Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-8817.
August 17, 2005.
Appeal from the District Court, First Judicial District, Craig, Kevin G. Miller, Judge. Trial Court Nos. 1CR-03-201 205 CR.
Samuel A. McQuerry, Assistant Public Defender, Ketchikan, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Daniel J.M. Schally, Assistant District Attorney, Stephen R. West, District Attorney, Ketchikan, and Gregg D. Renkes, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
William B. Heacock appeals his convictions for driving while under the influence and fifth-degree criminal mischief. On appeal, Heacock claims that the district court erred when it denied his request for a new trial. He also claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for driving while under the influence. For the reasons explained below, we reject Heacock's claims and affirm his convictions.
AS 28.35.030(a) and AS 11.46.486(a)(2), respectively.
Facts and proceedings
On August 3, 2003, Heacock was arrested for driving while under the influence. Later, after an incident in the police station, he was charged with fifth-degree criminal mischief.
On September 8, 2003, he appeared before District Court Judge Kevin G. Miller for the first of a number of representation hearings. Heacock was generally uncooperative at these hearings. Among other things, he refused to decide whether he wanted to be represented by an attorney.
On January 12, 2004, Judge Miller asked Heacock if he was prepared for trial. Judge Miller told Heacock that the trial would not be delayed any longer, and that Heacock had to declare that he was "either ready for trial or . . . going to talk to a lawyer." When Heacock said that he was ready for trial, Judge Miller scheduled it to start the next day at 9:00 a.m.
Later that same day, Heacock again appeared before Judge Miller. He said that, at the urging of his family, he had decided to request that an attorney be appointed to assist him. Judge Miller appointed an attorney. At Heacock's request, trial call was rescheduled.
The case resumed with a trial call on March 8, 2004. There, Heacock's appointed attorney said that Heacock wanted a sixty-day continuance. The attorney also said that "there's a question as to whether [Heacock is] going to be pro se." When Judge Miller asked why a continuance was necessary, Heacock said that his "solicitor [was] not prepared" because the attorney had not yet talked to Heacock's witnesses. But despite his attorney's comment about proceeding pro se, Heacock did not tell Judge Miller that he wanted to represent himself. Rather, Heacock suggested that he proceed with the attorney as co-counsel.
Judge Miller, referring to an incident that had occurred earlier in the day, when Heacock had disrupted the courtroom during an unrelated case, said that he was not going to let him act as co-counsel: "You've . . . demonstrated that you cannot control yourself in the courtroom." Heacock then began to recite court rules, despite Judge Miller's request that he not do so.
When Heacock's attorney was asked if he was ready for trial, he said that he was. Heacock requested that the attorney be dismissed, arguing that he had the right to "excuse" him. After Judge Miller denied this request, Heacock asked for co-counsel status. Judge Miller denied this request, finding that Heacock could not behave himself in the courtroom, and could not follow basic rules. Heacock then exclaimed that the court was requiring him to deal with somebody involved "in violating the trading with the enemy act," and that his attorney was really only a professional truck driver. Heacock did not control himself until he was threatened with contempt of court.
Trial began the next day. The jury found Heacock guilty of both charges. Afterwards, Heacock moved for a new trial, claiming that Judge Miller, by refusing to allow him to fire his attorney, had violated Heacock's right of self-representation. He also filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the drunk driving conviction. On appeal, in lieu of filing a brief, he relies on these pleadings. Discussion
The district court did not err when it denied Heacock's request for a new trial
Heacock claims that he was entitled to a new trial. He argues that when Judge Miller denied Heacock's motion to dismiss his attorney, he precluded Heacock from representing himself at trial.
Below, Heacock's motion to dismiss his attorney was not based on an argument that Heacock wanted to represent himself, but on Heacock's assertion that his attorney was not ready for trial because he had not yet talked to Heacock's witnesses. Although Heacock asked to proceed as co-counsel, and claimed that he had a right to "excuse" his attorney, he did not argue that he wanted to dismiss his attorney so that he could represent himself.
The record shows that Heacock did not raise this argument until he filed his motion for a new trial, which Judge Miller denied without explanation. Because Heacock did not invoke his right of self-representation before trial, Judge Miller did not abuse his discretion when he denied Heacock's motion for a new trial on this ground. (The State, also relying on its trial court pleadings, mistakenly asserts that Heacock "demanded he be allowed to represent himself." But the transcript of the hearing shows that Heacock did not make this demand.)
Moreover, even if Heacock had moved to proceed pro se, the record would have supported a denial of that motion. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself. But this is a conditional right, and a trial court may deny a request for self-representation "if the defendant is not capable of conducting [his] defense without being unusually disruptive." Here, the record supports Judge Miller's finding that Heacock, when he asked to proceed as co-counsel, could not keep himself under control in the courtroom, or follow basic rules.
Lampley v. State, 33 P.3d 184, 189 (Alaska App. 2001).
Id.
There was sufficient evidence to convict Heacock of driving under the influence
Heacock next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his drunk driving conviction. Heacock recognizes that in this type of claim, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. But despite this, he argues that we must weigh the evidence that was favorable to him. He concludes that after weighing the evidence he presented against the State's evidence, we must find that "the evidence does not support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that there was no reasonable doubt as to [his] guilt."
Heacock misapprehends an appellate court's function in deciding this type of claim. The evidence that he argues contradicted the State's evidence was his testimony, and the testimony of his witnesses. This type of evidence does not "afford a basis for questioning the sufficiency of the evidence." The "assessment of witness credibility is exclusively within the province of the jury." Hence, when an appellate court reviews a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the court does not "weigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses." Rather, the appellate court, considering "only those facts in the record most favorable to the prosecution and such reasonable inferences as a jury may have drawn from them," determines whether "a fair-minded juror exercising reasonable judgment could conclude that the State met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Simpson v. State, 877 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Alaska App. 1994).
Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1974).
Harris v. Keys, 948 P.2d 460, 464 (Alaska 1997).
Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741, 747 (Alaska App. 1999).
Heacock concedes that the State's evidence showed that he "drove poorly, . . . admitted to driving, . . . stated that he did not drink alcohol [after he drove], . . . and [that] the DataMaster result [was] 0.118 [percent]." The record supports these concessions.
The State's evidence included witnesses who testified that Heacock drove erratically and admitted he had been drinking before he drove. The evidence also showed that state troopers contacted Heacock approximately fourteen minutes after his erratic driving was reported. When the troopers spoke with Heacock, his eyes were watery, "somewhat bloodshot," and he had "a moderate odor of alcohol on . . . his breath and person." A short time later, a DataMaster test showed that Heacock's blood alcohol content was .118 percent. Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict, this evidence was adequate to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that there was no reasonable doubt that Heacock was guilty of driving while under the influence. Conclusion
See Dorman, 622 P.2d at 453.
Heacock's convictions are AFFIRMED.