" is sufficient to authorize defendant's convictions on all four counts for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of OCGA § 16-11-106 (b). The State cites Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 791), reversed on other grounds at 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228), in support of this argument, apparently reasoning that specific proof of the type weapon possessed by an accused is unnecessary to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm when a victim testifies that the accused possessed an object which appears to be within the class of weapons prohibited by an unlawful firearms possession statute. In Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1), supra, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, pointing out that the State failed to prove the "pistol" he possessed was a firearm within the meaning of OCGA § 16-11-131 (a) (2).
It was a case wherein an unbifurcated trial resulted in convictions for both armed robbery and the possession offense and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 ( 316 S.E.2d 791) (1984). We granted certiorari and reversed, because the defendant's prior convictions had "nothing to do with any element of the robbery charge, except the forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and propensity for violent crimes."
DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 1984. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 170 Ga. App. 324 ( 316 S.E.2d 791). Carl P. Greenberg, for appellant.
The victim testified that defendant had a gun and threatened her with it. "There being no evidence that the [gun] was not a firearm, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that it was such beyond a reasonable doubt." Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 325 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 791), rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228) (1984). The evidence was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.E.2d 560) (1979) to support conviction on these counts.
(Emphasis supplied.) Favors v. State, 182 Ga. App. 179 (2) ( 355 S.E.2d 109); Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 326 (3) ( 316 S.E.2d 791), rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228). However, if the State elects to aver in a possession of firearm by felon count that the defendant has been convicted of more than one prior felony offense, such averment is descriptive of the manner in which the offense was committed and, as such, the State must make an honest attempt to prove the offense "as laid" (see generally Ross v. State, 195 Ga. App. 624 (1) (b) ( 394 S.E.2d 418) and cases therein cited); any other holding would permit the State to list all of an offender's prior offenses without any intent to prove each of the averments and merely to enflame the jury.
Thus, the jury was authorized to find that the guns were actual working firearms and to convict appellant on that count. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 791) (1984); rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228) (1984). 4.
Prather, supra. Favors complains that not one, but four previous convictions of six felonies were alleged and proven against him. Although listing a defendant's entire record on the facts of an indictment has been discouraged, see Biggers v. State, 162 Ga. App. 163, 165 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 159) (1982), the state is not limited to alleging and proving only one prior felony conviction when proof of a felony conviction is an element of the crime charged. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 326 (3) ( 316 S.E.2d 791) (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228) (1984); Sheffield v. State, 163 Ga. App. 533 ( 295 S.E.2d 336) (1982); Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775 ( 296 S.E.2d 110) (1982). Refusal to limit the allegations and proof to one prior felony conviction was not reversible error.
PER CURIAM. On certiorari, Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228) (1984), the Supreme Court has reversed our judgment of affirmance in Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 ( 316 S.E.2d 791) (1984). Therefore, our former judgment is vacated and the judgment of the trial court is reversed in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court opinion.