2)(a) ( 515 S.E.2d 425) (1999).

  7. Kirkland v. State

    424 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 53 times
    In Kirkland, supra, in an opinion authored by then-Presiding Judge Carley, this Court reasoned: "The type of vehicle driven or the degree or source of intoxication may vary, but it is the simple act of driving while having the status of an habitual violator or while under the influence [of alcohol] that establishes the commission of those crimes.

    Independent evidence of appellant's prior convictions for those offenses was otherwise admitted as similar transactions. See Division 3. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 363 (7) ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980); Hester v. State, supra at 644 (2). Accordingly, the listing of those prior offenses in the "package" was merely cumulative of that independently admitted similar transaction evidence.

  8. Jackson v. State

    397 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 3 times
    In Jackson v. State, 196 Ga. App. 724 (397 S.E.2d 13) (1990), the emergency room treating doctor testified that he ordered the test, and that he did so in order to take blood alcohol level into account in making medical treatment decisions.

    Although Bynum was a civil case, we see no reason to distinguish it on that basis because OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) by its terms applies equally to civil and criminal actions, and OCGA § 24-3-14 regularly has been applied in criminal trials. E.g., Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 365-366 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980). Accordingly, we find the trial court properly admitted the results of the blood test administered by the hospital.

  9. Odister v. State

    383 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    Evidence of a similar crime is admissible to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 364 ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980). It is admissible to show the defendant's lustful disposition and to corroborate the victim's testimony.

  10. Holloway v. State

    371 S.E.2d 259 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    Evidence of a similar crime is admissible to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 364 ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980). It is admissible to show the defendant's lustful disposition and to corroborate the victim's testimony.